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ABSTRACT 
 
Pressures to Plead Guilty or Playing the System? : An Exploration of the Causes of 
Cracked Trials 
 
Daniele Alge, The University of Manchester, PhD 2009 
 
 
This thesis is an empirical exploration of cracked trials at Manchester Minshull Street 
Crown Court. Cracked trials are cases which are listed for trial but on the day they are due 
to be tried are disposed of in some other way. The thesis presents quantitative and 
qualitative data extracted from prosecution case files, as well as interviews with legal 
professionals, to examine the reasons for cracked trials, focusing on those trials which 
crack as a result of a late guilty plea. The data are analysed in order to explore the features 
of cracked trials, and the defence lawyer’s role in late guilty pleas (identified as significant 
by previous studies) is also examined.  
  
The existing literature has identified plea bargaining as a significant cause of late guilty 
pleas; the extent to which this was a feature within the sampled cases is assessed, and the 
nature of the plea bargains which were present in the data is explored. It is argued that the 
data demonstrate that plea bargaining played a key role in those cases which cracked as a 
result of a late guilty plea and that several types of plea bargain were prevalent within the 
sample.  
 
In light of these findings, the thesis analyses the reasons for the criminal justice system’s 
reluctance to acknowledge the role of plea bargaining in cracked trials (despite some recent 
formalisation of plea bargaining itself), and examines the extent to which grounds for 
policy and academic objections to plea bargaining and cracked trials were evidenced in the 
data collected. The thesis then considers whether either policy objections (that cracked 
trials represent defendants ‘playing the system’) or academic objections, (that plea bargains 
create pressure on defendants to plead guilty, and cracked trials are a manifestation of that 
pressure) are necessarily true, and whether plea bargaining could alternatively be viewed as 
a legitimate consensual or contractual exchange of concessions. 
 
The thesis concludes with the argument that a contradictory and hypocritical approach to 
plea bargaining has created a situation whereby the significance of plea bargaining is often 
ignored by a criminal justice system which has come to rely upon it. It is argued that the 
policies pursued in an attempt to reduce cracked trials are therefore flawed in their failure 
to acknowledge that cracked trials are inextricably bound together with plea bargaining.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cracked trials in the Crown Court are trials which, on the day the case is due to be tried (or 
any subsequent day of the trial before the jury retire to consider their verdict) are in fact 
not tried but are disposed of by other means; usually by a late guilty plea to either the 
original or alternative charges, or by the prosecution offering no evidence in respect of the 
case.1 This is the definition of a cracked trial used by the Judicial and Court Statistics, 
although the term is often used informally by practitioners to refer specifically to cases 
which result in a late guilty plea. Cracked trials are a common feature of the criminal justice 
system and the most recent figures show a cracked trial rate of 42% (Crown court annual 
reports, 2006 / 2007)2. They are regarded by the court system and government as an 
inefficient use of valuable resources and in recent years, a range of measures has been 
implemented to reduce the frequency with which they occur. The overwhelming emphasis 
of these measures has been to encourage defendants to plead guilty at an earlier stage in 
their cases. Defendants pleading guilty ‘at the door of the court’ are often regarded as 
‘playing the system’ in the hope that they will be able to secure a greater reduction in 
sentence or charges if they withhold their guilty plea until a later stage, when it will be 
‘worth more’ to the prosecution (despite the fact that, in theory, greater discounts are 
awarded for early guilty pleas). Alternatively, defendants may withhold their pleas in the 
hope that the prosecution might, once at court, be forced to drop the case due to a lack of 
witnesses or other evidence. The government White Paper, Justice for All stated that one of 
the key steps in ‘rebalanc[ing] the criminal justice system in favour of the victim and the 
community so as to reduce crime and bring more offenders to justice’ should be ‘new 
procedures which get the case to trial quickly, with reduced chances of the accused ‘playing 
the system’ and escaping justice if guilty’ (2002, p.15), and this has indeed been the focus of 
a number of procedures since the enactment of the 2003 Criminal Justice Act. 
 
Academic research and opinion paints, in large part, a very different picture of cracked 
trials. They are often regarded as the manifestation of pressures on defendants to plead 
                                                 
1 Cracked trials also include trials which do not proceed because the defendant is bound 
over to keep the peace, is unfit to proceed or is deceased. These types of cracked trials are 
relatively infrequent and the 2006 Judicial and Court Statistics show that in combination, 
these reasons accounted for 2% of cracked trials. No such cases were present in the 
research sample. 
2 Although 2007 / 2008 statistics are now available in the form of the Judicial and court 
statistics 2007 and Crown court annual reports for the year 2007 / 2008, where 
appropriate, figures from 2006 are referred to throughout the thesis as the data obtained 
for this study were from cases finalised in 2006. 
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guilty in that when faced with an impending trial, pressures from a variety of sources force 
defendants to ‘crack’ and change their plea to guilty in order to avoid the risk of the harsher 
penalties which would follow a conviction after trial (see for example Baldwin and 
McConville 1977; McConville et al. 1994; Belloni and Hodgson 2000; Darbyshire 2000, 
2005; Ashworth and Redmayne 2005; Sanders and Young 2007). The various pressures, 
which this thesis will discuss, tend to come together at a relatively late stage in criminal 
proceedings, once all the evidence is available and the defendant has met his trial barrister. 
From a psychological perspective, the pressures of the situation may only become a reality 
for a defendant once a trial date is approaching, or has arrived.  
 
The academic literature specifically on cracked trials in England and Wales is sparse, but 
includes the Crown Court Research Study carried out by Zander and Henderson for the 
1993 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (RCCJ, 1993) which presents primarily 
quantitative data relating to the administrative effect of cracked trials on court business, the 
Evaluation Report of the Joint Performance Management Pilot Scheme on Cracked 
Ineffective and Vacated Trials (2001) and Bredar (1992) which considers strategies for 
reducing the number of cracked trials. However, the literature on defendants’ late guilty 
pleas more generally can also be drawn on, as late guilty pleas inevitably result in cracked 
trials, and several empirical studies have explored this area (notably McCabe and Purves, 
1972; Bottoms and McClean, 1976; Baldwin and McConville 1977; McConville et al, 1994; 
Tague 2006, 2007). Baldwin and McConville’s 1977 study Negotiated Justice remains the 
classic work in the area. Its core findings were that late guilty pleas were regularly the result 
of defence barristers pressurising their own clients to plead guilty, pressure which was often 
accompanied by an implicit or explicit plea bargain. McCabe and Purves (1972) and 
Bottoms and McClean (1976) had also found evidence of plea bargaining as a cause of late 
guilty pleas although the former differed from Baldwin and McConville in their moral 
evaluation of the practice and found no evidence of undue pressure and the latter did not 
criticise the practice as vehemently as Baldwin and McConville, although they were 
sceptical of McCabe and Purves’ conclusions. McConville et al‘s 1994 study Standing Accused 
revisited the issue of legal advice and again found that defence lawyers (the focus was on 
solicitors) encouraged defendants to plead guilty, although most recently Tague (2006, 
2007) puts forward findings which are in direct opposition to what has become almost a 
general consensus within the academic literature that defence barristers encourage their 
clients to plead guilty.  
 
There is a vast body of literature on plea bargaining and the defence lawyer’s role in 
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advising on guilty pleas in the USA, which is far more developed than the UK literature, 
both in quantity and in the variety of analytical approaches; primarily because plea 
bargaining is a more widely acknowledged element of the criminal justice system in the 
USA and has been for several decades. This thesis draws on some of the theoretical 
analyses of plea bargaining to have emerged from the North American literature, and does 
refer to key empirical findings where relevant, but to make direct comparisons between the 
mechanics and structure of plea bargaining in the two systems could be misleading.3  
 
The focus of this thesis is on cracked trials which occur as a result of late guilty pleas. The 
reason for this is threefold. Firstly, on a practical level it was beyond the scope of an 
empirical doctoral thesis to explore both defendants’ late guilty pleas and prosecution 
decision making. The intention is to explore cracked trials and plea bargaining from the 
defendant’s perspective; his scope for playing the system, the pressures placed upon him, 
and his lawyer’s role.  
 
Secondly, this study explores issues which have been neglected to a certain extent and are 
in need of revisiting; in order to do this, the focus of previous studies in the area (that is, 
late guilty pleas) has been adopted to allow for some comparison with previous research. 
Thirdly, the policy response to cracked trials has focussed on those occurring as a result of 
late guilty pleas and an aspect of this thesis is to examine that policy response and the 
political context within which cracked trials operate. This is however not to say that trials 
which crack as a result of the prosecution offering no evidence are ignored; the same data 
were collected and are presented for all cases within the sample. There is a close 
relationship between what can be termed ‘defence cracks’ and ‘prosecution cracks’, as one 
                                                 
3 Key differences between the systems are that: (i) prosecutors in the USA are able to make 
recommendations of specific sentences, (ii) many offences carry minimum sentences in the 
USA, (iii) Judges often play a central role in plea bargaining in the USA, where as the 
decisions in Turner and Goodyear limit their role in England and Wales (iv) plea bargaining is 
an accepted and regulated aspect of criminal procedure in most US states, with 
accompanying guidelines (USAM United States Attorney Manual Chapter 9 – 16. In limited 
circumstances, US courts in some states will also accept pleas of guilty from defendants 
who maintain their innocence, known as ‘Alford pleas’ following the judgment in North 
Carolina v Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). In McKinnon v United States [2007] EWHC 
(Admin) 762 at para. 60, the Divisional Court expressed ‘cultural reservations’ about the 
American system of plea bargaining. It should be noted, however, that since the enactment 
of ss110 and 111 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (PCC(S)A), and 
s.51A of the Firearms Act 1968, as amended by s. 287 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a 
limited number of mandatory minimum sentences have been introduced in England and 
Wales, with the effect that if prosecutors choose to charge an offence as one which would 
attract a mandatory sentence, there is in effect a minimum sentence for that offence. 
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case can comprise of guilty pleas to some charges, and the prosecution offering no 
evidence to others.  Moreover, the way in which the proportion of defence to prosecution 
cracks is presented by policy makers (that defence cracks are seen as occurring most 
frequently and as being at the root of the ‘problem’ of the cracked trial) is of considerable 
relevance to this thesis.  
 
The research on cracked trials and plea bargaining in England and Wales, as well as on their 
relationship, is underdeveloped. There has been some recent work published although it 
draws very different conclusions to previous studies and so raises further questions (Tague 
2006, 2007). The directly applicable literature is sparse, outdated to a certain extent, and 
varied in its approach and conclusions. It raises many questions about the causes of 
cracked trials, and the role of plea bargaining within them. This is particularly pertinent at a 
time when the criminal justice system has become ever more efficiency orientated and 
measures are being introduced to reduce cracked trials at local and national levels, despite 
little evidence of their underlying causes. This thesis explores these issues and presents the 
findings of an empirical study of the prosecution case files of 151 defendants in 119 cases 
listed for trial at Manchester Minshull Street Crown Court, and interviews with ten legal 
professionals. In doing so, it highlights the gulf between the current policy approach to 
cracked trials and the realities of their causes. This study takes the approach that the 
‘causes’ of cracked trials are primarily the administrative processes and dynamics which 
lead to a trial cracking, but that these are themselves multi-layered. For example, a late 
guilty plea or a prosecution decision to offer no evidence might be the recorded cause of a 
cracked trial and the first stage in explaining why a particular trial cracked, but there may be 
underlying issues such as a reduction in the charges due to a lack of evidence, or witnesses 
not attending, which could be regarded as the underlying procedural causes. This thesis 
examines both layers of explanation, as well as their relationship to each other, in order to 
learn more about cracked trials and their interplay with plea bargaining. 
  
In order to contribute to the research in this area, this thesis therefore has four core aims: 
(i) to examine the causes of cracked trials; (ii) to assess the extent to which plea bargaining 
is a feature of cracked trials; (iii) to explore the nature of plea bargaining in the Crown 
Court; and (iv) to examine the policy response to cracked trials and plea bargaining and 
place it within the broader context of current criminal justice policy. 
 
It achieves these aims in part by exploring existing data but primarily (as existing data is 
limited), by presenting and analysing the findings of an empirical study of cracked trials and 
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plea bargaining at Manchester Minshull Street Crown Court. The existing administrative 
data compiled by the courts provide a starting point from which to examine the causes of 
cracked trials and show that, in 2006, 39% of cases nationally resulted in cracked trials 
(Judicial and Court Statistics, 2006). These same statistics also show that in 64% of these 
cases, the trial cracked as a result of the defendant pleading guilty, in 16% of cases as a 
result of the prosecution offering no evidence and in 18% of cases as a result of the 
prosecution accepting a guilty plea to an alternative charge. There are, however, 
inconsistencies within the administrative data which cast doubt over the accuracy of these 
figures. The utility of the administrative definition of cracked trials, and the validity of the 
statistics which indicate that cracked trials are caused primarily by defendants’ late guilty 
pleas are called into question in the light of this study’s empirical findings. The research 
also explores a range of other features of the cases sampled to assess whether they may 
have had an impact on the cases cracking. 
 
The thesis examines the extent to which plea bargaining is a feature of cracked trials by 
analysing the data gathered on cracked trials within the sample, particularly those caused by 
late guilty pleas, and by exploring the views recorded in interviews with legal professionals. 
The features of cases which were indicative of plea bargains having taken place (such as 
charge reductions or indications as to the maximum sentence to be imposed following a 
guilty plea) are explored in detail, and the extent of these cases as a proportion of the entire 
sample is assessed.  
 
Having established the extent to which plea bargained cases featured within the cracked 
trials investigated, the thesis moves on to explore the nature of those cases in order to put 
forward arguments as to the nature and scope of plea bargaining in the Crown court. 
Drawing on the existing literature, and on this study’s findings, four different types of plea 
bargain are identified and explored: sentence bargains arising from sentence canvassing, 
sentence bargains arising from the operation of the sentence discount, charge bargains and 
fact bargains. The wider context within which the practice operates is explored by 
evaluating how plea bargaining and cracked trials relate to the aims and objectives of 
criminal justice policy more broadly. 
 
The thesis is divided into five chapters which, in combination, serve to achieve the aims of 
the thesis in the manner set out above. The primary purpose of Chapter 1 is to review the 
literature and explore the debates surrounding cracked trials and plea bargaining as they 
currently stand. The existing administrative data on cracked trials are analysed and the 
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criminal justice system’s response to (and expectation of) the problem of the cracked trial, 
including the operation of the sentence discount principle, is analysed in terms of its utility 
and underlying rationale. The previous empirical research on plea bargaining is outlined, 
and the chapter also addresses the traditional justifications for, and criticisms of, plea 
bargaining which underlie the academic perspectives on plea bargaining. Chapter 1 also 
provides a discussion of recent criminal justice policy, including its failure to consider plea 
bargaining as at least a potential cause of cracked trials (even though plea bargaining itself 
has received some limited acknowledgement and formalisation in recent years). 
 
Chapter 2 explains the methods employed to carry out the study’s empirical research and 
discusses the benefits which flowed from the methods selected and from combining 
quantitative with qualitative methods. A quantitative analysis of Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) court files generated statistical data, and the addition of qualitative data from the 
files, as well as qualitative interview data allowed for the data as a whole to be analysed with 
greater depth and context than would otherwise have been possible. Chapter 2 also 
addresses the methodological problems which were faced during the completion of the 
study and considers the ethical issues which arose in the research design. 
 
Chapter 3 considers the issues surrounding the role of defence lawyers (barristers in 
particular) in plea bargaining and cracked trials. It analyses the relevant legal and ethical 
framework, the significance of working relationships and reputation, attitudes towards 
defendants and remuneration. In doing so, it develops the existing literature, which has not 
yet considered these factors in combination. Where possible, the chapter also evaluates 
qualitative data arising from interviews in order to add to what is known about the role of 
the defence lawyer in advising on late guilty pleas. This is an area which has repeatedly been 
identified as significant by previous literature (for example: Bottoms and McClean, 1976; 
Baldwin and McConville, 1977; McConville et al, 1994; Tague, 2006; 2007) and this study’s 
findings indicate that the way in which legal professionals view defendants’ late guilty pleas 
and cracked trials more generally, as well as defence lawyers’ perceptions of their own roles, 
is of fundamental importance in understanding cracked trials and plea bargains.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the quantitative findings of this study, alongside the qualitative data 
from CPS case files (with the exception of any data relating to lawyers). It includes data on 
the features of cracked trials including the defendants within the sample, their offences, the 
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outcomes of their cases, the evidence against them, the use of Goodyear4 indications and 
whether there appeared to be offers or agreements to plead guilty within the case; in doing 
so it contributes to the empirical findings in an under researched area. 
 
Chapter 5 analyses and interprets the data presented in Chapter 4 and assesses the extent of 
plea bargaining’s role as a cause of cracked trials within the sample. It is argued that the 
‘problem’ of the cracked trial is broader than commonly suggested, as although only 49.6% 
of the sample were defined as cracked trials under the currently adopted administrative 
definition, at least one individual count within the case ‘cracked’ in 72.2% of cases. Chapter 
5 therefore puts forward a distinction between the former (recorded cracked trials) and the 
latter (informal cracked trials). The data, both quantitative and qualitative, highlight a range 
of features within the cases sampled as having a potential bearing on cracked trials or plea 
bargaining, and these features are explored.  The chapter also challenges assumptions about 
the causes of cracked trials being predominantly a result of the defence or defendant’s 
decisions. A further contribution this chapter makes is to consider the nature of plea 
bargaining as currently practised in the Crown court, and whether the cracked trials and 
plea bargains observed justified the opprobrium with which they are viewed by policy 
makers and academia respectively. It is concluded that in many of the cases sampled, 
although plea bargains were certainly present, they were neither necessarily the product of 
defendants playing the system, nor of pressures to plead guilty. The chapter therefore also 
considers the validity of alternative conceptualisations of plea bargains as legitimate 
consensual or contractual exchanges.                                                                                
 
Throughout this thesis, the question of whether particular policies, regulations, practices 
and individuals’ cases are indicative of scope for defendants to play the system, or of 
pressures upon defendants to plead guilty, is considered. Evaluating if either were, or could 
be, present, necessarily involved some degree of subjective judgement. For example, 
determining whether an offer of a reduced charge from the CPS is a pressure to plead 
guilty to the reduced charge, or a means by which a defendant can play the system and 
escape a conviction for the more serious charge, could be a moot point in the absence of 
any reliable data from the defendant himself as to how he perceived the offer. However, 
despite the absence of such data in the present study, on an individualised case level, it was 
often possible to make an informed judgement. For example, where there appeared from 
the file to be a lack of evidence to the original charge, then a guilty plea to a lesser charge 
                                                 
4 [2005] EWCA Crim 888  
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should not, it is submitted, be seen as the defendant playing the system. If there appeared 
to be a lack of evidence to even the reduced charge, but the defendant nonetheless entered 
a guilty plea, a judgement could be made that there were some pressures extraneous to the 
evidence against the defendant which induced him to enter a guilty plea.  
 
When considering policies such as the sentence discount which operate on a systemic 
rather than (or in addition to) an individual case level, it was also possible to make 
judgements based on a consideration of the likely effects of the policy and where available, 
the findings of any existing literature. Moreover, a core conclusion of this thesis is that plea 
bargaining is a richly layered and multi-faceted practice, and this necessarily means that 
competing interests and pressures will coincide. There may be tensions between the 
individualised and systemic factors involved in late guilty pleas.  By way of illustration, a 
defendant may feel under considerable pressure to plead guilty as a result of the sentence 
discount, but on an individual level, could still feel that he has ‘played the system’ 
(benefitted in some way, at the expense of a ‘just’ outcome in terms of the sentence, the 
offence or the effect on victims) by pleading guilty to a lesser offence than the one with 
which he was originally charged, and knew himself to be guilty of. It is therefore not always 
possible to evaluate whether a particular feature of cracked trials or plea bargaining 
operates as a pressure to plead guilty or as scope to play the system in every given situation, 
because the same features have the potential to operate with different effects in different 
cases. Nonetheless, where possible, this study attempts to identify and evaluate both 
individual and systemic pressures, and potential to play the system, by drawing on the data 
collected and the existing literature to consider the likely effects of the relevant factors, and 
having regard to situations in which there could be multiple effects.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis demonstrates that the assumptions upon which the criminal 
justice policy response to cracked trials rests are flawed. There is little evidence to support 
the proposition that defendants deliberately ‘playing the system’ are a significant cause of 
cracked trials and it is argued that it is in fact lawyers, if anyone, who have more to gain 
from ‘playing the system’. There is however a great deal of evidence to suggest that plea 
bargaining is widespread and plays a pivotal role in cracked trials; at times creating an 
institutional pressure on defendants to enter a guilty plea. It is argued that the criminal 
justice system’s increasing provision of inducements to defendants to plead guilty, when 
coupled with a failure to consider the full impact of plea bargaining, despite some recent 
formalisation of the practice, makes for a hypocritical and disjointed approach both to 
cracked trials and to plea bargaining, which may pose a greater threat to due process than 
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the practice of plea bargaining itself. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
CRACKED TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING IN ENGLAND AND WALES: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the literature and debates which provide the context 
for this study. It examines the prevalence of cracked trials, their recorded causes, and 
outlines the difficulties cracked trials are perceived to create within the criminal justice 
system. The potential relationship between cracked trials and plea bargains is discussed, as 
are the methodological problems faced by anyone attempting to define or quantify plea 
bargains, particularly in the light of their relationship with cracked trials. The relevant 
literature is reviewed, and the features of the criminal justice system which are identified as 
giving rise to late guilty pleas and plea bargaining (thus leading to cracked trials), such as 
the sentence discount and sentence indications, are discussed. The chapter concludes with 
the argument that given the importance criminal justice policy places on reducing cracked 
trials, it seems illogical that their causes have not been meaningfully investigated. Despite 
some recent policy engagement with plea bargaining, the possibility of its relationship with 
cracked trials (as highlighted by research on late guilty pleas by Bottoms and McClean 
1976; Baldwin and McConville 1977; Hedderman and Moxon 1992; Zander and 
Henderson 1993) has been neglected. Courts and policy makers have instead chosen to 
maintain what has become an increasingly fragile fiction that plea bargains have no place in 
English criminal courts.    
 
1.2 Outlining the ‘problem’ of the cracked trial 
 
As stated in the introduction to this thesis, a cracked trial is a case in which ‘on the trial 
date, the defendant offers acceptable pleas or the prosecution offers no evidence. A 
cracked trial requires no further trial time…’ (Judicial and Court Statistics 2006, p.103). By 
far the most common recorded reason for a cracked trial is that the defendant enters a 
guilty plea to the original charge(s), as was the case in 64% of cracked trials in 2006. In 18% 
of cracked trials in 2006, the trial cracked when the prosecution accepted a plea of guilty to 
an alternative charge. Other reasons were that the prosecution offered no evidence (16% in 
2006) or that the defendant was bound over to keep the peace, or was unfit to proceed, or 
deceased. The cracked trial is one of three possible trial outcomes; the other two being an 
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effective trial, or an ineffective trial. An effective trial is one which goes ahead and results 
in the defendant being convicted or acquitted by a judge or a jury. An ineffective trial 
differs from a cracked trial in that the case has not been disposed of in an ineffective trial, 
and provided that the problem which led to it being ineffective can be resolved, it will be 
listed again at a later date. Common reasons for ineffective trials, which in 2006/2007 
accounted for 12% of all listed trials (see Crown Court Annual Reports 2006/2007) are: 
key witnesses failing to attend, the defendant failing to attend, or issues with trial readiness 
on the part of either the defence or the prosecution (the Judicial and Court Statistics 2006 
provide a detailed breakdown at pp. 103 – 104).   
 
The cracked trial is a common feature of the court system and, during the past four years, 
the percentage of cracked trials as a proportion of all listed trials first approached, then 
exceeded 40%, as Fig. 1.1 illustrates.  
 
Fig. 1.1: England and Wales average cracked trial rates 2000 - 20085 
 
Year 
Percentage of trials cracked 
(%) 
2000 – 2001 23.4 
2001 – 2002 24.2 
2002 – 2003 24.5 
2003 – 2004 38.3 
2004 – 2005 39.2 
2005 – 2006 38.0 
2006 – 2007 
2007 – 2008 
39.0 
42.0 
 
Fig. 1.1 also shows that there was a significant rise in the proportion of cracked trials which 
appeared to occur during the course of the 2003 – 2004 year, and the rates in subsequent 
years have remained at a comparable level. There has been no corresponding rise in the 
overall number of cases committed for trial at Crown Courts, and no apparent change in 
the way cracked trials are recorded or defined.6 There have been developments in the past 
                                                 
5 Figures taken from the relevant Crown Court Annual Reports, published by the 
Department for Constitutional Affairs, and since 2006 by the Ministry for Justice. It was 
not possible to obtain statistically comparable figures for years prior to 2000. 
6 Cases committed for trial at the Crown Court between 2001 and 2006:  
2001: 54,310 
2002: 51,672  
2003: 51,837  
2004: 48,943  
2005: 48,340  
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decade which may have had an effect on the proportion of cracked trials: the introduction 
of ‘plea before venue’ for either way cases in 1997, new legislation (the 2003 Criminal 
Justice Act in particular), changes to the Bar’s fee structure, such as the introduction of the 
Revised Advocacy Graduated Fee Scheme (RAGFS) in 2007, and schemes such as the 
Effective Trial Management Programme (ETMP). Even in combination though, these 
factors inadequately explain the sharp rise in 2003 – 2004, and indeed many of the relevant 
developments have taken place since 2003. That year is also the first year in which each 
Crown Court was required to provide a detailed breakdown of statistics relating to that 
individual court, rather than the shorter summaries published in the previous three years. 
This may be relevant as it is possible that there was an accompanying change in recording 
practices, although having spoken to court administrators at both Manchester Crown 
Courts and a civil servant in the Business Information Division of Her Majesty’s Court 
Service Performance Directorate, it appears that recording practices remained consistent 
across the period in question. 
 
These inconsistencies in the data become yet more puzzling with reference specifically to 
Manchester’s cracked trial rates, of particular interest as Manchester Minshull Street Crown 
Court cases were those sampled for this study. It is important to note that Manchester has 
relatively high cracked trial rates (discussed below, and not an inconsistency in itself); but 
the rates recorded by the Annual Crown Court Reports for the years 2000 to 2003 differ 
considerably to the rates for those same years as published by more the recent, detailed 
Court Reports compiled by Manchester Minshull Street and Manchester Crown Square 
Crown courts (the previous years’ figures are provided within the reports as a comparison). 
Figs. 1.2 and 1.3 below set out the discrepancies for Manchester Crown Square and 
Manchester Minshull Street Crown Courts respectively, by tabulating the percentages of 
cracked trial rates as published by the two sets of reports:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
2006: 47,059 
(Source: Judicial and Court Statistics 2006, Table 6.1).  
Each of the Annual Court Reports (which were first published for the 2000 – 2001 year), 
and the Judicial and Court Statistics define any case that is dealt with on the day a trial was 
scheduled to take place, but without the trial going ahead, as a cracked trial. 
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Fig.1.2: Manchester Crown Square Crown court published cracked trial rates 2000 – 2008 
 
Year Crown Square cracked 
trial rate, as published 
in 2000–2003 Annual 
Reports (%) 
Crown Square cracked 
trial rate, as published in 
2003–2007Annual 
Reports (%) 
Difference 
between 
published 
cracked trial 
rates (%) 
2000/2001 33.9 42.1 8.2 
2001/2002 30.0 41.3 11.3 
2002/2003 32.6 47.2 14.6 
2003/2004 n/a 49.2 n/a 
2004/2005 n/a 54.0 n/a 
2005/2006 n/a 49.0 n/a 
2006/2007 n/a 48.3 n/a 
2007/2008 n/a 50.5 n/a 
 
 
Fig. 1.3: Manchester Minshull Street Crown court published cracked trial rates 2000 - 2008 
 
Year Minshull Street cracked 
trial rate, as published in 
2000-2003 Annual Reports 
(%) 
Minshull Street cracked 
trial rate, as published in 
2003–2007 Annual 
Reports (%) 
Difference 
between 
published 
cracked 
trial 
rates(%) 
2000/2001 34.6 47.5 12.9 
200/2002 31.7 45.5 13.8 
2002/2003 35.8 49.7 13.9 
2003/2004 n/a 53.0 n/a 
2004/2005 n/a 52.6 n/a 
2005/2006 n/a 53.1 n/a 
2006/2007 n/a 48.9 n/a 
2007/2008 n/a 53.2 n/a 
 
Other than an administrative error, or a failure of individual courts and the then 
Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) to synchronise their recording practices, 
there appears to be no explanation for this anomaly. Lord Justice Leveson’s introduction to 
the 2006/2007 series of Annual Reports states (at p.2) that ‘real problems’ in relation to the 
accuracy of statistical information had been reported, although no reference is made to 
cracked trial rates specifically.7 
                                                 
7 The 2006 Judicial and Court Statistics published by the Ministry of Justice contain the 
following caveat, which may also have some bearing on these inconsistencies: ‘The Ministry 
of Justice publications ‘Criminal Statistics 2006’ (CS) and ‘Judicial and Court Statistics 2006’ 
(JCS) both contain data on the number of proceedings heard in the Crown Court. 
However, while both sets of figures are produced from the same core source (the CREST 
system used to administer Crown Court cases), they are not directly comparable as there 
are known differences between them. These are due to a number of factors, including 
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One conclusion which can reliably be drawn from these statistics, despite the 
inconsistencies, is that both Manchester Crown Courts have had consistently higher rates 
of cracked trials than the national average, and Lord Justice Leveson, the Senior Presiding 
Judge for England and Wales, expressed his concern that the North West of England has 
cracked trial rates well above the national average (Crown and County Courts Annual 
Report 2006/2007, p.5) and cracked trial rates increased again during the 2007 / 2008 year, 
at both of Manchester’s Crown courts. Manchester’s high cracked trial rates are, however, 
not out of the ordinary when set against those from the relatively comparable Crown 
Courts (that is, busy urban court centres) at Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds, Nottingham or 
Sheffield, as Fig. 1.4  below demonstrates:  
 
Fig. 1.4: Cracked trial rates 2006 – 2007; Manchester Crown Courts and comparable court 
centres 
 
Court Cracked trial rate, 
2006–2007 (%) 
Manchester Minshull Street 48.9 
Manchester Crown Square 48.3 
Birmingham 48.5 
Leeds 51.8 
Liverpool 45.7 
Nottingham 44.6 
Sheffield 57.7 
England and Wales average 39.0 
 
Despite the absence of any conclusive evidence on the effects of cracked trials, they are 
viewed as a challenge to the criminal justice system by policy makers and court 
administrators. Manchester Crown Courts have achieved considerable success in reducing 
ineffective trial rates, but cracked trials appear to present an ongoing problem, even for 
court centres with measurable achievements and improvements in case management.8 The 
perceived costs incurred by cracked trials, seen as wastage by the government, are a primary 
concern for criminal justice managers. Figures from the then Department for 
Constitutional Affairs estimate that every cracked Crown Court case costs £1608 in lost 
                                                                                                                                               
differences in the data collation mechanics and the counting and validation rules used…’ 
(p.97).  
8 Manchester Minshull Street Crown Court reduced its ineffective trial rate from 27.4% in 
2002 to 13.5% in 2007, and Manchester Crown Square Crown Courts reduced its 
ineffective trial rate from 21% to 14% in the same period, with both courts demonstrating 
consistent, year on year reductions (Crown Court Annual Reports 2006/2007). 
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and wasted court time (DCA, 2005). A raft of measures has accordingly been introduced, 
predominantly since the mid to late 1990’s in order to reduce the number of cracked trials 
and their associated costs.9  
 
One tool which has been employed to reduce cracked trials is the Plea and Case 
Management Hearing (PCMH), (previously the Plea and Directions Hearing (PDH)), 
introduced to all Crown Court cases in 1995. One purpose of this pre-trial hearing is to 
elicit an indication of plea from the defendant. If the defendant wishes to plead guilty, the 
judge can proceed to sentencing there and then. If no guilty plea is entered, the judge, with 
assistance from counsel, ascertains the likely issues in the case and gives any necessary 
directions. Defence counsel is obliged to complete a standardised form, the first question 
of which is ‘Has the defendant been advised about credit for pleading guilty?’ (The 
Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction, Annex E). It is clear that the courts are keen to 
sift out those cases which would potentially result in cracked or ineffective cases if they 
were allowed to proceed to trial. On a local level, Crown Courts have also been encouraged 
to manage their case loads proactively in order to more accurately identify potential cracked 
trials before they occur. One such measure was a ‘Good Practice: Cracked and Ineffective 
Trials’ pamphlet published in 2006 by Her Majesty’s Courts Inspectorate (HMCI), outlining 
ways in which courts could reduce their cracked and ineffective trial rates. One suggestion 
(at p.2 of the guide) was removing financial disincentives for the defence to resolve cases 
early, by listing cases identified as potential cracks for mention pre-trial, and paying the 
defence advocate the cracked trial or first day of trial rate (a higher rate than that which 
would usually be paid if a guilty plea was entered at a pre-trial stage) if the trial cracked at 
this earlier hearing. The pamphlet suggests that courts should identify those types of cases 
which ‘are more prone to cracking’ and gives the examples of public order and domestic 
violence offences (at p.1). It illustrates how grave a problem cracked trials are perceived to 
be, and also assumes that defence lawyers have financial incentives to allow or to encourage 
                                                 
9 The Evaluation Report of the Joint Performance Management Pilot Scheme on Cracked 
Ineffective and Vacated Trials (2001) reported on a form to be completed by court staff 
and defence and prosecution advocates detailing the reasons for the crack, which is now in 
use as the Cracked and Ineffective Trial Monitoring From (known as a CITM). The 
evaluation report recommended some amendments to the form to make it reflect more 
accurately the reasons for trials cracking, so that the forms might be a useful tool in 
monitoring (and ultimately reducing) cracked trials. However, although the forms are in 
use, whilst carrying out this research, I was told on several occasions by court staff and 
CPS case workers that they were rarely completed in sufficient detail to be of any 
assistance, and although there should, in theory, be a copy of the CITM form kept 
alongside the case files of cases which have cracked, they were only present in four of the 
119 case files I had sight of for this study. 
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a case to proceed initially, but then crack on the date listed for trial. Tague (2006, 2007) has 
argued that even under the Graduated Fee Scheme (GFS) for barristers, as amended in 
2005 and revised in 2007 to become the Revised Advocacy Graduated Fee Scheme 
(RAGFS), this is not necessarily the case, and that there are other competing incentives for 
lawyers, such a developing a reputation for good advocacy and winning rather than 
negotiating cases, which may be more powerful.10 
 
A striking feature of the way in which criminal justice policy has responded to the cracked 
trial is the assumption that cracked trials are more often than not caused by the deliberate 
actions (or inaction) of defendants and/or their lawyers. Lord Justice Auld refers to the 
‘uncooperative or feckless defendant and/or his defence advocate who considers that the 
burden of proof and his client's right to silence justifies frustration of the orderly 
preparation of both sides' case for trial’ (Auld Report, 2001, para. 9). This view appears to 
be widely held: the Courts Inspectorate pamphlet mentioned above suggests that court 
managers should analyse cracked trials in terms of the presence of specific defence 
solicitors or chambers involved (having first informed the solicitors or chambers) then 
check with other local courts to establish whether those firms or chambers have high 
cracked trial rates there too. If so, the pamphlet recommends forwarding the results to the 
Criminal Defence Service (HMCI 2006, p.2). The reasoning follows that if the defence have 
no financial incentives to hold off a guilty plea until the trial, and would in fact be 
sanctioned for doing so, cracked trial rates will fall. This begs the question of whether 
defendants or defence lawyers should bear any responsibility for the administrative 
expediency of the criminal justice system. The Code of Conduct for the Bar of England 
and Wales states that ‘A practising barrister has an overriding duty to the Court to act with 
independence in the interests of justice: he must assist the court in the administration of 
justice…’ (8th edn., 2004, para 302). (The ethical dilemmas inherent in this overriding 
responsibility to the court and the court’s goals, rather than to the client, are discussed at 
Chapter 3). Defendants are bound by no such code though, and to require defendants to 
take part in the smooth running of their own trials is both cynical and naïve.  
 
Furthermore, the assumptions upon which the Auld report’s reasoning rests are by no 
means supported by overwhelming evidence. The report of the 1993 Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice states authoritatively that ‘the most common reason for defendants 
delaying a plea of guilty until the last minute is a reluctance to face the facts until they are at 
                                                 
10 See Chapter 3 for further discussion of Tague’s research, and (dis)incentives for lawyers 
to ‘crack’ trials generally. 
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the door of the court’ (RCCJ, 1993, p. 111, para. 45). The Royal Commission, however, 
had commissioned a study of the Crown Court, but appear to have neglected the fact that 
that study, when questioning defence solicitors, found that in only 6% of cases where there 
was a late notification of plea was the reason given that the defendant had changed his 
mind. The most common reasons were that an earlier consultation with the client was 
impossible or had not taken place (31%) or that there had been a change in the 
prosecution’s approach (28%) (Zander and Henderson 1993, p.148). 
 
Even the assumption that cracked trials create serious problems is not beyond question. 
Zander and Henderson’s Crown Court study found that 81% of judges surveyed said none 
of their court time was wasted as a result of cracked trials (1993, p.154). Particularly at large 
court centres, there will be sufficient ‘floating’ cases (cases which are not listed for a 
particular time or court room, but which are placed on a waiting list to be heard that day, 
on the assumption that some cases will crack and courts and court staff will become 
available) on the list to be heard if a court room and judge become available. Of course, 
this only takes into account one kind of wastage and does not take into account the 
inconvenience to victims and other witnesses, which the Royal Commission gave particular 
weight to.11 Even prosecutors were not necessarily of the view that cracked trials presented 
a problem for the efficient running of the courts. Sixty-four per cent felt that cracked trials 
were ‘good’, and 34% that they were ‘satisfactory’ (Zander and Henderson, 1993, p.156). 
  
Undoubtedly, a high proportion of trials crack, and this is viewed as a significant challenge 
for court administration, regardless of the fact that some research suggests that the effects 
of cracked trials need not necessarily be viewed as a problem. It is nonetheless true that 
even if floating trials are ready to fill the gap in the court lists, thereby minimising the time 
and money ‘wasted’ by cracked trials, the time of victims and other witnesses is still wasted, 
and a great deal of time and resources may have been expended preparing the case for trial. 
The assumption that ‘feckless’ defendants, or ‘uncooperative’ defence lawyers cause 
cracked trials is, however, unsubstantiated and there is insufficient evidence for the 
assumption to be held out as fact. The underlying assumption that defendants cause 
cracked trials is therefore assessed and challenged throughout this thesis. 
 
One of the most notable means of encouraging guilty pleas has always been the sentence 
                                                 
11 ‘Cracked trials create serious problems, principally for all the thousands of witnesses each 
year…who come to court expecting a trial only to find that there is no trial because the 
defendant has decided to plead guilty at the last minute’ (RCCJ, 1993, p. 111, para. 45). 
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discount, and in 1980 Boyd clarified that ‘…the court encourages pleas of guilty by 
knocking something off the sentence which would have been imposed if there had not 
been a plea of guilty’.12 The current structure of the sentence discount should in theory 
provide defendants with an incentive to plead guilty early, before the case comes to trial, 
and the section below examines the operation of the sentence discount and the graduated 
sentence discount introduced by the Sentencing Guidelines Council (SGC) in 2004.  
 
1.3 The sentence discount  
 
The sentence discount occupies a unique and paradoxical position in relation to cracked 
trials: it is both a cause of cracked trials and a measure used in an attempt to reduce them. 
It is a cause of cracked trials because it encourages guilty pleas, and if these guilty pleas 
occur at a sufficiently late stage, a cracked trial results. That the sentence discount explicitly 
encourages and rewards guilty pleas is undeniable. It has been an established convention of 
sentencing that a guilty plea will attract a discount of around one third on the punishment 
which would have been imposed following conviction upon a not guilty plea.13 The 
rationale has traditionally been that the defendant is rewarded for saving the time, expense 
and trauma to the victim of a trial, but primarily that it rewards remorse. In reality, it 
operates to punish those who exercise their right to a trial. The case law on sentence 
discounts is relatively clear. In Cain it was stated that it was trite to say that in general terms 
a guilty plea would attract a lesser sentence than a plea of not guilty after a full-dress 
contest on the issue. The court stated that there was no doubt about this and accused 
persons should be made aware of it, the sooner the better.14 This was described by 
McConville as the ‘most celebrated statement of the overriding importance of 
administrative considerations’ in criminal justice (1998, p.564). Cain was affirmed in 1980 
by Boyd.15 
 
In 1994, the sentence discount principle was consolidated on a statutory basis by s.48 of 
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, which provided that in determining the sentence 
for an offender who had pleaded guilty, the court should take into account the stage in 
proceedings at which the defendant pleaded guilty, the circumstances in which the 
intention to plead was given and that, if taking account of the above, the court imposed a 
                                                 
12 Boyd (William Henry) (1980) 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 234, per Cumming-Bruce LJ at 234. 
13 Cain [1976] Crim LR 464 CA. See also Boyd (William Henry) (1980) 2 Cr App Rep (S) 234; 
Hollington and Emmens (1985) 7 Cr App Rep (S) 364 
14 [1976] Crim LR 464  
15 n. 13 supra 
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lesser sentence than it would otherwise have done, the judge should state in open court 
that this was the case. That provision then became s.152 of the consolidating Powers of 
Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (PCC(S)A), and is now s.144 of the 2003 Criminal 
Justice Act (CJA), which does not include the requirement that the judge should state 
reasons for the lesser sentence in open court.16 Section 144(2) of the CJA 2003 also 
contains the provision that a discount (of no more than 20%) can still be given for a guilty 
plea to one of the offences specified in s.110 and s.111 of the PCC(S)A – despite the fact 
that these are intended to be mandatory minimum sentences.17 It seems that the 
government is willing to sacrifice an element of its ‘tough on crime’ agenda in exchange for 
maximising the number of guilty pleas.  
 
Increasing the number of guilty pleas alone does nothing to remedy the problem of the 
cracked trial though, particularly as an essentially unregulated and discretionary discounting 
process ensured that sizeable discounts were still to be had in many cases even if the guilty 
plea was entered at a very late stage. In theory, the earlier the guilty plea was entered, the 
greater the discount which would be applied, but research found that in practice there was 
no demonstrable advantage to pleading guilty early in order to secure a greater discount 
(Baldwin and McConville 1978; Moxon 1988). The government has therefore sought to 
increase the degree to which the sentence discount encourages early guilty pleas by the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council’s introduction in 2004 of the graduated sentence discount, 
now the updated Reduction in Sentence for Guilty Plea Revised Guideline which was 
published in July 2007. The Guideline states that the level of reduction should operate on a 
sliding scale from one third where the plea is entered at the ‘first reasonable opportunity’, 
to one quarter where the trial date has been set, and to a recommended one tenth for a 
guilty plea entered ‘at the door of the court’ or after the trial has begun (SGC 2007, para. 
4.2). It remains to be seen whether judges will adhere to these recommendations or 
whether they will use their discretion and award larger discounts, even for late guilty pleas. 
It was held in Last,18 decided after the publication of the 2004 Guideline, that the Guideline 
was intended to assist judges but that it could be departed from if valid reasons for doing 
so were given, and it seems unlikely that the ostensible standardisation of the sentence 
                                                 
16 The principle of the sentence discount had, until 1993, been a firm fixture in the Crown 
Court but was of little significance in the magistrates’ Court. However, the Magistrates’ 
Sentencing Guidelines published that year formalized the principle that a ‘timely’ guilty plea 
may be a mitigating factor for which a discount of approximately 1/3 may be given. 
17 s.110 specifies a minimum of 7 years imprisonment for a 3rd Class A drug trafficking 
offence; s.111 a minimum of three years for a third domestic burglary. 
18 [2005] EWCA Crim 106 
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discount principle will have ensured the complete uniformity of its application. 
 
Perhaps the most striking feature of SGC’s 2007 Guideline is that it explicitly states that 
‘the reduction principle derives from the need for the efficient administration of justice and 
not as an aspect of mitigation’ (para. 2.2). Previously, in cases such as Cain and Boyd, the 
courts had emphasised that a significant justification for the sentence discount was that a 
guilty plea showed an element of remorse, which was deserving of recognition.19 This 
emphasis on remorse no longer holds true: irrespective of whether it achieves its aims, the 
sentence discount now exists purely to encourage early guilty pleas, reduce cracked trials, 
and save money. The administrative function of the discount is highlighted further by 
paragraph 2.1 of the Guideline which states that ‘the final sentence after the reduction for 
the guilty plea will be less than the seriousness of the offence requires’; clear evidence that 
the goal of encouraging early guilty pleas outweighs the principle of just deserts. The 
Guideline states that full credit (that is, up to one third) will be given if the plea is entered 
at the ‘first reasonable opportunity’, which the explanatory Annex suggests may be very 
early, possibly even at the police station (SGC 2007, Annex 1, p.10). Any encouragement 
(or pressure) to plead guilty which is created by the sentence discount has therefore been 
moved to an early stage of the criminal process (and one at which little may be known 
about the strength of either the defence or the prosecution case), if the defendant is to 
benefit from a ‘full’ discount. In A and B, the Court of Appeal stated that a defendant can 
receive an ‘extra’ discount by cooperating with the authorities by, for example, testifying 
against co-accused or providing information which leads to the suppression of other 
serious crime. The greatest discounts are available to those who put the safety of 
themselves of their families at risk by cooperating with the authorities.20 
 
Much of the available literature points to the sentence discount as being either prima facie 
evidence of the practice of plea bargaining (see for example Partington 2008, pp.126 – 
127). Duff et al. describe the sentence discount as ‘the core of what we have called plea-
bargaining strictly speaking’ (2007, p. 174). Others at least as a feature which encourages 
guilty pleas and is conducive to plea bargaining (Darbyshire 2000; Ashworth and Redmayne 
2005, Ashworth and Blake 2006; Sanders and Young 2007). Sanders and Young describe it 
as ‘[t]he most naked attempt to persuade defendants to plead guilty’ (2007, p. 385). 
Moreover, the sentence discount is undoubtedly a nexus which links cracked trials to plea 
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 Cain [1976] Crim LR 464 CA; Boyd (William Henry) (1980) 2 Cr App Rep (S) 234. 
 
20 [1998] Crim LR 757 
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bargaining; it encourages guilty pleas, which will often result in a cracked trial (it remains to 
be seen whether the graduated sentence discount will in fact reduce cracked trials), and, 
dependent on one’s definition of a plea bargain, its operation can also be seen as a form of 
plea bargaining in its own right, which is the approach taken by this thesis (definitions of 
plea bargaining are discussed at 1.5 below).   
 
1.4 The relationship between cracked trials and plea bargaining 
 
The nature of the relationship between cracked trials and plea bargaining has not been 
expressly considered by previous research. None of the government publications on 
cracked trials make any reference to plea bargaining as a possible cause of cracked trials, 
which may be indicative of the fact that the relationship is a sensitive political issue. The 
government has been reluctant to openly acknowledge the use of plea bargaining, which is 
in stark contrast to the academic literature which argues for the most part that the use of 
plea bargaining in England and Wales is very much a reality, and has been for some time 
(see for example Bottoms and McClean 1976; Baldwin and McConville 1977; McConville 
et al. 1994; McConville 1998; Darbyshire, 2000; Ashworth 2006; Sanders and Young 2007). 
There have, however, been some recent developments which suggest that the government 
may be moving towards implementing a more formal role for plea bargaining in limited 
circumstances. The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, ss.71 – 73 allows the 
prosecution to enter into written agreements with suspects or defendants who assist law 
enforcement by providing evidence, or by some other means, and the court is entitled to 
give credit for that agreement. In addition, Lady Scotland, the Attorney-General, 
announced proposals in March 2008, which have now come into effect, for plea 
‘negotiations’ in serious fraud cases whereby the prosecution and defence can negotiate the 
agreed level of the defendant’s culpability, and sentencing options. The judge is not bound 
to accept the outcome of the negotiations and can insist on a trial. Lady Scotland has 
attempted to distance the procedure from plea ‘bargaining’ and stated that ‘[T]his is 
absolutely not plea bargaining, it is plea negotiation’ (The Times, 4th April 2008), and the 
consultation document circulated prior to the procedure coming into use makes reference 
to the negative connotations of the term plea ‘bargaining’ (Attorney General’s Office 
2008), and it has accordingly been referred to as plea ‘negotiation’ since. Whilst this is not 
quite an acknowledgement of plea bargaining, it comes close. These recent measures have, 
however, not made the link between cracked trials and plea bargaining, save that the fraud 
consultation document expressed the hope that a system of plea negotiation could lead to 
earlier guilty pleas; there is no mention of the existing relationship between late guilty pleas 
 33 
and plea bargaining.  
 
This thesis takes the standpoint that there is a clear relationship between plea bargaining 
and cracked trials.21 Cracked trials are the ideal forum for plea bargains. In the UK, plea 
bargains are likely to be struck at the last minute; there is still little incentive to plead guilty 
or to strike bargains at a particularly early stage. Although earlier guilty pleas should attract 
greater sentence discounts (at least in theory) this may not be an immediate incentive if the 
defendant believes there is a chance of acquittal, or perceives that greater discounts are to 
be had later on in the process. It would be counterintuitive to negotiate any kind of 
agreement without first knowing the strength of one’s own position, and that of the other 
party, and in many criminal cases this knowledge will not be available until the day of the 
trial, as a great deal may hinge on whether prosecution and defence witnesses attend, and 
this can not be known prior to the trial date. Moreover, the literature points to the 
significance of the barrister’s role in advising on plea (Bottoms and McClean 1976; Baldwin 
and McConville 1977; McConville et al. 1994; McConville 1998; Ashworth and Blake 1998; 
Tague 2006, 2007).22 With this in mind, Zander and Henderson’s finding that defendants 
did not meet their barrister until the day of the trial in 70% of cases in which the defendant 
subsequently pleaded guilty on the day of the trial, becomes all the more significant (1993, 
p. 1732). If the barrister does play a pivotal role in facilitating plea bargains, and defending 
counsel meets the defendant at court for the first time, which is also the time at which the 
prosecutor will be present, it is inevitable that if a plea bargain is struck, it will result in a 
cracked trial. This relationship has been under researched, but Baldwin and McConville’s 
Negotiated Justice (1977) set a precedent for using cracked trials as a means of investigating 
plea bargaining, insofar as it was the high rate of cracked trials observed during the course 
of another study which led the authors to investigate the causes, and to conclude that a 
primary cause was plea bargaining.  
 
The nexus between plea bargaining and cracked trials is relatively straightforward 
conceptually, but can be problematic methodologically. A bargained for plea is difficult to 
                                                 
21 It is interesting to note that in an article about cracked trials, which does not discuss plea 
bargaining, Bredar describes the process of a trial cracking much as one might describe the 
process of plea negotiation between barristers: ‘what generally happens is that prosecuting 
and defending counsel compare views on the strengths and weaknesses of their respective 
cases, and, in an indirect way, discuss what it would take from each side to get the case to 
‘crack’. Counsel come to a unified view of what would be an appropriate settlement of the 
matter.’ (1992, p.155). 
22 Tague (2006, 2007) draws significantly differing conclusions to those of the other studies, 
and argues that it is not in barristers’ interests to encourage guilty pleas. See Chapter 3. 
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define, which is compounded by the fact that it is not yet a fully acknowledged feature of 
the English criminal justice system. This results in an absence of applicable administrative 
statistics, other than guilty plea and cracked trial rates, which in isolation can not paint a 
picture of the nature or extent of plea bargaining. Not every cracked trial is a plea bargain; 
not least because trials are also deemed to be cracked when the prosecution offer no 
evidence, or the defendant is bound over, or is unfit or deceased. However, most 
academics have put forward, or at least support, a definition of plea bargaining which 
incorporates implicit bargaining, which would include a guilty plea with some expectation 
of a lighter sentence. This would mean that every guilty plea entered in England and Wales 
with an awareness that the sentence discount exists, would be a plea bargain. As recorded 
statistics for 2006 show that guilty pleas to the original or an alternative charge account for 
around 80% of cracked trials, it would follow that 80% of cracked trials were the result of 
plea bargaining.23 It should be borne in mind though that this may be a simplistic view to 
take when little is known about defendants’ motivations, the effect of the sentence 
discount on their decisions, and what proportion of defendants would have pleaded guilty 
in any case.24 It is therefore necessary to clarify what is meant by the term plea bargaining, 
and to review the literature which considers the issue.  
 
1.5 Defining Plea Bargaining 
 
Much of the law, literature and research refers to ‘plea bargaining’ without placing the 
phenomenon within any definitive boundaries. Of the limited case law, only Turner and 
Goodyear consider the concept of plea bargaining in any depth and even these cases provide 
little assistance in conceptualising plea bargaining in England and Wales.25 The judgment in 
the leading case of Turner mentions what is referred to as the ‘vexed question of so-called 
‘plea-bargaining’’, but no attempt is made to explain what is meant by the term and the 
judgment in Turner confines itself to the type of advice which counsel may give clients and 
                                                 
23 The Judicial and Court Statistics 2006 (at p.103) record 64% of cracked trials in 2006 as 
being due to the defendant pleading guilty on the trial date, and 18% being due to the 
prosecution accepting a plea of guilty to an alternative charge. 
24 The Criminal Justice: Working Together Report by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General. (London: The Stationery Office, 1999) made the recommendation that to reduce 
cracks, the Home Office and the then Lord Chancellor’s Department should collect 
information on the use of sentence discounts and evaluate their impact on defendant 
behaviour, and review whether the system could be improved. To date, this 
recommendation has not been acted upon.  
25 Turner [1970] 2 Q.B. 321; Goodyear [2005] EWCA Crim 888 
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the propriety of judicial indications of sentence, without addressing any wider issues.26 
More recently, in Goodyear, whilst delineating the extent to which the judiciary may give 
advance indications of sentence, the Court of Appeal restricts itself to stating that the judge 
‘is not to be asked to indicate levels of sentence which he may have in mind depending on 
possible different pleas’.27 The court effectively limited itself by refraining from going 
beyond this narrow concept of what plea bargaining might be and bypassed an opportunity 
to consider the legality and wider role of plea bargaining. 
 
Some of the empirical research is more instructive in defining and distinguishing between 
different forms of negotiated plea but previous studies in England and Wales have taken  
varied approaches to defining plea bargaining. Baldwin and McConville introduce their 
study by making reference to the fact that there was at that time no knowledge of the 
precise forms that plea bargaining could take (1977, vii). The authors’ analysis of their 
empirical findings led them to discern four categories of late guilty plea: i) no deal or 
pressure: defendant guilty as pleaded; ii) plea bargain: offer made and accepted and benefit 
accrues to the defendant; iii) no explicit bargain but the defendant thinks or assumes that a 
bargain has been struck on his behalf; and iv) pressure from barrister but no specific offer 
made to the defendant. Types ii) and iii) were therefore the two categories of guilty plea 
which could most readily be described as plea ‘bargaining’. Bottoms and McClean felt that 
‘the essence of plea bargaining is that the defendant agrees to plead guilty to at least one 
charge in return for some concession by the prosecution’ (1976, p.123), and McCabe and 
Purves (1972) identified two varieties of plea bargain: (i) involving a judicial indication as to 
sentence and (ii) situations where counsel’s advice, discussions and negotiations led to a 
defendant pleading guilty. It is interesting to note though that Bottoms and McClean 
regarded the latter as ‘plea changing’ rather than ‘plea bargaining’ (1976, p.128). 
 
The term ‘plea bargaining’ has become the accepted term in the academic literature to 
denote a range of types of negotiated settlement in criminal cases and as demonstrated 
above, empirical studies have differed in their identified categories of plea bargain.28 A 
degree of consensus is nonetheless present in the literature (see in particular: Darbyshire 
                                                 
26 Turner [1970] 2 Q.B. 321 at 326 
27 Goodyear [2005] EWCA Crim 888 at 67 
28 There is a considerable body of literature on plea bargaining in the USA which explores 
what ‘plea bargains’ are, on normative, prescriptive, and theoretical levels. See for example 
Miller, McDonald and Cramer (1978), McDonald (1979), Nardulli, Fleming and Eisenstein 
(1985), Scott and Stuntz (1992a) and Schulhofer (1992). Newman (1956) provides one of 
the first categorisations of different types of plea bargain in the USA. 
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2000; McConville 2002; Ashworth  and Redmayne 2005; Sanders and Young 2007; Cownie 
et al. 2007; Partington 2008) and the primary distinctions are between charge, fact, 
‘straightforward’ plea bargaining, and sentence bargaining, though there is a great deal of 
overlap, in particular between the latter two types. These distinctions are outlined below. 
 
1.5.1 Differentiating between charge, fact, ‘straightforward’, and sentence bargaining 
 
Charge bargaining occurs when a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a prosecutorial 
agreement to reduce the severity and/or number of charges and the CPS has a wide 
discretion to drop or reduce charges. The Code for Crown Prosecutors states that 
prosecutors should select charges which: reflect the seriousness and extent of the 
offending; give the court adequate powers to sentence and impose appropriate post-
conviction orders; and enable the case to be presented in a clear and simple way, and that 
this means that ‘Crown Prosecutors may not always choose or continue with the most 
serious charge where there is a choice’ (CPS, 2004, at para. 7.1.). The Code does, however, 
also state that ‘Crown Prosecutors should never go ahead with more charges than are 
necessary just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a few. In the same way, they 
should never go ahead with a more serious charge just to encourage a defendant to plead 
guilty to a less serious one’ (para. 7.2). There is a limited degree of judicial oversight of the 
practice, and in Soanes, Lord Goddard stated that ‘it must always be at the discretion of the 
judge whether he will allow [a plea of guilty to a lesser offence] to be accepted’.29 In those 
situations where the accused pleads guilty to some counts on the indictment in exchange 
for the prosecution offering no evidence on others, the rule appears to be that the 
prosecution is bound by the judge’s views of the bargain only if counsel has expressly asked 
him to approve it in advance. The Court of Appeal held in Grafton that a trial judge was 
powerless to prevent counsel dropping or reducing charges except where counsel has 
sought judicial approval for the proposed deal, meaning that the barristers would essentially 
have a free reign to negotiate between themselves with little check on the nature or 
outcome of their negotiations, other than that the defendant need at least appear to make a 
voluntary and informed plea.30 In Herbert, the Court of Appeal went further and held that 
the practice of the Crown indicating that they would be willing to accept pleas of guilty to 
lesser offences was not only acceptable, but had long been part of the prosecutor’s public 
duty.31 This indicates that the swift disposal of cases is seen as being in the public interest, 
                                                 
29 (1948) 32 Cr App R 136 
30
 [1993] Q.B. 101 
31
 (1991) 94 Cr App Rep 2 
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and charge bargains (whether or not the CPS chooses to call them such), are a firmly 
established feature of the criminal courts.  
 
Fact bargains have been described by Ashworth and Redmayne as lying half-way between 
charge bargains and what they refer to as ‘straightforward’ plea bargaining (2005, p. 274).  
A fact bargain occurs when, in exchange for a plea of guilty, the prosecution agrees to 
present a certain version of the facts, for example to not mention a particular aggravating 
factor, or to accept that the offence was committed recklessly rather than with intent, 
(which would have a bearing on sentencing) and prosecutors have a wide discretion to 
present the facts in the manner they feel is appropriate. A basis of plea, where a defendant 
makes a written statement which is agreed by all parties to be a representation of the factual 
basis of the plea (and resulting sentence) equates to a fact bargain. What Ashworth and 
Redmayne refer to as ‘straightforward’ plea bargains are situations where there is no 
bargain related to the charge or the facts, but the defendant simply pleads guilty in the 
expectation of a lower sentence, as is provided for by the principle of the sentence discount 
(2005, p.275). (See also Darbyshire 2000; McConville 2002; Sanders and Young 2007, 
pp.385-401; Partington 2008, pp.385-401).   
 
Particularly in the North American context, much of the literature refers to the additional 
category of the sentence bargain, whereby a plea of guilty is exchanged for the promise of a 
lower sentence, and often a specified maximum sentence. In England and Wales, 
prosecutors have no power to recommend specific sentences and the discretion lies in the 
hands of the judge. Sentence bargaining in England is therefore much the same as 
straightforward plea bargaining, in that a guilty plea is entered in the hope of a lower 
sentence; an expectation which is generally matched. It could be argued, however, that the 
introduction of maximum sentence indications by the judgment in Goodyear32 makes the 
concept of sentence bargaining as distinct from ‘straightforward’ plea bargaining a reality in 
England and Wales. It could also be argued that the introduction of a limited number of 
mandatory minimum sentences in England and Wales has also contributed to the 
likelihood of a type of sentence bargaining. Section 110 of the PCC(S)A 2000 provides for 
a minimum custodial sentence of seven years for a third class A drug trafficking offence, 
and s.111 a minimum custodial sentence of three years for third domestic burglary. Section 
287 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 amended the Firearms Act 1968 and inserted s.51A, 
which introduced a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment for the 
                                                 
32 R v Goodyear [2005] EWCA Crim 888.  
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possession, purchase, acquisition, manufacture, transfer or sale of prohibited weapons. 
However, the judge has discretion not to impose the minimum custodial sentences if he is 
of the opinion that there are circumstances which relate to the offences or to the offender 
which would make it unjust to do so, and if so, the particular circumstances must be stated 
in open court. Mandatory minimum sentences have proved unpopular and have been rarely 
used by judges, who in the majority of cases have found reason to state that their 
imposition would be unjust in the circumstances (see eg. Jones and Newburn 2006). 
Nonetheless, their existence does make the prospect of sentence bargaining of a more 
American nature, where the prosecution may offer to accept a guilty plea to a reduced 
charge so that the defendant can avoid falling foul of a mandatory sentence, a possibility in 
the UK. 
Despite it being possible to establish a level of clarity as to several different types of plea 
bargain, there is no accepted catch-all definition of a plea bargain, although the US 
literature has turned to this matter frequently and in considerable depth over the past 
decades. Newman’s distinction between implicit and explicit bargaining (1966) marked a 
key stage in the development of theory in this area, and his inclusion of implicit bargaining 
provided the framework within which a range of negotiations and types of behaviour could 
be conceived of as plea bargaining. This was developed by Goldstein and Marcus’ research 
which documented that even in jurisdictions where explicit plea bargaining was not 
prevalent (such as England), and defendants were not able to negotiate directly, they 
learned about a regular pattern of expectations and that they could expect greater leniency 
if they did not challenge the prosecution case (1977, p. 278). Friedman also found ‘ample 
evidence of ‘implicit plea bargaining’’ in his study of historical plea bargaining in California 
(1978, p.247). Miller, McDonald and Cramer put forward the broad definition of a plea 
bargain as ‘a defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to a criminal charge with the reasonable 
expectation of receiving some consideration from the state’ (1978, p.2). More recently, 
Vogel (2007) has published research which incorporates what she terms ‘tacit’ bargaining 
and argues that guilty pleas are induced by an expectation of leniency, but that it is not 
necessary for leniency to actually be awarded in every case in order for the practice to 
operate. As discussed above, given the existence of the sentence discount, this would mean 
that every guilty plea entered in the knowledge that a discounted sentence would result, was 
a plea bargain. Without interviewing defendants about the impact the sentence discount 
had on their decision to plead guilty, it is, however, impossible to know whether every guilty 
plea is effectively a bargain with the state, induced by the expectation of leniency. 
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This raises the issue of whether plea bargaining is to be defined on a systemic or on an 
individual, case by case level. This thesis submits that on a systemic level, every guilty plea 
(even where there is no explicit bargaining of facts or charges, or pressure from a legal 
advisor) is a plea bargain. The inducements to plead guilty provided for by the criminal 
justice system (the sentence discount in particular) ensure that guilty pleas are generally 
rewarded, and even if they are not rewarded in each individual case, defendants enter guilty 
pleas in the expectation that they will receive a more lenient sentence, and are thus entering 
into an agreement with the state; an agreement which bears all the hallmarks of a plea 
bargain.33 The definition of plea bargaining adopted by this study (which draws on the 
broad definitions put forward by Miller, McDonald and Cramer (1978) and Vogel (2007), 
amongst others, in its incorporation of implicit bargaining) is that:  
 
Any guilty plea which a defendant believes will give rise to benefits or 
concessions which flow from the prosecuting authorities or the 
government to the defendant, directly or indirectly, is the result of a plea 
bargain.    
 
The practice is therefore operational in England and Wales, firstly as a result of the 
sentence discount, which ensures that in all but the very rarest cases, a defendant can 
expect his guilty plea to attract the benefit of a lesser sentence. The additional benefits or 
concessions available to defendants in some cases (such as Goodyear indications, or charge 
reductions) operate on top of the ‘base layer’ of the sentence discount. It is possible that 
the guilty plea may not attract leniency in each individual case, but the practice can still be 
said to be operating on an institutional level (Vogel 2007, p.92). Research has shown that 
sentencers may not always take sufficient account of a guilty plea (Moxon 1988), and that 
charge ‘reductions’ may merely be the consequence of the offence having initially been 
overcharged (McConville, Sanders and Leng 1991), but if the defendant perceives that he 
stands to benefit from entering a guilty plea, then a plea bargain has nonetheless elicited his 
plea. 
 
However, one aim of this study was to consider the dynamics of cracked trials and plea 
bargaining in individual cases, rather than on a purely institutional or systemic level.  On an 
individual level, additional issues emerge, as individual defendants’ motivations will have an 
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 Research has shown that the vast majority of defendants are made aware of the sentence 
discount; the National Audit Office found that 95% of defendants in Crown court cases 
were aware of the discount (National Audit Office 2000). 
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effect on their entry of a guilty plea, and those motivations may not always tally with a 
conceptualisation of plea bargaining which is premised upon an institutional definition. 
Friedman, whilst accepting that plea bargaining could account for a large proportion of 
guilty pleas also wrote that defendants might plead guilty because of ‘remorse, self-hate, or 
sheer hopelessness; or to get things over without spending money; or to avoid the shame 
and humiliation of the process’ (1978, p. 255). As defendants were not interviewed or 
surveyed for this study, it was not possible to discern whether such factors played a role in 
their decisions to plead guilty, alongside any plea bargaining in operation. Nonetheless, 
under the definition of plea bargaining put forward by this thesis, even if such factors 
played a role in inducing some individual guilty pleas, the practice of plea bargaining would 
still be operational as the benefits of the guilty plea (which would at the very least be the 
sentence discount) would still flow to the defendant.  
 
As plea bargaining is central to this study’s exploration of cracked trials, its origins, the 
traditional justifications for and criticisms of its use and the existing empirical research on 
plea bargaining in England and Wales require further examination and are discussed in the 
following sections of this chapter. 
 
1.6 The origins of plea bargaining  
 
McConville refers to plea bargaining as ‘the most virulent virus ever to have invaded the 
criminal justice system’s body’ (2002, p.376), and in order to understand how plea 
bargaining may have become endemic, it is necessary to consider its origins and growth. 
Despite the prevalence of the guilty plea as a means of case disposition (and thus the 
potential for plea bargaining) in both the USA and England and Wales, this has only been 
the case for the past century or so and is generally said to be unique to adversarial systems 
such as the Anglo-American model of justice.34  
 
The literature on the origins of plea bargaining can (with some exceptions) be grouped into 
three categories. Firstly, there is a body of early work on plea bargaining which attributes its 
rise to increasing case load pressures (Miller 1927; Moley 1928). Secondly, there is the 
school of thought that the increasing complexity of the trial, its ‘lawyerisation’, and court 
                                                 
34 Plea bargaining is rare in inquisitorial jurisdictions, which often have no concept of plea. 
The introduction of a limited form of plea bargaining in France in 2004 proved 
controversial but the public prosecutor can propose a penalty to suspects of minor crimes a 
penalty not exceeding 1 year in prison in exchange for a guilty plea. See also Goldstein and 
Marcus (1977); Leigh and Zedner (1992); Ma (2002); Langer (2004).  
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room actors’ working practices led to a dramatic rise of plea bargaining from the late 19th 
century onwards (Heuman 1974; Feeley 1973, 1982; Langbein 1978; Fisher 2000, 2003). 
Thirdly, there are those who argue that plea bargaining should be seen in an even wider 
context and that external social and political factors account for its rise (McConville and 
Mirsky 2005; Vogel 2007). There is a parallel to be drawn between these three waves of 
explanation, and three distinct phases of research on plea bargaining; it’s ‘discovery’ in the 
1920’s, a huge expansion of work in the 1970’s, and its more recent examination over the 
past decade, although only the latter two waves of research apply to England and Wales, 
and have been on a significantly smaller scale.35 
 
The first phase of research emphasised the importance of rising case loads as an 
explanation for the plea bargaining it discovered. Plea bargaining did, and still does, ‘offer 
an expeditious and cost effective way of dealing with the large backlog of cases that seem 
to be a feature of most modern systems’ (McConville 2002, p.353). The widespread 
discovery of plea bargaining in the USA came about as a result of the surveys which many 
American criminal jurisdictions carried out in the 1920s (Fosdick 1922; Fuller 1931; Illinois 
Association for Criminal Justice 1929; Missouri Association for Criminal Justice 1933) and 
the high rates of guilty pleas, and the associated plea bargaining they discovered came as a 
surprise both to scholars and to the general public (Miller 1927; Moley 1928). A range of 
factors were identified which accounted for the increase in caseload, such as new laws 
governing the licensing of alcohol, the rise in motor vehicle use which led the emergence of 
a body of law to deal with traffic violations, urban expansion which necessitated laws on 
building and sanitation, and the inadequacy of criminal justice officials, from police to 
judges, to deal with this rise (Miller 1927). 
 
This line of argument stood relatively unchallenged (although the reliance on it was cast 
into doubt by Feeley, 1973) until Milton Heuman’s 1974 article, ‘A Note on Plea 
Bargaining and Case Pressure’, in which he challenged the assumption that ‘case pressure 
and plea bargaining appear to ‘go together’’ (p. 517) and today, few commentators would 
regard case pressure as the only factor behind plea bargaining’s rise. As Heuman 
demonstrated in his analysis of court dispositions in Connecticut, there appeared to be no 
causal relationship between the guilty plea rates at ‘high volume’ courts, which faced the 
greatest case pressure, and ‘low volume’ courts, even when factors such as staffing levels 
were taken into account. Heuman’s article was written during what could be described as 
                                                 
35 Fisher (2003, p.6) refers to ‘waves’ of research. 
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the heyday of plea bargaining research in the USA. There was some notable research 
between the 1920’s and 1970’s (particularly Newman 1956, 1966) but the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s marked a reinvigoration of interest in plea bargaining. American research at the 
time examined a wide range of issues in depth, such as at the role of defending and 
prosecuting lawyers, the likelihood of plea bargaining in particular cases, alternatives to plea 
bargaining and theoretical approaches to the negotiated plea (for example: Alschuler 1975, 
1983; Reiss 1975; Rhodes 1976; Miller, McDonald and Cramer 1978; McDonald 1979; 
Jacob 1984; Schulhofer 1984). 1978 notably saw the publication of a Law and Society special 
edition on plea bargaining with contributions from Feeley, Langbein, Alschuler and 
Heumann amongst others. It was around this time that plea bargaining also attracted a 
degree of academic attention in the UK (McCabe and Purves 1972; Bottoms and McClean 
1976; Baldwin and McConville 1977, 1978; Seifman 1980). 
 
As well as exploring the practice of plea bargaining as it was operating in the courts at that 
time, the literature began to explore other reasons for its origins. The link between plea 
bargaining and the rise in importance of the lawyer, and the associated complexity of trials, 
emerged as a key school of thought (Feeley 1997; Langbein 1979).36 It has been argued that 
the guilty plea (and thus the potential for plea bargaining) can be linked to the growth in 
importance of the lawyer as a courtroom actor over the past 250 years. During much of the 
18th century, there was a general rule forbidding defendants the right to counsel and 
prosecution lawyers acting on behalf of the victim were permitted, but uncommon.37    
 
However, research on the Old Bailey Session Papers of the period suggests that at some 
point during the 1730’s, defence counsel began to be allowed to examine and cross 
examine witnesses and appeared to take a more frequent and larger role in the courtroom, 
despite there being no express relaxation of the rule prohibiting their presence (Langbein 
1978; Feeley 1997). Until 1836, when the rule was formally abolished, defence lawyers were 
                                                 
36 Feeley and Langbein both examine the historical rise of plea bargaining in England, 
rather than in the USA. 
37 See Langbein (1978) for further discussion of the rationale behind the rule forbidding 
defendants the right to legal representation. Langbein (1979) does also, however, refer (at 
n.11) to evidence which suggests there may have been a spate of plea bargaining in late 
Elizabethan England. Vogel also points to isolated evidence of infrequent plea bargaining 
in earlier British history (2007, p.94) and in research on property crimes in Essex between 
1740 and 1820, King has argued that informal settlements were a relatively frequent option 
(2000, p.92). 
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still not permitted to address the jury.38  
 
At some point during the mid 19th Century, guilty pleas began to occur with increasing 
frequency and Feeley documents that plea switching from not guilty to guilty on a reduced 
charge became commonplace towards the latter part of the 19th century; evidence which 
strongly suggests the use of charge bargaining (Feeley, 1997). There are some references to 
plea bargaining being in existence in this early era and Friedman refers to a letter dated 
1862 from the Home Office to a magistrate in Southwark complaining about the practice, 
writing that ‘[p]ermission to plead guilty followed by a trifling sentence’ was no deterrent 
(1978, p.248).39 Feeley argues that plea bargaining was ‘a response to an increased capacity 
for adversariness’ (1997, p.188) which arose as a result of lawyers taking an increasingly 
active role, and the trial process becoming more complex, with rules of evidence taking 
greater priority.40 Similarly, Langbein writes that the rise in evidential provisions resulted in 
the jury trial no longer being an efficient means of case disposition, as it had been 
previously when it was effectively a form of summary justice (1979, p.262). An alternative 
interpretation of this would be that the advent of the lawyer’s primacy in the courtroom led 
to a decline in adversarial principles which arose when victim and accused faced each other 
more directly across the courtroom and perhaps mediated, negotiated forms of justice 
arose to replace those principles and to suit the needs of lawyers and growing case lists. It 
is worth noting that these processes occurred relatively late in England and Wales, when 
compared with the USA or even Scotland, where prosecutions were institutionalised and 
taken out of the hands of private individuals on a much wider scale at an earlier stage (Reiss 
1975, p.4).  
 
Some of the most recent research argues, however, that the rise of plea bargaining must be 
seen in an even wider context. The argument put forward by McConville and Mirsky in a 
study based on an empirical analysis of New York trials between 1805 and 1865, is that 
accounts of plea bargaining which focus on the lawyerisation or professionalization of the 
process fail to take into account a wider range of features such as judicial politicisation and 
changing perceptions of crime, and that the criminal justice system was in fact complex and 
professionalised well before the advent of routine plea negotiations (McConville and 
Mirsky 2005). Similarly, although with a different focus, Mary Vogel’s account of the rise of 
                                                 
38 The rule was abolished by The Second Report From His Majesty’s Commissioners On Criminal 
Law 6 (London 1836). 
39 Citing Home Office Papers, No. 60, Vol 7, p.57: correspondence from H. Waddington, 
Whitehall to T.B Burcham, Esq. Southwark, Sept 16, 1862. 
40 These arguments are also put forward by King (2000), pp.223 – 228. 
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plea bargaining in Boston brings changing social and political institutions to the fore and 
argues that a system of social control effectively became reworked into the practice of plea 
bargaining and Vogel writes that ‘plea bargaining emerged in Boston during the 1830s and 
1840s as part of a political struggle to stabilize and legitimate newly established elites and 
democratic institutions’. She argues that in doing so, it enhanced the discretionary powers 
of both prosecuting and defending lawyers, who often had aspirations to political careers 
(Vogel 2007, pp. 325 - 326). Fisher claims that such accounts minimise the role of human 
actors (2000, p. 859) and argues that ‘we are unlikely to find the root causes of so court-
focused a practice anywhere outside the courtroom’ (2003, p. 11). It is evident that there is 
still no consensus on the origins of plea bargaining. Whether or not any of the existing 
approaches can provide a full explanation which rings true across jurisdictions and eras, it 
seems clear that, for whatever reason, the increased reliance on the guilty plea developed in 
tandem with the modern trial.  
 
1.7 Traditional justifications for, and criticisms of, plea bargaining 
 
The arguments commonly used to justify, and to oppose, plea bargaining can be distilled 
into three areas: (i) cost and efficiency, (ii) due process and adversarialism and (iii) victims 
and other witnesses.  
 
1.7.1 Cost and efficiency 
 
The overriding justification for plea bargaining is that in encouraging guilty pleas, the 
process saves time and money and becomes more efficient. On average, a guilty plea in the 
Crown Court takes 1.3 hours, compared with 9.8 hours for a contested trial (Judicial and 
court statistics 2006). Considered in this light, the only problem with plea bargaining is that 
it happens too late and results in cracked trials which, whilst quicker and cheaper than 
trials, require greater resources than an early guilty plea. Efficiency has become a key 
performance indicator for criminal justice agencies, to the extent that the 1993 Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice had, as its general terms of reference the ‘…effectiveness 
of the criminal justice system…in securing the conviction of those guilty of criminal 
offences and the acquittal of those who are innocent, having regard to the efficient use of resources’ 
[emphasis added] (RCCJ, 1993, p. iii). It is a frequently held assumption (albeit one 
increasingly not borne out by evidence) across Anglo-American legal systems that the 
courts would simply become overburdened were it not for a high rate of guilty pleas 
(regarding England and Wales, see for example McCabe and Purves 1972; Bottoms and 
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McClean 1976; Seifman 1980; RCCJ, 1993). However, Darbyshire has argued that the 
courts are not overburdened, and if the sentence discount were abolished, courts would 
cope with any additional caseload and ‘the sky will not fall in’ (Darbyshire 2000, p.908).41 
Schulhofer’s seminal article, ‘Is plea bargaining inevitable?’, argued that a system could be 
instituted in the USA which made no use of plea bargaining whatsoever, with only a 
minimal increase in resources (a 9% increase to reduce a 90% plea rate to a 70% plea rate) 
(Schulhofer 1984, p.1085).42 
 
There have been two notable experiments in banning the use of plea bargaining, which had 
very different results in terms of the impact on court efficiency. El Paso, Texas banned 
implicit and explicit plea bargaining in 1975, and adopted a system that provided no 
particular incentive to plead guilty. After two years, an unmanageable backlog of cases has 
formed and the courts began to reintroduce plea bargaining. Although this appears to 
indicate that a system which has once been reliant on inducements to plead guilty cannot 
function if those inducements are removed, it has been argued that the main factor in the 
experiment’s failure was that the defence Bar was resistant to the new scheme (Daudistel 
1980). In stark contrast with El Paso’s experience, Alaska’s ban on plea bargaining was very 
successful, and the ban (albeit with some modifications) is still in place: court processes 
actually speeded up and the guilty plea rate remained high despite the lack of incentives for 
defendants to plead guilty.43 The total number of trials (even with the increase following 
the ban on plea bargaining) remained very small though, given the small size of the Alaskan 
jurisdiction (Rubenstein and White 1978a, 1978b, 1978c). Closer to home, the Scottish legal 
system functioned despite being traditionally hostile to plea bargaining and there was no 
general principle of a sentence discount to encourage or reward guilty pleas. Since the 
recent decision in Du Plooy v HM Advocate44 this is however no longer  the case and it was 
held that an early guilty plea can be rewarded with a sentence discount of up to one third 
(see Leverick 2004; Shiels 2007).  
 
There is therefore ample evidence that whilst plea bargaining can save time and money, it is 
                                                 
41
 Although it is unclear which statistics or other evidence Darbyshire relies upon to 
support her argument. 
42 Schulhofer’s results were based on an analysis of trials in Philadelphia in 1982, where 
very little use was made of bargaining, despite a rising caseload. He found that trials took 
up 45% more court time than guilty pleas; much less than had been assumed. 
43 See Alaska Judicial Council (1991), ‘Alaska’s Plea Bargaining Ban Re-evaluated’. There 
was only a 6% - 9% increase in not guilty pleas. Charge bargaining is, however, said to be 
common now, despite an official policy maintaining the ban.  
44 (2003) SLT 1237. 
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not necessarily the most efficient use of resources, and certainly not to the extent that a 
criminal justice system reliant on it would collapse without it. Stephen and Tata (2006), 
Stephen, Fazio and Tata (2008) and Stephen and Garoupa (2008) have recently published 
studies examining plea bargaining in Scotland from an economic perspective and have 
found it not to be as efficiency enhancing as is often assumed. The myth of the 
overburdened trial system remains powerful though, and the focus of efficiency based 
criminal justice policy appears to remain on reducing the overall number of trials.45  
 
1.7.2 Due process 
 
Reducing the number of trials means reducing the instances of adversarialism and thus the 
arena in which many of a defendant’s strongest due process safeguards take effect and 
arguably leads to crime control orientated processes (Packer 1968). The fact that plea 
bargaining results in so many cases being disposed of without a trial undermines the 
burden of proof resting on the prosecution; cases are not proven beyond reasonable doubt 
before a jury. The high rate of guilty pleas means there may be little incentive for the 
prosecution to ensure that only well prepared, strong cases are brought to trial, which 
means more weak cases are brought and with that, potentially more innocent people are 
convicted, which from a due process perspective is one of the most fundamental flaws of a 
system reliant on plea bargaining.  The 1993 RCCJ stated that it was ‘naïve to suppose that 
innocent persons never plead guilty because of the prospect of the sentence discount’. This 
goes against fundamental principles of due process and the right to a fair trial, but the 
Commission chose instead to place greater emphasis on encouraging the guilty to plead 
guilty. Whether or not innocent defendants would plead guilty as a result of plea bargains is 
a contentious debate, but there is well documented and methodologically sound empirical 
evidence from both the USA and England and Wales which suggests it does occur; 
evidence which can not simply be overlooked (Blumberg 1967a; Dell 1971; Baldwin and 
McConville 1977; Zander and Henderson 1993). Zander and Henderson found that in 53 
cases defence barristers answered in the affirmative when asked whether they had concerns 
that the defendant in the case might in fact be innocent. If this were representative, and 
accurate, it would equate to over 1300 innocent defendants per year pleading guilty (1993, 
pp.138 – 139). Zander, however, has written that ‘so far as one can tell, few are likely to be 
thought to be a cause for concern’, on the basis that upon closer examination, most were 
cases in which the barrister felt the defendant was maintaining innocence in the face of 
                                                 
45 For a critique of the 1993 RCCJ’s approach to this issue, see Field and Thomas (1994).  
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strong evidence, and was reflecting that concern on the questionnaire, rather than his or 
her own opinion. Others were cases in which the barrister was satisfied that the client was 
guilty of at least some counts on the indictment (1993b, p.85).46  
 
McConville and Bridges (1993) were critical of Zander’s reasoning though and several 
other authors have put forward strong arguments based on the available empirical evidence 
that innocent defendants in England do on occasion enter guilty pleas following plea 
bargains (Darbyshire 2000; McConville 2002; Ashworth and Redmayne 2005; Sanders and 
Young 2007).47   
 
In addition to the risk of innocent defendants pleading guilty, sentence discounts for guilty 
pleas penalise those defendants who elect to go to trial and put the prosecution to proof; 
Sanders and Young describe this as an ‘elementary point’ (2007, p.434) but one which is 
often disputed by those who claim that the discount simply rewards those who plead guilty.  
It seems an almost impossible point to dispute: if we accept that defendants have the right 
to a fair trial, then it is unjust that they should receive a longer sentence upon conviction 
than that would have done had they pleaded guilty. To argue otherwise quite blatantly 
prioritises crime control considerations of cost and efficiency over basic rights, yet this is 
what successive governments have done by virtue of their endorsement of the sentence 
discount and other inducements to plead guilty.  
 
1.7.3 Victims and other witnesses 
 
A further issue, and one which seems to be used as often to support plea bargaining as it is 
to criticise it, is the impact that a guilty plea, particularly a negotiated plea, has on victims 
and other witnesses. The White Paper Justice for All, which preceded the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 makes the assumption that early guilty pleas would be favoured by victims (2002, 
p.77) but there are doubtless many victims who would prefer ‘their’ defendant to face a full 
trial, be confronted with the evidence against them, and receive a ‘full’ sentence, rather than 
two thirds of a sentence. Fenwick writes that the justification for the use of the sentence 
discount has often been found in the desirability of sparing witnesses, particularly victim-
witnesses, the ordeal of a trial (1997 p.26). However, from the victim’s perspective, whilst a 
                                                 
46 See also McConville and Bridge’s (1993) critical response to Zander’s interpretation of 
the findings.  
47 As Sanders and Young put it, ‘Do the innocent plead guilty? (Is the Pope a Catholic?) 
(2007, p.430). 
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late guilty plea spares him the need to give evidence and eradicates the fear that the trial will 
result in an acquittal, it does not alleviate the ordeal of waiting during the most stressful 
time – immediately before and at court hearings. Therefore, in terms of its validity as a 
justification for the sentence discount, the victim centred argument is at its most powerful 
where there is an early guilty plea, and a formal graduated discount system as proposed by 
the RCCJ to reward early guilty pleas, and currently provided for in the 2007 SGC 
Guideline, might be in victims’ interests. Nonetheless, as Fenwick (1997) argues, a graded 
discount could create additional pressures on innocent defendants to plead guilty, and 
victims have an interest in seeing the true offender punished.  
Victims of violent or sexual offences in particular may feel let down by a system that is 
heavily reliant on charge bargains which result in counts of grievous bodily harm being 
‘downgraded’ to actual bodily harm, offences of violence reinterpreted as public order 
offences, or rape defendants pleading guilty to lesser sexual offences. Even where the 
offender pleads guilty to the indictment as it stands, victims may be disappointed when 
they learn that the offender’s guilty plea automatically entitles him to a sentence discount. 
Sanders and Young comment that ‘witness distress may be all the greater if the cracked trial 
is achieved through a last minute charge bargain resulting in a re-labelling of the offence in 
a way a victim finds objectionable’ (2007, p.429) and Hoyle and Zedner point out that 
victims may feel unwilling to cooperate with the CPS in the future if unexplained decisions 
to drop cases have caused them distress (2007, p.473. There was public outcry following 
the case of Peverett in which a headmaster who had indecently assaulted pupils at his school 
agreed to plead guilty to some charges, with the basis of plea that his intention had been to 
exert power over the girls, not to derive sexual gratification.48 He received a suspended 
sentence, which the Attorney General sought to appeal on the ground of undue leniency, 
but the Court of Appeal ruled that there was no leave to appeal, as Peverett had relied on 
assurances made by the prosecution, and these promises could not be reneged on. There 
was a similar furore when Craig Sweeney, convicted of the sexual assault and abduction of 
a child was given a life sentence but was to be eligible for release on license after five years 
(in part as a result of the effect of his guilty plea) and there were calls in the media for the 
sentence discount to be abolished.49 
 
Whether plea bargains work to the advantage or to the detriment of victims will ultimately 
be dependent on the individual circumstances of cases; neither can be a universal criticism 
                                                 
48 A-G’s Ref NO. 44 of 2000 (R v Peverett) [2001] Crim LR 60  
49 See for example ‘Reid seeks review of paedophile sentence’ The Guardian, 12th June 2006 
and ‘Paedophile case ignites sentence row’ The Guardian, 13th June 2006. 
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of, nor justification for, the use of plea bargaining. This in itself means that the 
government’s reliance on the supposed benefit to victims of earlier guilty pleas in order to 
justify measures which are at the very least conducive to plea bargaining, is built upon 
shaky foundations. 
 
1.8 Empirical research on plea bargaining in England and Wales 
 
As stated in the introduction to this thesis, there has been relatively little empirical research 
on plea bargaining in the UK, in contrast with the more developed body of work in the 
USA, where plea bargaining is widely acknowledged and is to an extent a regulated feature 
of the criminal justice system and its relative lack of acknowledgement in the UK has 
stunted the potential for research on plea bargaining in England. Despite a flurry of 
groundbreaking research during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, there has not been a great 
deal of writing on the subject in the UK, and even less empirical research. There have been 
little more than a handful of empirical studies in England and Wales which have examined 
the nature and application of plea bargaining to some degree and the key studies have used 
a variety of methods and taken different approaches to the problem, making it difficult to 
draw any overarching conclusions. Nonetheless their importance, particularly given that 
there is such a limited body of work available, should not be underestimated. Baldwin and 
McConville’s 1977 research is the classic study and the only one to aim for a specific and 
systematic investigation of the nature of plea bargaining. Other empirical work has been 
carried out by Dell (1971), McCabe and Purves (1972), Bottoms and McClean (1976), 
Seifman (1980), Zander and Henderson (1993), McConville et al (1994) and most recently 
Tague (2006, 2007). 
 
Dell’s was a study of Holloway inmates which found that 12% of those tried at the 
Magistrates’ court were ‘inconsistent pleaders’; those who pleaded guilty despite protesting 
innocence (Dell, 1971). One quarter of these had no previous convictions and cited police 
advice or pressure as their reason for pleading guilty. Approximately 80% of the sample 
had no legal representation, which makes it difficult to compare with more recent studies 
and cases where legal representation is available to, and used by, the vast majority of 
defendants. It is also worth noting the potential significance of Dell’s sample being 
comprised entirely of women, which again makes it difficult to draw comparisons with 
other studies. 
 
After Dell’s research came Bottoms and McClean’s 1976 study; a broad examination of 
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defendants in the criminal process, not specific to plea bargaining. Bottoms and McClean 
were wary of American research which suggested that large proportion of guilty pleaders 
protested innocence (Blumberg 1967a), but still found that 18% of their guilty pleaders 
suffered ‘quite possibly mistaken convictions’ in respect of at least one charge (p.120). The 
most common reason given for the guilty plea was their own lawyer’s advice. Late plea 
changers were also examined and 68% said the reason was their barrister’s last minute 
advice – often contradicting the solicitor’s long-held view that they ought to maintain a not 
guilty plea. They found that in many cases defendants did not ‘take decisions’ in any formal 
sense (Bottoms and McClean 1976, p.8) and the study thus provided reinforcement for 
Baldwin and McConville’s research which was published the following year.  
 
Baldwin and McConville’s seminal work, Negotiated Justice: Pressures to Plead Guilty was the 
first detailed empirical examination of the issues in the UK (1977). It was highly 
controversial at the time, and met with strong criticism and denials by the legal 
establishment. Loosely structured interviews on plea and reasons for plea were conducted 
with 121 defendants within one month of sentence by Birmingham Crown Court. As stated 
above, the authors distinguished four broad categories: 
 
Fig. 1.5 Negotiated Justice: Guilty plea reasons 
 
Reason for guilty plea Percentage of sample 
(%) 
No deal or pressure – guilty as pleaded 28.9 
 
Plea bargain – offer made and accepted – with supposed benefit 
to defendant 
18.2 
 
No explicit bargain, but defendant thought a deal was struck on 
his behalf 
13.2 
Pressure from barrister to plead guilty, but no specific offer 
 
39.7 
 
Pressure from defendants’ own barristers (not accompanied by any apparent offer or 
bargain) was identified as the most common reason for late guilty pleas. In 18.2% of the 
cases sampled, however, the authors found that there was an explicit plea bargain in which 
an offer was made and accepted, and in 13.2% of cases the defendant was of the opinion 
that a deal had been struck on his behalf. 
 
More recently, in the Crown Court Study commissioned by the Runciman Commission and 
carried out by Zander and Henderson, plea bargaining was just one of many issues 
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researched. Of 269 defendants responding to a questionnaire 11% of guilty pleaders 
claimed they had not committed the offence. The study  found that counsel saw his client 
for the first time on the morning of the hearing in almost 70% of cases in which the 
defendant changed his plea to guilty on the day (p.1732). This again points to both the 
primacy of the barrister’s role in plea formation, as distinct from the solicitor’s, and also to 
the fact that many barristers (at least in that study’s sample) may have arrived at court ill-
prepared to deal with a full trial. McConville et al’s Standing Accused, also published in 1994, 
provides additional evidence of the significance of the legal profession’s role in plea 
bargaining, and explores the effect legal representatives (although particularly solicitors, 
rather than barristers) have at various stages of the criminal justice process, and was able to 
explore the issues on a wider theoretical level than the Crown Court Study. The authors 
found that clients were regarded as ‘good’ if they accepted advice compliantly and ideally 
plead guilty without complaining. ‘Bad’ clients resisted advice, requested meetings with 
counsel in advance of trial, and objected to discontinuous representation. Even ‘good’ 
clients were often interviewed and seen at the police station by clerks as it is not profitable 
for fee earning solicitors to carry out this task – their time is best spent at the magistrates’ 
Court (McConville et al. 1994, p.42). All clerks seemed to ‘learn’ that criminal clients were 
not worthy of a great deal of respect and came to see criminal practice as being geared 
towards the production of guilty pleas (p. 189). Further, they found that solicitors and 
clerks often did not check whether there was a factual basis for plea of guilty and that their 
desire to get guilty pleas means that solicitors would sometimes accept a plea of guilty even 
if this was completely at odds with the rest of what the client was telling them. Regarding 
the role of the barrister, McConville et al. found that the implicit purpose of conferences 
with counsel was to persuade the defendant of the likelihood of conviction and the 
advantages of a guilty plea (1994, p. 193).  
 
There is, however, also research which contradicts the findings outlined above, both from 
the 1970’s and more recently. In McCabe and Purves’ study, a total of 112 defendants in 90 
cases in the sample changed their pleas. Forty-eight pleaded guilty to the whole indictment 
as it stood, and 64 came to an agreement with the prosecution whereby charges were 
reduced or dropped in exchange for plea of guilty, but despite identifying this as plea 
bargaining, McCabe and Purves’ main conclusion was the importance of pragmatism and 
realism in making the decision to change plea. They could not find evidence that any of the 
sample was ‘substantially innocent’ or that the police had behaved improperly. (McCabe 
and Purves, 1972). Furthermore, in the aftermath of Negotiated Justice, Seifman (1980) 
carried out his research on plea bargaining in England. He agreed with critics that Negotiated 
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Justice represented a one-sided view of the plea-bargaining process and that defendants’ 
statements were not adequately corroborated by the researchers.50 Seifman argued that, on 
the basis of his findings, there were only infrequent, isolated incidents of innocent 
defendants being pressurised into pleading guilty, with no evidence that it presented a 
significant problem. Most recently, Tague has published the results of an empirical study 
which would suggest that it is now not financially or professionally in barristers’ interests to 
encourage guilty pleas and their interests are to attract briefs, maximise income and avoid 
sanction, each of which Tague argues are best served by taking cases to trial (Tague 2006, 
2007). 
 
The existing empirical evidence thus provides strong indications that plea bargaining is 
common and that it may be a significant cause of late guilty pleas, and therefore of cracked 
trials. Nonetheless, the body of evidence is small, and studies have varied greatly in their 
ethical evaluations of the practice and on the issue of whether innocent defendants may be 
induced to plead guilty by plea bargains, and the most recent empirical study (Tague 2006, 
2007) calls into question some previous findings and assumptions. There is clearly a need 
for a great deal more research into the causes of late guilty pleas, and the nature and extent 
of plea bargaining as one of those causes.  
 
1.9 Plea bargaining, criminal justice policy and the ‘rebalancing’ agenda 
 
Administrative efficiency has become an overriding concern of the criminal justice system, 
and one which has been used to rationalise increasing inducements for defendants to plead 
guilty, without any real consideration of the academic literature which highlights the perils 
of this course of action. This concern has manifested itself recently in the graduated 
sentence discount but is also to be seen in recent criminal justice policy on guilty pleas 
more widely, and has culminated in what is perhaps the most blatant attempt to encourage 
guilty pleas; the legitimisation of sentence canvassing.   
 
The 1993 RCCJ in some ways marked a watershed when it accepted that it was naïve to 
suppose that the innocent never plead guilty, but that this needed to be weighed against the 
benefits to the system and to defendants of encouraging those who are in fact guilty to 
                                                 
50 Nonetheless, Baldwin and McConville went to considerable lengths to justify their 
methodology and approach to the study, in particular their decision to base their findings 
on what defendants told them (they also used other methods to triangulate their findings) 
and devote a section of their monograph to it (1977, pp. 1 – 17) as they rightly anticipated 
that this criticism would be levelled at them.  
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plead guilty (1993, at para. 42). This reasoning has been described as ‘breathtakingly bare’ 
(Field and Thomas 1994, p.3) and it is, from a due process perspective, startling that a 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice would expressly prioritise encouraging guilty pleas 
over the protection of the innocent. Ashworth and Redmayne write that ‘one of the Royal 
Commission’s most conspicuous omissions was its failure to discuss the rights of 
defendants in any principled fashion’ (2005, p. 286) Before the Royal Commission had 
reported, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Bar Council and the Attorney General 
were from the outset arguing for formal sentence canvassing and a clearer system of 
discounts for early guilty pleas to facilitate plea bargaining. The Bar Council had been 
advocating for sentence canvassing and a relaxation of the Turner rules for some time, and 
the General Council of the Bar set up the Seabrook Committee (1992) which published a 
set of proposals prior to the RCCJ. The Seabrook Report made several recommendations 
on plea bargaining and was fiercely criticised by McConville and Mirsky for the ‘violence’ it 
proposed to do to the adversarial system (1993, p.6). The report proposed that there 
should be a clear gradation of minimum sentence discounts, from 30% at committal to 
10% after the first Court listing, that judges should be permitted to give indications of 
maximum sentences and that there should be greater use of formal pre-trial conferences in 
cases where it would be useful, which McConville and Mirsky argue requires defendants to 
unjustifiably disclose information which would undermine their rights to an adversarial trial 
(1993, p.7).  
 
It came as no great surprise that the RCCJ proposed a relaxation of the Turner rules to 
permit the judge, at the defendant’s request, to indicate in advance the highest sentence he 
would impose for a guilty plea at that stage. This measure was implemented over a decade 
later as the Goodyear indication, but the proposal was not acted on at the time.  The RCCJ 
had also proposed graduated sentence discounts to reward early guilty pleas to a greater 
extent than late pleas (again, this was not acted on at the time but was introduced by the 
SGC in 2004). McConville and Mirsky argued that by advocating sentence canvassing and 
graduated discounts, the RCCJ:  
 
‘transform[ed] the meaning of guilt from one based upon an objective assessment 
of the weight of the evidence in a rational legal environment, to another dependant 
upon the attribution of guilt through routinised lawyering conducted in a coercive 
environment and justified in terms of the routinised processing of mass defendants, 
with the minimum expenditure of time and effort either on the part of the State or 
of private witnesses’ (1994, p.267). 
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Issues surrounding plea bargaining surfaced once more, albeit superficially, in the 2001 
Auld Report. The Auld Report acknowledges that ‘some judges and defence advocates 
have continued to breach [the Turner rules] in different ways’ but that ‘[t]hey have no doubt 
been motivated for the best’ (para 94). It is interesting that contraventions of what were 
essentially (loose) guidelines designed to ensure the voluntariness of defendants’ pleas were 
deemed to have been ‘for the best’. Lord Justice Auld (at para. 112) did not share the view 
of the RCCJ that a system whereby  judges could indicate to  defendants both  the 
maximum sentence on a plea of guilty and the possible sentence on conviction after trial 
would amount to unacceptable pressure. Auld skirts over the question of ‘plea bargaining’ 
itself, interpreted by his Report as situations in which the prosecution agrees to drop 
certain charges or substitute lesser charges in return for guilty pleas; the focus is very firmly 
on ‘advance indication of sentence,’ as though this and the concept of plea bargaining were 
entirely unrelated.  
 
In 2002, following the Auld Report, the Labour government published its Justice for All 
White Paper. Justice for All is of particular interest in that White Papers tend to reveal more 
of the rationale behind policy-making than Acts of Parliament ever can and in this sense is 
more instructive than the 2003 Criminal Justice Act it led to. The first paragraph of the 
foreword to Justice for All reads: 
  
‘The people of this country want a criminal justice system that works in the 
interests of justice. They rightly expect that the victims of crime should be at the 
heart of the system. This White Paper aims to rebalance the system in favour of 
victims, witnesses and communities and to deliver justice for all, by building greater 
trust and credibility…Whilst we need to ensure that there is a fair balance of rights 
between defence and prosecution, we are determined to ensure that justice is done 
and seen to be done.’  
 
It does not require a great deal of reading between the lines of this foreword to see that the 
government’s stance is that defendants have enjoyed too many rights for too long and that 
the criminal justice system ought to start favouring good, honest, law abiding citizens. It is 
hard to see how the system could be ‘rebalanced’ in favour of victims without rights being 
removed from defendants – despite the assurance of a ‘fair balance’. The White Paper goes 
on to outline a range of what are essentially pro-prosecution measures, including the giving 
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of sentence indications to encourage early guilty pleas.51 Justice for All proposes that the 
process will be geared towards ‘convicting the offender as early as we possibly can, and 
minimising opportunities for anyone in the system to impede all efforts to achieve that’. 
This is similar to the promise later in the paper, that new procedures will ensure that cases 
get to trial quickly, ‘with reduced chances of the accused ‘playing the system’’ (p.6). Justice 
for All takes the stance that criminals manipulate the system by pleading guilty at the last 
minute; deliberately wasting the taxpayer’s valuable resources. As a result, measures to 
encourage ever earlier pleas of guilty are seen as necessary. It is difficult to see what 
evidence this stance may have been based on; the academic literature certainly does not 
support it.  
 
In addition to Justice for All, the second Criminal Case Management Framework, published in 
July 2005 is also of relevance. It was designed to act as a guide to practitioners on how 
cases should be managed most effectively and efficiently from pre-charge through to 
conclusion, and was intended to complement the introduction of the Criminal Procedure 
Rules in April 2005. It is a 193 page handbook on how to process cases more quickly and 
with as little expenditure as possible. There is a great emphasis on making effective use of 
pre trial hearings such as the plea before venue procedure and hearings where a main 
objective is ‘to allow the court to take an early guilty plea’.52 The purpose of the Framework  
seems to be to help practitioners ensure that guilty pleaders progress swiftly through the 
system and those entering not guilty pleas are to be given as many (early) opportunities as 
possible to change their minds;  thus avoiding the time and expense of a trial. 
 
The Criminal Case Management Framework complements the Criminal Case Management 
Programme (CCMP), designed to deliver the goals set out in Justice for All. The CCMP 
comprises of three main elements; the charging programme, the victim and witness care 
scheme, and most relevant to plea bargaining, the effective trial management programme 
(ETMP). The overriding aim of the ETMP was to help deliver the government’s 
requirement of a 27% reduction in the number of ‘ineffective’ trials by the end of the 2005 
to 2006 year. The ETMP emphasises the importance of efficient case progression, tracking 
and the importance of the defendant’s appearance at court hearings. This it attempts to 
achieve through the early communication of the ‘benefits of cooperating with the process’ 
                                                 
51 Other measures include allowing the court to be informed of previous convictions where 
appropriate, allowing hearsay evidence where appropriate, giving witnesses increased access 
to original statements at trial, and extending the prosecution’s right to appeal against bail. 
52 Part 11.11.1(a). 
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and improved enforcement procedures for non attendance. The ETMP was trialled in five 
test areas in 2003 and in 2005 was implemented nationwide, and in most court centres, 
ineffective trials have been reduced (the average ineffective trial rates for England and 
Wales have fallen from 20.6% in 2003/04 to 12% in 2006/07; see Crown Court Annual 
Reports 2003/2004; 2006/2007).  
 
The introduction of sentence canvassing in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and the 
clarification of the procedure in the case of Goodyear was a further, fundamental, step in the 
formalisation of practices which seek to encourage guilty pleas and maximise administrative 
efficiency by avoiding trials where possible. The previously leading case of R v Turner 
(1977), as well as clarifying the extent to which a barrister could encourage a defendant to 
plead guilty also stated that ‘the judge should never indicate the sentence he is minded to 
impose’. The one exception to this was that it was permissible for a judge to say that 
whatever happened, the sentence would or would not take a particular form, for example 
custodial, suspended or non custodial. This element of Turner has been overruled now that 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides for the ‘advance indication of sentence’ following 
support for such a procedure in the Auld Report, and in Goodyear [2005] the Court of 
Appeal laid down guidelines as to how sentence canvassing should work in practice in the 
Crown Court.53 The Court held that a judicial response to a request for an indication of 
sentence from the defendant did in fact not constitute inappropriate judicial pressure on 
the defendant but that if the defendant did not seek an indication, it would be 
inappropriate for the judge to give one. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that: 
 
(i) any advance indication of sentence to be given by the judge should be   confined 
to  the maximum sentence if a plea of guilty was tendered at that stage; 
(ii) once an indication had been given it remained binding on the judge who had 
given it and any other judge who became responsible for the case; 
(iii) if, after a reasonable opportunity to consider his position in light of the 
indication, the defendant did not plead guilty, the indication ceased to have effect; 
(iv) the hearing should take place in open court; 
(v) the new procedure would not apply in the magistrates’ Court; 
(vi) defence counsel should not seek an indication without written, signed authority 
                                                 
53 Goodyear [2005] EWCA Crim 888. 
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from the defendant; 
(vii) the judge should never be invited to give an indication on the basis of what 
would appear to be a plea bargain and,  
(viii) prosecution counsel should not say anything which created the impression 
that the sentence indication had the support of the Crown. 
 
In the Court’s judgement, there was a significant distinction between a sentence indication 
given to a defendant who had deliberately chosen to seek one from the judge and an 
unsolicited indication directed to him from the judge and conveyed by counsel. It would 
however be naïve in the extreme to suppose that defendants would request a sentence 
indication on their own initiative without the input of counsel. Once the defendant has an 
indication of a lighter sentence, counsel is in a stronger position than previously (given that 
it is an ‘official’ indication) to give advice in the ‘strong terms’ that Turner (1977) permits 
that a plea of guilty would be to the defendant’s advantage. 
 
The ostensible objective of the guidelines in Goodyear was not to formalise plea bargaining, 
but ‘to ensure common process and continuing safeguards against the creation or 
appearance of judicial pressure on the defendant’ (Thomas 2005, p.661). The Court stated 
that ‘a judge should never be invited to give an indication on the basis of what would 
appear to be a ‘plea bargain’. He should not be asked or become involved in discussions 
linking the acceptability to the prosecution of a particular plea or bases of plea and the 
sentence which might be imposed and he should not be asked to indicate levels of sentence 
which he might have in mind depending on possible different pleas’ ([2005] EWCA 888 at 
67). This denial that advance indication of sentence has anything to do with plea bargaining 
is difficult to rationalise, and could only be on the very narrowly conceived basis that a 
response to a request is just that, and not a bilateral exchange of concessions in a stricter 
sense of a ‘bargain’, but what is a formal, judicial indication of a light sentence in exchange 
for a guilty plea, if not a plea bargain?54 Most recently, the government has moved towards 
a less closeted encouragement of plea bargaining in certain cases of serious and organised 
crime, and in fraud cases, unthinkable less than a decade ago (discussed at Chapter 1.4 
above). This type of criminal activity is quite removed from ‘ordinary’ criminal processes 
though, and the criminal justice system still remains a long way from engaging with the 
academic literature and openly acknowledging the routinised use of plea bargaining. The 
                                                 
54 Even the fraud consultation document considering a system of plea negotiation, 
published by the Attorney General’s Office, describes Goodyear as ‘a significant step 
towards what is proposed in the draft Framework’ (2008, p. 35). 
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approach taken by criminal justice policy to cracked trials and plea bargaining is, to a large 
extent, mirrored by developments in criminal justice more generally, in which new Labour’s 
promise of evidence based policy has not come to fruition and the RCCJ’s reasoning on 
criminal justice, described by Field as being ‘based on a mixture of influences, some 
certainly practical, but others based on half-articulated statements of principle and/or 
rather particular readings of the research evidence’ (1994, p.121) has remained the norm. 
Political considerations based on government perceptions of public opinion have become 
ever more powerful forces behind criminal justice policy, and Tonry has written that 
‘criminal justice policy making in England and Wales has been more theatrical than 
substantive…tabloid front pages and political advisors have had more influence on 
government proposals and policies than have criminal justice professionals, systematic 
evidence or subject matter experts’ (2004, p.3).55 
 
The increasingly actuarial, target driven motivations behind criminal justice policy (Sanders 
and Young comment that ‘efficiency, effectiveness and economy became the trinity which 
public sector officials were required to worship’ (2007), p.35) and a preoccupation with 
‘bringing offenders to justice’ has also had the effect of placing pressure on the CPS to 
increase conviction rates. This applies particularly to offences such as rape and domestic 
violence, where there is a perception that offenders ‘get off’ all too easily. The Crown 
Prosecution Service’s annual report in 2003 had as one if its key aims ‘increasing the 
number of crimes for which an offender is brought to justice, to 1.2 million by 2005/2006’, 
and the 2007 /2008 CPS annual report shows that this aim was not only met but exceeded, 
with the conviction of offenders for almost 1.4 million offences by the end of December 
2006.56 Conviction targets no doubt result in additional incentives to prosecutors to plea 
bargain, and perhaps to accept guilty pleas to inappropriate offences, or to allow weak cases 
to proceed, in order to ensure that conviction rate targets are met (see for example 
McConville, Sanders and Leng 1991). Langbein’s analysis of why plea bargaining rose to 
dominance historically is perhaps just as plausible an explanation of its continued 
contemporary rise: he argued that it emerged as the response to increasingly inefficient, 
evidentially complex jury trials because it allowed the ‘sanctified’ status of the jury trial to 
remain, making it possible to circumvent it in the majority of cases whilst still retaining the 
principle, rather than openly moving to an inquisitorial or other non-jury system (1979, 
p.269). This engenders a situation in which various administrative pressures on all parties to 
plea bargain, and upon defendants to plead guilty, are all the more insidious for being 
                                                 
55 See also Newburn and Rock (2006), Downes and Morgan (2007). 
56 Accessed at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/reports/annualreport04.html  
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hidden behind a façade of due process and commendable aims such as ‘bringing offenders 
to justice’. 
 
In many respects, the 2003 Criminal Justice Act embodies much of new Labour’s criminal 
justice agenda, and Gibson has described it as ‘by far the most wide-ranging statute of its 
kind of modern times’ (2004, p.9), but the sheer volume of criminal justice legislation in 
recent years is testament to the extent to which the government has attempted to ‘re-
balance’ the criminal justice system.57 Sanders and Young argue that through this legislative 
programme, the Labour government has ‘dismantled suspects’ rights and increased police 
powers at an even greater rate’ than preceding Conservative governments (2007, p.18) and 
that the drift towards crime control has accelerated (ibid., p.26). Sanders and Young also 
write that with respect to plea bargaining (as well as criminal justice policies more generally) 
‘the crime control victory sought by the Runciman Commission has now been 
achieved…the due process rump is largely presentational’ (ibid., p.437). The ostensible 
justification for the increase of crime control measures has been re-balancing the system in 
favour of victims, and sparing victims and witness the ordeal of a trial had always been an 
element of the rationale for the sentence discount and plea bargaining, as discussed earlier 
in this chapter. However, the victims’ or law abiding citizens’ rights based agenda has 
provided little in the way of tangible benefits to victims or the wider community and has 
instead become little more than a gloss on measures which deprive defendants of basic 
entitlements (Sanders and Young 2007, pp.648 - 673; Hoyle and Zedner 2007). 
 
The prioritising of crime control values over defendants’ rights has inevitably contributed 
to a legal framework in which the defendant’s right to put the prosecution to proof has 
been eroded, and there are increasing pressures to plead guilty, and to do so as early as 
possible in order to avoid attracting the penalty of a more severe punishment. Defendants 
are expected co-opt themselves into their own prosecutions in order to spare themselves 
greater punishment, as evidenced by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994’s 
erosion of the right to silence and compulsory defence disclosure introduced by the 
Criminal Procedures and Investigation Act 1996. As Sanders and Young write of the means 
by which a defendant can enhance his sentence discount, ‘this principle is part of a wider 
                                                 
57 Key legislation enacted by the Labour government since 1997 includes: the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act, the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the 
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, 
the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 and the Terrorism Act 2006. 
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strategy of encouraging various forms of cooperation from suspects…[which]…in turn 
undoubtedly helps secure the mass production of guilty pleas’ (2007, p.387). The state 
provides the greatest sentence discount incentives to plead guilty for those who put their 
own safety at risk, and to provide additional pressures to plead guilty to defendants in such 
situations is, arguably, unethical (Sanders and Young 2007, pp.433 – 434). This 
notwithstanding, there remains an illogical perception that in being ‘rewarded’ by a 
sentence discount, defendants are playing the system, that they are almost mocking their 
victims in doing so, and that their scope to do so needs to be curtailed, whilst still ensuring 
as many guilty pleas as possible. It is ironic that a defendant, having pleaded guilty and 
therefore complied with what is expected of him and spared the state the resources of a 
trial, is then promptly ‘blamed’ for the resulting cracked trial and the ‘wasted’ resources - 
unless he pleads guilty at the earliest possible stage; a stage at which he may not even have 
been aware of the evidence against him.   
 
1.10 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has outlined the key issues relevant to cracked trials, plea bargaining, and their 
relationship, as well as outlining the relevant criminal justice policy. There is a considerable 
body of literature (albeit predominantly from the USA) which suggests that behind high 
guilty plea rates lies the phenomenon of the negotiated plea. However, as this chapter has 
shown, the issue is still sensitive in England and Wales; neither the legal establishment nor 
policy makers seem willing to engage with the likelihood that the ‘problem’ of the cracked 
trial requires a more thorough analysis of its underlying causes and instead focus on crime 
control measures designed to reduce the number of adversarial trials. The unwillingness of 
the criminal justice system to examine cracked trials more closely, and to assume they are 
caused by defendants ‘playing the system’, may lie in the fact that academic studies, 
prevailing academic opinion, and the anecdotal experiences of lawyers, all point very 
strongly to the fact that plea bargaining is widespread and creates pressure to plead guilty; 
even scratching the surface of the problem of the cracked trial could reveal this, and open a 
Pandora’s box. This ‘ambiguous, unsettled and hypocritical’ attitude to plea bargaining 
(Darbyshire 2000, p. 897) has stunted the development of research, potentially of use to 
courts and policy makers, which explores cracked trials, and regardless of what the causes 
of cracked trials may be, a greater, and genuine understanding of them would be required 
in order to reduce them if that is to be the aim of the courts. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
METHODS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Having analysed the key issues which relate to cracked trials and plea bargaining in the 
preceding chapter, Chapter 2 outlines the research questions adopted by this study in order 
to explore the issues empirically. The chapter sets out the overall research design and 
methods used; it reviews the methods used by previous similar studies and explains why 
the methods used in this study were chosen in preference to others. In carrying out this 
piece of research considerable delays and other difficulties in accessing appropriate data 
were experienced; these issues, and how they affected the methods eventually employed 
and the scope of the data collected are also discussed. Documentary analysis of CPS case 
files and interviews with legal professionals were the primary methods used, and the 
general nature of this data is outlined. Finally, the difficulties which may be involved in 
interviewing those in positions of authority, the extent to which this actually presented 
difficulties, and ethical issues in researching sensitive topics are also considered. 
 
2.2  Research Questions 
 
The empirical element of this study was designed to: 
 
(i) quantify the number of, and reasons for, cracked trials within a specified 
sample of cases; 
(ii) identify and explore the features of cracked trials, in particular those caused 
by late guilty pleas; 
(iii) identify and explore the nature of cases in which some form of plea 
bargaining may have led to a cracked trial; and 
(iv)  explore legal professionals’ perspectives on cracked trials and plea    
negotiations. 
 
The key question the research design addresses is the why so many defendants change their 
plea to guilty on the day listed for their trial, or the prosecution offers no evidence, 
resulting in a cracked trial. The research is also designed to explore more generally the 
extent to which negotiated pleas play a role in cracked trials, as identified by previous 
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literature. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, there has been little research into the 
relationship between cracked trials and plea bargaining, and any exploratory approach to 
cracked trials requires a consideration of negotiated pleas.58 The data collection was from 
the outset approached from a broad perspective, which considered the reasons for cracked 
trials generally, without creating a narrow focus on negotiated pleas. This guarded insofar 
as possible against the potential danger of results which exaggerated the nature or extent of 
plea bargaining. Although the research was designed in the knowledge that previous studies 
had identified negotiated pleas as a feature of cracked trials and that it warranted further 
exploration, there was potentially a range of personal, administrative, case management and 
local court pressures which could play a role in the generation of cracked trials, which also 
required consideration.  
 
This study also considers the role of the lawyer in cracked trials, particularly the role of the 
defence lawyer in late guilty pleas. Much of the previous research has examined the 
importance of the relationship between lawyers’ advice and late guilty pleas (McCabe and 
Purves 1972; Bottoms and McClean 1976; Baldwin and McConville 1977; Seifman 1980; 
Zander and Henderson 1994; McConville et al 1994, Tague 2006, 2007). The role that 
lawyers play in cracked trials and plea formation is therefore an area of interest and also 
one which requires particular attention from a methodological perspective.  
 
2.3  Methods used: documentary analysis 
 
The two methods most clearly suited to the aims of this study were therefore a 
documentary analysis of case files, complemented by interviews to add depth and context 
to the data contained within the files.59  
 
2.3.1 Previous studies’ use of documentary analysis  
 
Some, but by no means a great deal of the previous research into cracked trials or plea 
bargaining in England and Wales has made use of some form of documentary analysis as a 
research tool. McCabe and Purves (1972) examined police and court documents, Bottoms 
                                                 
58 Plea bargaining has been identified as a factor of varying significance in late guilty pleas 
by several studies (Dell, 1971; McCabe and Purves, 1972; Bottoms and McClean, 1976; 
Baldwin and McConville, 1977; Seifman, 1980; and Zander and Henderson, 1994). Their 
findings are discussed in Chapter 1. 
59
 A consideration of the methods which were unsuited to this study is provided at 
Appendix C. 
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and McClean (1976) studied three months of records as a preliminary to determine the 
relative numbers of different types of cases they later analysed, and Baldwin and 
McConville (1977) had committal papers examined by legal professionals to make 
judgements on strength of cases. However, bar (to a limited extent) McCabe and Purves 
(1972), none of the studies in England and Wales which focused on cracked trials or 
negotiated pleas used a systematic analysis of contemporary completed case files as a 
research tool. McConville et al. examined case files as part of their 1994 Standing Accused 
study, but their focus was much wider ranging, and was confined primarily to the work of 
solicitors, not barristers. The examination of case files provided an invaluable quantitative 
dimension to this study, as well as being (an unexpected) source of qualitative data. When 
combined with the additional qualitative material from interviews, these three strands of 
data have complemented and mutually reinforced each other. 
 
Files held by the CPS were chosen in preference to defence files, as using CPS files meant 
that a broad cross section of files, stored chronologically, could more easily be accessed; 
obtaining defence files would have resulted in files from a very limited range of solicitors’ 
firms or negotiating access to a large number of firms, which may have been unfeasible. 
 
2.3.2  Gaining access to Crown Prosecution Service files 
 
The access to case files granted by the CPS, and the assistance of employees of the CPS in 
facilitating access to those files, and physically locating them was crucial to this study and a 
great deal of gratitude is owed to the organisation and those individuals within it. The 
process of gaining access was however lengthy, and once access had been agreed, there 
were practical impediments to carrying out the data collection as swiftly as had been hoped; 
both factors resulted in unavoidable modifications to the number of files which could be 
examined. Between first contacting the CPS to request access and being granted access in 
principle, nine months had elapsed, and a further five months passed before it was possible 
to start data collection. This delay was a result of waiting for security clearance, and for the 
CPS to extract the information to compile a list of case reference numbers from the 
relevant courts, over a suitable time period. It proved difficult to select a time period which 
was long enough to contain sufficient cases, but recent enough that the files had not been 
sent to remote storage. The data collection itself progressed at a slower pace than had been 
anticipated, for a variety of reasons. One issue was that a room within the CPS offices had 
to be booked for my use on a day by day or week by week basis, and when, as was often 
the case, all available rooms had already been booked, I was unable to carry out any work. 
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On those days when I was able to book a workspace, I was reliant on CPS support staff to 
locate the closed files from what was known as the ‘dead room’; if these staff had other 
tasks to carry out, or had been unable to locate the relevant files, I was left without 
sufficient files from which to extract data.  
 
2.3.3 Case selection 
 
The cases to be analysed were selected by non-random sampling, the process of which is 
described below. 
 
The CPS had provided me with a list of case numbers which I was informed represented a 
continuous, chronological sample of cases finalised at Manchester Minshull Street Crown 
Court and Manchester Crown Square Crown Court between June and August 2006.60 The 
intention had been to collect data from each of these cases (around 200 from each court) 
but to accommodate for the delays encountered (in part the practical problems outlined 
above, but also because the files yielded richer data than had been anticipated, which 
therefore took longer to record), this figure was revised and it was decided that only cases 
from Minshull Street would be analysed. After data from 81 cases on the June to August 
list had been recorded, it transpired that some of the files from the list had erroneously 
been taken for remote storage, and I was provided with an additional list of cases finalised 
at Minshull Street between September and December 2006; 38 cases were drawn from this 
list. 
 
In total, data were collected from 119 cases, out of a possible 560 cases which were 
finalised at Minshull Street between June and December 2006.61 The CPS in Greater 
Manchester processes cases within a structure of six geographical units loosely based on the 
locations of committing magistrates’ courts, and the files within the sample were drawn 
from three of those units (Salford, Sale and Stockport). Working teams at the CPS 
headquarters in Manchester are organised by geographical unit and retrieving cases 
necessitated liaising with managers of that particular unit; the three units in question 
proved to be those which were able to spare the time of an administrative assistant to 
locate case files for me. The total number of cases finalised at Minshull Street from the 
                                                 
60
 Finalised cases are those which have proceeded through all stages to either acquittal or 
sentencing on all counts. 
61
 Data on the total number of cases finalised at Minshull Street were obtained from the 
Performance Directorate of the Court Service. 
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Salford, Sale and Stockport units combined was 317, and the study’s sample of 119 
therefore represents 37.5% of the total number of cases in the population of three units 
sampled, and 21.3% of the wider sampling frame of all 560 cases to have been finalised at 
Minshull Street between June and December 2006.62   
 
2.3.4 The nature and content of the files 
 
The 119 cases from which data were collected involved a total of 151 defendants, and it 
was the defendant rather than the case that has been taken as the unit of analysis.63 Of the 
151 defendants, 75 (49.6%) had cracked trials, where a cracked trial was defined as a case in 
which all counts were disposed of by means of a guilty plea or the prosecution offering no 
evidence. The prosecution files contained a wealth of information potentially relevant to 
cracked trials; including the police records of the offence, witness statements, 
correspondence between the prosecution and defence, and between the police and the 
prosecution, the details of the lawyers involved in the case, the defendants’ personal details, 
records of the defendants’ previous offences, and of course the indictment, and details of 
pleas and sentences where relevant (the data collection form used is reproduced at 
Appendix A). 
 
Unexpectedly, the most interesting and useful source of information proved to be the 
CPS’s Crown Court Minute Sheet contained within each file, and updated (generally in 
extremely thorough detail) by CPS caseworkers at each stage of the case. It was this part of 
the file from which it was often possible to establish the reason for a change of plea guilty 
to the indictment as it stood, why a plea of guilty to lesser or fewer charges had come 
about, or the reasoning behind a CPS decision to offer no evidence in respect of a 
particular case. 
 
The minute sheet often provided contextual, qualitative data about the reasons for cracked 
trials in individual cases, supplementing the quantitative data which had originally been 
anticipated from the files. In the vast majority of files, all the material was present; only 
rarely was information missing, and on those occasions where it was, it was often possible 
                                                 
62 The figures for individual units break down as follows: Salford: 112 finalised in total, 50 
in sample; Sale: 88 finalised in total, 26 in sample; Stockport: 117 finalised in total, 75 in 
sample. 
63 CPS files are held for each individual case, not for each defendant, but where there were 
multiple defendants the file would contain individualised information where relevant. 
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to establish the relevant information using an alternative source.64  
 
2.3.5  Analysing case file data 
 
The quantitative data collected and recorded on the data collection forms was coded and 
entered into an SPSS database, and analysed using univariate descriptive statistics and 
bivariate statistics. The qualitative data recorded on data collection forms was collated and 
reproduced as one document and analysed thematically.65 
 
2.4 Methods used: Interviews 
 
Notwithstanding the unexpected qualitative data which could be extracted from the CPS 
files, this study benefited greatly from the additional depth and context interviews were 
able to bring to it. As discussed at 3.2 above, lawyers’ experiences and perceptions of the 
reasons for cracked trials was a significant focus of this thesis from the outset, and 
interviewing a range of legal professionals made it possible to provide an element of 
empiricism in the discussion of the lawyer’s role in late guilty pleas.  Baldwin and 
McConville (1977) came under fire for not interviewing lawyers, and taking defendant’s 
accounts at face value (see for example Seifman 1980 and the response to Negotiated Justice 
cited at p. viii of the study), whereas Tague’s recent research (2006, 2007) can be criticised 
for only approaching cracked trials from the perspective of the barrister, and taking these 
accounts at face value.66 In carrying out varied  interviews, as well as collating data from 
case files, this study attempts to bring together a range of data so as to gain a broad picture.  
 
2.4.1 Access to interviewees 
 
In total, ten interviews were conducted; four barristers, one solicitor, two circuit judges, 
two crown court case progression officers and one representative from the criminal 
defence service. Potential interviewees were chosen by a variety of means. The Bar 
Directory, available online, was used to search for barristers practicing at the criminal Bar 
                                                 
64 For example, if the record of previous convictions was missing, these were also detailed 
in the probation report.  
65 A larger data set, which it did not prove possible to analyse, was also obtained; details are 
provided at Appendix D. 
66 Baldwin and McConville (1977) did however go to considerable lengths to ensure their 
data had as much validity as possible, see in particular pp. vii – xii and pp. 59 – 82.  
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in Manchester.67 Fifty of those barristers were chosen at random, and written to, followed 
up with phone calls; this resulted in just four interviews. It had initially been hoped to carry 
out more interviews with barristers, but it proved difficult to do so within the timeframe of 
this study (exacerbated by the fact that criminal barristers in particular, spend much time at 
court making it difficult to contact them, save through their clerks).68 This notwithstanding, 
a great deal of invaluable data was transcribed from these four interviews. 
 
One interviewee suggested the names of two circuit judges, who he felt might be amenable 
to speaking to me, this proved to be the case, and they were both interviewed. For a 
broader perspective of the issues as they affect lawyers, one solicitor was interviewed (after 
contacting forty by email and telephone, from the list of solicitors practising criminal law in 
Manchester which it was possible to compile using the Law Society’s online search facility 
(www.lawsociety.org.uk). The broad perspective the study aimed at was developed further 
by speaking to two members of Manchester’s Crown Court case progression teams, and a 
representative from the Criminal Defence Service. 
 
It had been decided at a relatively early stage of this research not to collect data from 
defendants or those convicted of criminal offences, primarily for practical reasons. Access 
was granted by the Prison Service on a national level to interview prisoners in custody; this 
took nine months, and the terms of access still needed to be negotiated with local prisons 
individually, with no guarantee that it would be granted. Carrying out this additional 
element of the research would have been overly time consuming and was ultimately beyond 
the scope of this thesis. It is however hoped that interviews with defendants or convicted 
prisoners can be carried out at a later date to supplement the existing results of this project.  
 
2.4.2  Interview structure and content 
 
The most fitting style of interview was the semi-structured interview, which minimised the 
disadvantages of other methods whilst retaining some of their advantages. This was the 
primary method was used by Baldwin and McConville (1977), and Bottoms and McClean 
(1976) also used semi-structured interviews in addition to observation.  Semi-structured 
interviews allow for each interview to have a similar focus and achieve some consistency in 
                                                 
67 The directory was part of the Bar Council’s website but is now part of Legal Hub, 
www.legalhub.co.uk.  
68 Tague (2007) encountered similar problems and refers to only receiving two responses to 
questionnaires sent out to all members of the Criminal Bar Association (n.2). 
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the kind of data gathered; making it capable of being subjected to meaningful analysis. 
Interviewees were asked carefully phrased questions about the reasons for cracked trials, 
late guilty pleas and their perceived influence on plea in general terms, avoiding terms such 
as ‘bargain’ or ‘negotiation’. Plea bargaining is a grey area within the law and professional 
ethics and the phrase itself carries with it slight connotations of wrongdoing which were 
avoided. The interviews varied in length and format; all were face to face, bar one which 
was conducted over the telephone, and seven of the ten were recorded. The telephone 
interview was one of those not recorded, but detailed notes were taken during and after the 
conversation. The other two interviews which were not recorded took place at the same 
time as a group interview, in a noisy public place; the quality of the recording would have 
been insufficiently clear, so again detailed notes were taken during and after the interview. 
The shortest interview lasted for fifteen minutes, and the longest for 45 minutes; with an 
average duration of 25 minutes. 
 
2.4.3 Analysing interview data 
 
Interviews were recorded on a digital voice recorder, transferred to a PC, then transcribed 
and, as there were a relatively small number of transcripts, they were analysed thematically 
and without the need for qualitative software (see for example Mason 1996, p.137). 
 
2.5 Researching the ‘locally powerful’  
 
Baldwin has written that ‘Judges, lawyers, and other court personnel have proved in the 
past to be almost uniquely resistant to social research’ (2000, p. 237)  and that ‘studying the 
way that the criminal courts work remains a very tricky undertaking’ (2000, p. 238). A 
number of researchers have highlighted the problems which can arise when researching 
what Bell (1978) refers to as the ‘locally powerful’. Punch comments that ‘researchers have 
rarely penetrated to the territory of the ‘powerful’…and that field studies often focus on 
marginalized groups, referred to by Punch as ‘the so-called ‘nuts and sluts’’ (1986, p. 25). 
Baldwin and McConville, writing of the difficulties they encountered researching Negotiated 
Justice, warn that ‘no researcher who trespasses on this difficult terrain can expect an easy 
passage’( 1978, p. 228 ). Baldwin comments that following Negotiated Justice,  he and Mike 
McConville were described as being ‘the legal equivalent of Salman Rushdie’ by Sir Thomas 
Bingham (2000, p. 248). Evidently, there are some potential difficulties to be aware of 
when researching lawyers, particularly when the research relates to a relatively controversial 
topic such as plea bargaining. 
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The potential difficulties associated with research on groups or individuals who enjoy a 
certain status are threefold. Firstly, groups such as lawyers are less likely to consent to take 
part in research, either because they are genuinely too busy or because they view the 
research as unworthy of their valuable time, or fear that the research will reflect badly on 
them or challenge their authority. Secondly, that even if they do take part in research, those 
in a position of authority (perhaps in common with anyone) may present information in 
such a way that reflects well on themselves and / or not reveal their true beliefs and 
behaviour. Thirdly, that they may object to any conclusions drawn from the research, 
which applies particularly if the research is to be published. Negotiated Justice for example, 
was described by the Chairman of the Bar at the time as ‘a compilation of unsubstantiated 
anecdotes’ and as ‘no more than the tittle-tattle of the cells’ (The Guardian, 9th June 1977). 
 
To minimise the impact of these problems, it has been suggested that a researcher needs to 
be as knowledgeable as possible about the work of the ‘locally powerful’ individual being 
interviewed in order to command a greater degree of legitimacy (Mungham and Thomas 
1981, p. 90). Conversely, Punch points out the fact that a researcher who seems young and 
inexperienced is more likely to be perceived as non-threatening and may elicit sympathy 
and a willingness to help from respondents (1986, p. 24). One cannot make the assumption 
that lawyers will not speak frankly; they may welcome the opportunity to speak about their 
work and the issues which affect them (Mungham and Hoffman 1980). Even John Baldwin 
has written that ‘times are changing and new opportunities are opening up’ for researchers 
(2000, p. 238).  
 
Mungham and Thomas further comment that some lawyers were more willing to talk 
honestly if researchers were able to indicate that they had some prior knowledge from 
other lawyers who had talked frankly and write that ‘[t]hus if we could include in interviews 
statements like ‘we have been told that’ or ‘we have often heard that’ and seeking 
confirmation or comment, we would frequently provoke opinion and ideas from those 
who had previously been taciturn or cautious. Being able to display previous knowledge in 
this way, has been a tactic used quite successfully in other studies of lawyers’ (1981, p.85). 
My experience was that a combination of approaches was necessary, and that it was 
essential to be flexible and respond to the interviewees’ lead at times. On occasion it was 
apparent that interviewees expected me to have very little knowledge of law or legal 
procedure, others quite the opposite, and it was necessary to adapt my questions and the 
nature of my rapport with them accordingly so as to elicit as much information as possible. 
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In each of the ten interviews, it was as soon as I mentioned that I had trained as a barrister 
that interviewees appeared to become not only more technical, but less guarded in their 
responses. As Fontana and Frey write, interviewers cannot ‘ignore contextual, societal, and 
interpersonal elements. Each interview context is one of interaction and relation; the result 
is as much a product of this social dynamic as it is a product of accurate accounts and 
replies’ (2000, p. 647) and this appeared to be very much the case.  
 
Above all, it was necessary to approach the interviews in a sensitive way which did not 
explicitly refer to ‘plea bargaining’, at least unless interviewees had already used the term 
themselves, as did happen on occasion; defensive lawyers would have been unlikely to add 
much to the research. It was also necessary though to strike a balance between this 
sensitive approach, and asking direct questions of interviewees so as to ensure that all the 
interviews covered the issues within the remit of the research. 
 
2.6 Ethics 
 
2.6.1 Interviews 
 
Plea-bargaining, whilst in some senses a legalistic or even a purely administrative concern  
is nonetheless a ‘sensitive topic’ which has been described as a study ‘in which there are 
potential consequences or implications, either directly for the participants in the research or 
for the class of individuals represented by the research’ (Sieber and Stanley 1988, p. 49). 
Renzetti and Lee (1993, p.4) emphasize sensitive research as being that which could ‘that 
seem to be threatening in some way to those being studies’. They identify that one area of 
sensitive research is where research ‘impinges on the vested interests of powerful persons’ 
(1993, p. 6) – such as solicitors and barristers who may be uncomfortable divulging 
information about the practice of plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is a grey area in the 
ethics of the legal profession, and there are no clear guidelines for lawyers to adhere to.69 It 
raises fundamental questions about due process rights, the voluntariness of defendants’ 
plea and the adversarial nature of the trial process; lawyers are unlikely to want to be 
perceived as working in a manner which goes against these basic principles of the criminal 
justice system. 
 
 
                                                 
69 The ethical framework within which defending barristers operate is discussed further at 
Chapter 3.2 
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2.6.2 Confidentiality and anonymity 
 
The confidentiality and anonymity of sensitive information was ensured by adhering to the 
following principles: 
 
Case file data 
 
(i) Data collection took place on CPS premises, and no portion of the files was 
copied or removed 
(ii) Initially, some of the data collected still contained identifying information, 
so any data on paper were kept in a locked filing cabinet and Word 
documents were encrypted and password protected.  
(iii) Once analysed, the results no longer contained any identifying information 
any remaining identifying raw data was permanently deleted or destroyed. 
 
Interview data  
 
(i) This data was contained in several formats; the initial MP3 recordings, 
which were then uploaded from the MP3 recorder onto a PC, and the 
transcriptions of those interviews in Word format.  
(ii) All data held on a PC, along with back up copies, were encrypted and 
password protected.  
(iii) Back up copies of data were stored on CDs and kept in a locked filing 
cabinet 
(iv) MP3 files on the voice recorder were deleted as soon as they were 
transferred to the PC and MP3 files on the PC were deleted once they had 
been transcribed. 
(v) I completed the transcription myself and data was anonymized during the 
initial transcription process. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
Within the timeframe available, the methods chosen provided the most suitable means of 
exploring the study’s research questions, and yielded a wide range of data. The extraction 
of quantitative data from CPS files allowed for an exploration of a range of quantifiable 
features of the cases which had potential applicability to the causes and features of cracked 
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trials. The qualitative data contained within those files, alongside the interviews conducted 
added depth and context to the data and made it possible to explore the reasons for 
individual cracked trials within the sample and greater depth, and to add to what is known 
about lawyers’ perceptions of late guilty pleas and their roles in advising defendants on 
plea. It was regrettable that it was not possible to collect data from 400 case files as had 
been initially intended, but the data which was collected proved to be more than sufficient 
to achieve to aims of the research.  
 
The following chapter draws together the existing literature as well as the relevant data 
collected by the present study, in order to provide an analysis of the role of defence lawyers 
in cracked trials and plea bargaining. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE DEFENCE LAWYER’S ROLE IN CRACKED TRIALS AND PLEA 
BARGAINING 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The role of legal professionals has been identified by the literature as a central issue in the 
plea bargaining debate, as well as more generally in relation to plea formation and late guilty 
pleas, both in the UK and in the USA. This chapter provides a critique of that literature 
and develops the debate by drawing together the range of issues which currently affect the 
lawyer’s role in cracked trials and plea bargaining in England and Wales, with reference to 
the empirical data gathered by this study where relevant.70 As the focus of this thesis is the 
cracked trial and plea bargaining from the defendant’s perspective, this chapter primarily 
considers the role of the defence lawyer. 
 
A divide exists between the approach taken by the majority of academic studies which have 
tended to find that lawyers create or at least contribute to pressures upon defendants to 
plead guilty, and the criminal justice policy approach which has tended to view defence 
lawyers as ‘uncooperative’. Rather than the concern that they may put pressure on 
defendants to plead guilty, the problem from a policy perspective is seen as one of lawyers 
assisting or encouraging defendants to plead guilty at a late stage in their cases, and thereby 
contributing to defendants playing the system in a ‘frustration of the orderly preparation of 
both sides’ case for trial’ (Auld Report 2001, para 9).  
 
This chapter reappraises and draws together the variety of issues contributing to, and raised 
by, the defence lawyer’s role in plea formation in light of the existing literature, case law 
and professional codes of practice. This is supported by original data from interviews and 
case files where appropriate, and the three core issues addressed within this chapter are: (i) 
the legal and ethical framework; (ii) remuneration; and (iii) working relationships. 
Throughout, this chapter considers whether the features of the lawyer’s role in the plea 
formation process are conducive to the defendant playing the system, or whether the 
lawyer’s role is an element of pressures which are brought to bear upon defendants to 
                                                 
70 The data drawn upon for this chapter are primarily those gathered from the interviews 
conducted with legal professionals, and qualitative data extracted from Crown Prosecution 
Service files.  
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plead guilty. 
 
3.1.1 Previous studies in England and Wales 
 
Few studies to have considered cracked trials, late guilty pleas or plea bargaining have not 
at least touched on the role of legal professionals in the process of plea formation.71 Most 
of the UK research in this field (in common with this study) focuses on the role of the 
barrister, rather than that of the solicitor. It is the barrister who comes into contact with 
the client at a later stage in the case, when more of the evidence has been disclosed, and is 
thus more likely to play a key role during the stage at which a plea is determined (see 
Zander and Henderson 1993; McConville et al 1994, p. 244). This has particular relevance 
to cracked trials, which occur at court, on the day of the trial, as this may also be the first 
time the defendant encounters his barrister (Zander and Henderson 1993, p.1732). Several 
studies have presented findings on the relationship between advice from counsel and late 
guilty pleas (Bottoms and McClean 1976; Baldwin and McConville 1977; Zander and 
Henderson 1993; Hedderman and Moxon 1992; McConville et al. 1994; Tague 2006, 2007). 
Most recently, Stephen and Tata (2006), Stephen, Fazio and Tata (2008) and Stephen and 
Garoupa (2008) have published findings on the lawyer’s role in plea bargaining in Scotland 
from an economic efficiency perspective. Whilst Morison and Leith commented over 
fifteen years ago that ‘the advocate is the one actor in the legal process who has escaped 
the scalpel of the investigative researcher’ (1992, p.3), the emergence of a greater focus on 
the legal profession suggests that the scalpel may now be cutting somewhat deeper. 
Nonetheless, the body of empirical work in England and Wales dedicated to the lawyer’s 
role in plea bargaining  remains small, particularly as Baldwin and McConville’s and Tague’s 
research are the only studies to have focussed primarily on the barrister’s role in 
defendants’ guilty pleas.72 
 
The literature has, however, provided some significant and revealing findings. Bottoms and 
McCleans’ research found that in 68% of cases in which there was a late guilty plea, last 
minute advice from a defendant’s barrister was the reason cited for the plea change. Of the 
                                                 
71 Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 1, some accounts attribute the rise of plea bargaining to 
developments in the role of defence lawyers. See for example Langbein (1978); Feeley 
(1997).  
72 In addition to the empirical studies, there is some significant literature in the area (for 
example Ashworth and Blake 1998, 2004; McConville 1998; McConville and Bridges 1993; 
Cape 2006), and literature whose focus is on the ethics of the legal profession more broadly 
conceived (see for example Boon and Levin 1999, Cranston 1995, Abel 2003, Nicolson 
2005). 
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study’s sample who were deemed to be ‘possibly innocent’, yet still pleaded guilty, the 
authors found that 34% had done so on their lawyers’ advice (1976, p. 128). In Baldwin 
and McConville’s sample of cases, out of the 48 cases where pressure from barrister was 
cited as the main reason for change of plea, Baldwin and McConville were of the view that 
in 20 cases, counsel acted within the confines of professional code, was careful in advising 
about sentence and gave advice in general terms with no false expectations held out. In the 
remaining 28 cases however, there was evidence that the advice was such that ‘no 
reasonable person could say that it was fair or proper or that the final decision to plead 
guilty was made voluntarily’ (1977, p. 45). Of these 28 defendants, 23 said they had been 
given no alternative but to plead guilty and that their barrister had ‘instructed’, ‘ordered’, or 
‘terrorised’ them into pleading guilty (1977, p.46). Zander and Henderson’s Crown Court 
Study (1993) found that in almost 70% of cases in which the defendant met his barrister on 
the day of the trial for the first time (and thus received direct advice from his barrister for 
the first time at that stage), the defendant entered a late guilty plea. Hedderman and Moxon 
interviewed 282 offenders convicted at the Crown Court and found that 37% stated that 
their final plea differed from the plea they had intended to enter and bar one, each of these 
defendants said that their solicitor or barrister had advised them to plead guilty (1992, 
p.23). McConville et al.’s Standing Accused (1994) although centred around the work of 
solicitors, also considered counsel’s role. The authors found that pre-trial discussions 
between defence counsel and the defendant were characterised by ‘..discontinuous 
representation, hurried review of the evidence, and a structural propensity to encourage the 
defendant to avoid trial and instead plead guilty to the charge or some lesser negotiated 
offence’ (p. 239). They also found that, whilst during the early stages of a case pressure to 
plead guilty was subtle, ‘with the defendant’s determination to go to trial being sapped 
rather than directly confronted (p. 252), conferences at court on the day of the trial were 
less relaxed, characterised by ‘severe tension’ (p. 254), and that the pressure on the 
defendant ‘crystallise[d] in this one moment’ (p. 255). 
 
Stephen, in his recent research on the remuneration of defence lawyers in Scotland, argues 
that whilst plea bargaining has generally been regarded as efficiency enhancing by the 
literature on law and economics, this is not necessarily the case, particularly when the 
effects of the defence lawyer’s incentives are taken into account. Stephen and Tata (2006), 
Stephen, Fazio and Tata (2008), and Stephen and Garoupa (2008) have argued that the 
defence lawyer’s financial incentives can determine the outcome of a plea bargain in a way 
which is not necessarily consistent with the enhancement of efficiency, nor with 
defendants’ due process rights.  
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However, Tague’s research (2006, 2007) contradicts many of the previous studies’ findings, 
albeit not entirely convincingly. Tague argues that barristers have three selfish interests: to 
attract briefs, to avoid sanction, and to maximise remuneration, and that upon closer 
examination, their pursuit of these interests inclines barristers towards trials, rather than 
guilty pleas (2007, p.3). A flaw in this argument is the assumption that these are the only 
goals or interests pursued by barristers and Tague fails to adequately consider competing 
factors such as the importance of maintaining working relationships or managing busy 
caseloads. A variety of conceptualisations of lawyers’ competing interests have been put 
forward by the literature both in England and Wales and in the USA, yet Tague fails to 
acknowledge their potential significance.73  
 
For the most part, the existing empirical literature on defence barristers and their lay 
clients’ guilty pleas in England and Wales therefore provides compelling evidence that 
barristers may on occasion encourage the defendants they represent to plead guilty. 
However, much of the evidence is  now outdated; both Bottoms and McClean’s Defendants 
in the Criminal Process, and Baldwin and McConville’s Negotiated Justice were published over 
three decades ago and the legal profession has undergone changes even in the 15 years 
since McConville et al’s Standing Accused was published in 1994.  
 
3.2 The legal and ethical framework 
 
The extent to which barristers can (or ought) to influence their clients’ pleas is regulated by 
two key instruments; the Turner rules, and the Code of Conduct for the Bar of England and 
Wales. 
 
3.2.1 The Turner rules 
 
The facts of Turner ([1970] 2 Q.B. 321) were as follows: the defendant pleaded not guilty at 
his trial on a charge of theft; he had previous convictions, and was advised by counsel, in 
strong terms, to change his plea to guilty. After having spoken to the trial judge (with the 
defendant’s knowledge), counsel advised that in his opinion a non-custodial sentence 
would be imposed if the defendant changed his plea to guilty, but if he persisted with a plea 
of not guilty, with an attack being made on police witnesses, and was convicted, there was a 
                                                 
73 See for example Blumberg (1967b); Alschuler (1968, 1975); Feeley (1973); McConville et 
al (1994); Fisher (2003); McConville and Mirsky (2005); Vogel (2007). 
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real possibility of a custodial sentence. Repeated statements were made to the defendant 
that the ultimate choice of plea was his, but the defendant had gained the impression that 
counsel’s views were those of the trial judge; nothing was said to suggest that they were not 
and the defendant changed his plea to guilty. Turner subsequently appealed against his 
conviction, on the grounds that he did not have a free choice in retracting the plea of not 
guilty and pleading guilty. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ruling that counsel 
could properly advise a defendant in strong terms to change his plea provided that it was 
made clear to him that the ultimate choice was his; but that, if the advice was conveyed as 
that of someone who has seen the judge, a defendant should be disabused of any 
impression that the judge’s views were being repeated and that as the defendant may have 
felt that the views expressed were those of the judge he could not be said to have had a 
free choice in changing his plea, and that the plea of guilty should be treated as a nullity. 
 
The Court of Appeal also took the opportunity to lay down some general guidelines as to 
the defence barrister’s permitted role in advising on pleas of guilty. The resulting Turner 
rules can be summarized as five main points: 
 
(i) counsel must be completely free to do what is his duty, namely to give the 
accused the best advice he can – if need be in strong terms. This will often 
include advice that a plea of guilty, showing an element of remorse, is a 
mitigating factor which may well enable the court to give a lesser sentence 
than would otherwise be the case; 
(ii) counsel will emphasize that the accused must not plead guilty    unless he 
has committed the acts constituting the offence charged; 
(iii) the accused must have complete freedom of choice whether to plead guilty         
or not guilty; 
(iv) there must be freedom of access between counsel and judge, but counsel 
must only ask to see the judge if really necessary – as justice must be 
administered in open court, and; 
(v) the judge should never indicate the sentence he is minded to impose. The 
one exception to this is that it is permissible for a judge to say that whatever 
happens, the sentence will or will not take a particular form.74 
 
                                                 
74 The last of these points has effectively been overruled by the decision in Goodyear [2005] 
EWCA Crim 888, in which the Court of Appeal outlined the procedure for advance 
indications of maximum sentences to be given. 
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The appeal in Turner was allowed only on the basis that the appellant had been given the 
impression that counsel’s views came directly from the trial judge, and not because counsel 
had exerted any pressure on Turner. The Court of Appeal stated that the advice could be 
given in ‘strong terms’ and that the notion of a barrister exerting undue pressure on a 
defendant to the extent that a defendant would feel he had no choice in the matter was ‘a 
very extravagant proposition, and one which would only be acceded to in a very extreme 
case’ ([1970] 2 Q.B. 321 at 325). This suggests that even the authority intended to prevent 
undue pressure being exerted on defendants showed an unwillingness to countenance the 
possibility of that pressure originating in the advice of the defendant’s own barrister on all 
but the rarest occasions. 
 
3.2.2  Post-Turner case law 
 
Since Turner, several noteworthy cases have considered appeals from defendants claiming 
to have been put under pressure to plead guilty. In Herbert75, the defendant had been jointly 
charged with his wife on drugs offences, and both pleaded not guilty. At the trial, Herbert 
was informed that if he pleaded guilty, the CPS would not proceed with the case against his 
wife. Herbert pleaded guilty but continued to maintain his innocence and later appealed on 
the grounds that the prosecution had put improper pressure on him and therefore rendered 
his plea a nullity. The appeal was dismissed; the Court held that counsel for both defence 
and prosecution had behaved properly and that Herbert had had the ‘freedom to make his 
own choice’. It was stated that joinder of spouses, partners or other associates must not be 
used to secure a guilty plea from the main suspect but where such persons have been 
properly jointly indicted, it may often be in the public interest not to proceed against one of 
them if the principal offender pleads guilty and that the appellant can not have been said to 
have lost the power to have made a voluntary and deliberate choice. 
 
Roden76 concerned an appeal against conviction and sentence of life imprisonment for arson 
following a guilty plea. The appellant asserted that she had no recollection of committing 
the offences and had been persuaded to plead guilty following pressure from legal advisors. 
The appeal was dismissed notwithstanding the fact that immediately after pleading guilty 
she told the police officer in the dock she wanted to change her plea and defence counsel 
stated in mitigation that she could not remember making the fires, and had pleaded guilty 
only as a result of the strong circumstantial evidence against her. However, the Court of 
                                                 
75 (1992) 94 Cr. App. R. 230. 
76 [1995] C.L.Y. 1187. 
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Appeal held that Roden had not been influenced by undue pressure; the evidence against 
her was strong and although she intended to plead not guilty until the day of the trial and 
had hesitated considerably about her plea, that did not necessarily indicate undue pressure. 
 
In the case of Marshall (Leslie)77, Marshall appealed against a conviction for murder. He 
contended that the judge had erred in refusing to allow him to vacate his guilty plea, 
arguing that there was evidence that he had lacked the requisite intention as he had 
consumed a quantity of alcohol prior to the killing and that the plea had only been entered 
following advice from counsel, which had been pressurising. The appeal was dismissed; it 
was held that there was no realistic prospect of the jury finding a lack of intent due to 
alcohol, and that the plea had been entered of the appellant’s own free will; the only 
pressure being the factual situation that he himself had created. 
 
White (Leslie James)78 concerned a conviction for arson, and a convoluted series of problems 
with the defendant’s representation. Counsel at the initial trial had withdrawn following a 
disagreement with White over advice to change his plea to guilty. At a new hearing, White 
was represented by different counsel and changed his plea on advice, but subsequently 
denied guilt at his pre sentence review interview, and counsel withdrew on the grounds that 
he felt unable to mitigate on the basis of the pre sentence review. White was then 
represented by a third counsel, who sought to have White re-arraigned so that he could 
enter a plea of not guilty. The application was refused and the judge allowed counsel to 
withdraw before proceeding to pass sentence. White sought permission to appeal, arguing 
that the sentencing judge had not exercised his discretion by making enquiries to satisfy 
himself that the defendant had not been pressurized into changing his plea. This 
application was also refused and it was stated that the strength of the prosecution case, 
which included the identification evidence of two police officers, and the fact that the plea 
was entered on the advice of experienced counsel, meant that permission would not be 
given for the guilty plea to be withdrawn.  
 
In Khan (Janghir)79, the defendant appealed against a five year sentence following a plea of 
guilty to causing grievous bodily harm with intent. The day before the trial, the Recorder, in 
chambers, indicated that Khan would receive four years’ imprisonment on a guilty plea and 
accordingly, he pleaded guilty. In this case, the appeal was allowed; it was held that the 
                                                 
77 [2000] WL 1841613. 
78 [2001] N.I. 172. 
79 [2004] WL 195977.  
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Recorder had erred by giving an indication of the likely sentence on a guilty plea (Khan was 
heard pre Goodyear) – irregularities following from such an error could result in the 
quashing of a conviction where the change of plea could be attributed to improper pressure 
or, alternatively, it could raise a legitimate expectation as to the type and length of sentence. 
Here, the court held that it would be wrong to break the judge’s promise and a sentence of 
four years’ imprisonment was substituted.  
 
In Bargery80 the appellant had pleaded guilty to using threatening behaviour contrary to s.4 
of the Public Order Act 1986; the lesser alternative to affray. Bargery’s grounds of appeal 
were that the guilty plea was not entered freely and / or was equivocal. A co-defendant had 
pleaded guilty to same offence, and two meetings had taken place with the judge; which 
were attended by both counsel. In the first, counsel for the co-accused sought an indication 
from the judge as to whether a guilty plea might attract a community sentence. However, 
counsel for the appellant had clear instructions to fight the affray allegation whatever 
indications may be given and sought no indication. The judge indicated to counsel for the 
co-accused that he could not give such an indication. From an early stage, the CPS had 
indicated that they would be prepared to accept a plea to s.4 of the Public Order Act, but 
when counsel took further instructions from the appellant, since he could not assure him 
that a plea to s.4 was guaranteed to attract a community sentence, he still wished to 
proceed to trial. The co-defendant was anxious to accept the offer and agreed to give 
evidence against the appellant. A second meeting took place with the judge to inform him 
of that development and the judge indicated to all counsel that if both defendants pleaded 
guilty to s.4 he would not impose a custodial sentence. Counsel went back to the appellant 
to inform him of these two developments; firstly that he was much less likely to be 
acquitted at trial given the co-accused’s evidence against him, and secondly that he would 
receive a community sentence if he pleaded guilty to s.4; whereas affray would be virtually 
certain to attract a custodial sentence. Counsel stated that he pointed out that the offer very 
tempting but that he made it clear it was the appellant’s free choice. The appellant accepted 
the offer. On appeal, the court held that the judge’s indication should not have gone 
beyond an indication that the same type of sentence would be imposed regardless of the 
plea (again, this case was heard pre-Goodyear). In this case, the judge had indicated a 
contrasting situation which would arise on the basis of the lesser offence. It was held that 
was not a choice which should have been put before the appellant; the verdict was deemed 
unsafe and was quashed. 
                                                 
80 [2004] WL 852376. 
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What these cases have in common is that the appeals were only allowed in the two cases 
(Kahn (Janghir) and Bargery) in which there was incontrovertible evidence that specific offers, 
involving the judge had been made, which had led directly to the entering of a guilty plea. 
Where the facts have been more nebulous and the appeal has turned on the defendant’s 
interpretation of what was said to them by their barrister, the courts have been reluctant to 
find that any pressure has been brought to bear. Most worryingly, an element of the 
rationale of disallowing the appeals in Roden, Marshall (Leslie) and White appears to have 
been that there was strong evidence against the defendants in those cases. This ought not, 
if due process values are adhered to, have any bearing on the likelihood or acceptability of a 
defendant having been pressurised into pleading guilty. An analysis of the case law would 
therefore suggest that, rather than the defendants in question having attempted to gain 
from changing their pleas to guilty, they were put under some pressure to do so, albeit it 
not in each case pressure of a degree which the Court of Appeal felt contravened the 
principle that a defendant’s plea must be voluntary and informed. 
 
3.2.3 Codes of Conduct 
 
Codes of conduct play a pivotal role in the regulation of legal professions; they are not 
uniformly successful in achieving their aims but as Nicolson writes, ‘they are the closest 
one comes to a collective statement of the ideals, values and behavioural standards to 
which the professions are committed’ (2005, p.605). Practising barristers are regulated by 
the Code of Conduct for the Bar of England and Wales (2004, 8th edn.), and if prosecuting 
are also bound by the Code of Conduct for Crown Prosecutors (2004, 5thedn.).81 The Code 
of Conduct for the Bar states that: 
 
‘A barrister has an overriding duty to act with independence in the interests of justice; 
he must assist the Court in the administration of justice and must not deceive or 
knowingly or recklessly mislead the Court’ (para. 302). 
 
Until revised in 1998, the Code also stated that; 
 
‘Where a defendant tells his counsel that he did not commit the offence with which he 
                                                 
81 The Bar Standards Board launched a consultation on the content of the Code of 
Conduct for the Bar in March 2009, the results of which have not, at the time of writing, 
been published. See www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/consultations.  
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is charged but nevertheless insists on pleading guilty for reasons of his own, counsel 
must continue to represent him, but only after he has advised what the consequences 
will be and that what can be submitted in mitigation can only be on the basis that the 
client is guilty’ (at para. 12.5 Annex H). 
 
The most recent version now also reads that counsel ‘may’ continue to represent the 
defendant ‘if he is satisfied that it is proper to do so’ having explored the defendant’s 
reasons (2004, at para. 11.5.3(a) of Section 3). 
 
McConville (writing prior to the amendment) argued that the Code of Conduct did not 
serve to protect defendants from undue pressure to plead guilty because when the two 
provisions were combined, courts were able to accept pleas of guilty despite protestations 
of innocence from the defendant by manipulating the ethical concepts of responsibility and 
duty. He put forward the view that the requirement that a defendant must plead personally 
had been converted into the notion that responsibility for the plea was solely that of the 
defendant, and argued that this should not be the case, as once the facts implied by a guilty 
plea were out of line with private assertions of innocence to counsel, the plea could no 
longer be the sole responsibility of the client. By sharing knowledge, counsel shared 
responsibility and would become party to a deception of the court. However this, 
McConville argued, was circumvented by a manipulation of the ethical concept of duty. 
Where there was an inconsistent plea, and counsel was fully aware of the contradiction, 
under the rules of the Code of Conduct (pre-1998), it was stated that counsel ‘must 
continue to represent’ the client who maintained innocence yet wished to plead guilty. 
McConville argued that by elevating that professional responsibility to the client over any 
competing considerations of the nature of the representation, the barrister was relieved 
from having to reflect upon ethical considerations (1998, p.571); a criticism which, upon a 
careful reading of  the Code, seems justified. 
 
Although the Code of Conduct was amended in 1998 and the barrister is no longer strictly 
obliged to continue to represent the defendant, but may do so ‘if appropriate’, 
McConville’s argument still stands. Indeed, paragraph 11.5(a) of the amended version still 
reads that a barrister ‘must’ continue to represent the defendant; the provision is clearly 
incompatible with 11.5.3(a) which follows. In practice, for a barrister to withdraw from a 
case and leave a defendant unrepresented is unlikely to happen often given such vague 
guidance as to when it might be the proper course of action. Furthermore, it would 
disadvantage both the barrister who would be left without work, and the defendant who 
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would be left without representation, face further delays and be forced into a position 
where he would be unable to tell his new barrister the truth for fear of being left once more 
without representation. 
 
Some of the ethical issues which arise in this context are considered by Ashworth and 
Blake (1998, 2004), who highlight the fact that in most legal systems (England and Wales 
included) professional standards are not enshrined in legislation (1998, p.17). It is notable 
that the first Code of Conduct for the Bar was not published until 1980, despite the fact 
that solicitors have operated under a Law Society Code of Conduct since 1974 (which is 
still relatively late), and the Law Society Code of Conduct is over three times the length of 
the Bar’s Code of Conduct (Nicholson and Webb 1999, p. 98). Moreover, regardless of 
how long the Codes of Conduct have been in existence, or how detailed they are, they are 
drawn up by the professions themselves and are enforced by way of self regulation (in 
common with most professional codes of conduct). Ashworth and Blake are critical of the 
self-regulation of legal professional codes and argue that as the integrity of the legal 
profession is fundamental to the administration of justice, which in turn is a basic 
constitutional function, legal professional standards ought to be capable of being legally 
enforced (1998, p.17).   
 
For prosecuting advocates, the Code for Crown Prosecutors contains additional guidance:  
 
‘Crown Prosecutors should never go ahead with more charges than are necessary just 
to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a few. In the same way, they should never 
go ahead with a more serious charge just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to 
a less serious one’ (para. 7.2, 2004), and; 
 
‘Crown Prosecutors must never accept a guilty plea just because it is convenient’ 
(para. 10.1 2004). 
  
Both sets of guidelines are vague and leave a great deal of scope for discretion. It is for 
example difficult to draw a distinction between a ‘convenient’ guilty plea, and one which is 
in the interests of justice as it saves time, money, spares witnesses an ordeal and ensures a 
conviction: what could be more ‘convenient’ than a plea which achieves those goals? Rosett 
and Cressy argued that conflicts in goals and ethical guidance are more likely to arise when 
those goals are expressed vaguely, and this would appear to be the case here (1976, p.127). 
It is of course not individual barristers who are responsible for any insufficiency in the 
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ethical guidance provided by the Codes; they too suffer the consequences as they are 
unable to perform their roles backed by the security of clear guidance as to what the ethical 
limits of those roles are.  The only instruction pupil barristers are likely to receive on the 
acceptability and process of counselling defendants as to their plea, or if prosecuting, 
accepting guilty pleas in exchange for reductions in the severity of, or number of, charges is 
likely to be from observing their pupil master at work (Tague 2006, p. 24) and it is not an 
area which is covered during the academic stage of a barrister’s training. Cape aptly 
describes the ethical limits of the defence lawyer’s role as ‘opaque’ (2006, p. 56) and argues 
that defence lawyers are isolated in the ethical decisions they make (p. 78). The fact that the 
Law Society and Bar Council have set up ethics ‘help lines’ to which lawyers can resort if 
they are uncertain about the appropriate course of action in a case may be indicative of the 
fact that lawyers themselves find the Codes of Conduct insufficient. Nicolson has argued 
that one way in which codes of conduct can function to ‘make lawyers moral’ is by 
‘inculcating ethical norms both at the start of and throughout a professional’s career’ (2005, 
p.605); a function which is impossible if such norms are not clearly expressed, as is 
currently true of England and Wales. 
 
The combined effect of the Turner rules, subsequent case law and the Codes of Conduct is 
therefore to allow all but the most explicit (judicial) pressure to plead guilty to take place in 
a legal and ethical vacuum, with little guidance available to the barrister other than the 
working practices of his or her peers. In a system in which there are considerable benefits 
to pleading guilty, it is inevitable that the advantages of a guilty plea may legitimately be 
part of a defence lawyer’s advice to his client.82 Even Alschuler, who advocated the 
complete abolition of plea bargaining believed that, as long as there were benefits to 
pleading guilty it was unfair to deny even innocent defendants the choice to do so (1975, 
p.1296). At present however, the form which that advice may take is not sufficiently clear, 
and the fine line between advice and coercion is blurred, which Alschuler argued was an 
inevitable consequence of a guilty plea system (1975, p.1310). It is therefore not necessarily 
the case that defence barristers deliberately intend to coerce clients to plead guilty, but the 
existence of relevant research and appeal cases suggests that it does happen; certainly there 
seems scant protection within the legal or ethical framework to prevent advice becoming 
coercive and creating a pressure to plead guilty and shows no signs of being a framework 
within which defendants have the capacity to play the system.  
                                                 
82 The recommendations of the Seabrook Committee (1992), outlined at Chapter 1.9 would 
suggest that the Bar has long been in support of measures which allow the advantages of a 
guilty plea to be made very plain to a defendant. 
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There are several other issues of relevance to the defence lawyer’s role in cracked trials and 
plea bargaining though, and the remainder of this chapter considers the importance of 
remuneration, reputation, and the range of working relationships which may impact upon 
the reasons for cracked trials.  
 
3.3 Remuneration 
 
As self-employed practitioners, barristers often take on a high volume of work. This applies 
particularly to criminal barristers, whose earnings are significantly lower than those of their 
peers working in other areas of law, and many may feel the need to take on as many cases 
as possible to boost their income (Morison and Leith 1992, p.64). In 2005, The Times 
reported the findings of a survey of 1000 criminal barristers; 80% had said they were 
willing to turn down briefs – effectively go on strike without an income – if their rates of 
pay were not increased. 83 The article reported that hourly rates of pay for junior barrister 
were calculated at only £33.50 before tax, rising to £47 for senior barristers (excluding 
QCs). Nearly half of all chambers surveyed reported problems retaining barristers and 
‘general demoralisation’. The article quoted one barrister who had decided to leave the 
profession because ‘it has cost me £40,000 on a professional studies loan to become a 
barrister. I cannot now work for nothing’. Some work, such as advising clients they have 
no right to appeal, is not paid at all. 
 
Barristers have therefore traditionally tended to accept a surplus of work in the knowledge 
that many cases will be negotiated and not reach trial stage, which in itself provides an 
incentive to settle cases through negotiation and bargaining in order to manage the excess 
caseload (Morison and Leith 1992, p.64).  
 
The authors of Standing Accused (1994) found that many barristers deliberately manipulated 
cases so as to not achieve a settlement until the actual day of the trial because under the 
legal aid rules at the time, the fee chargeable for a straightforward guilty plea was 
considerably less than for a case that cracked at the last minute (1994, pp.253-4). Following 
several years of uncertainty, the Carter Review, Lord Carter’s Report on Legal Aid 
Procurement, was published in 1995 and the way defence barristers’ fees are calculated is 
currently governed by the Revised Advocacy Graduated Fee Scheme (RAGFS). The 
                                                 
83 The Times June 6th 2005. 
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RAGFS was brought into force by the Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order and took 
effect from the end of April 2007.84 A criticism of the previous graduated fee scheme had 
been that it inadequately rewarded pre-trial preparation and made cracked trials an 
attractive proposition to defence barristers (Tague 2000). The current system works on the 
principle that a barrister is assigned a basic fee per case which is dependant on the offence, 
the seniority of the barrister and the type of case (mention, guilty plea, cracked trial, trial 
and so forth). The basic fee includes a certain number of days of trial, witnesses and pages 
of evidence, and barristers receive an additional fee, or ‘uplift’ for additional trial days, 
witnesses and pages of evidence; again at a rate dependant on seniority, the offence and the 
type of hearing.85 
 
McConville et al.’s finding in Standing Accused that barristers on occasion deliberately 
cracked trials as it served  their financial interests (1994, pp.253-254) may well still hold true 
despite recent changes in the fee structure.  In a recent study of the impact of the 
introduction of fixed fees for defence lawyers in Scotland, Stephen and Garoupa have 
argued that if lawyers are insufficiently remunerated, they will spend less time on each case 
and less able lawyers will be those most likely to end up representing poor defendants; plea 
bargaining becomes a way of achieving the objective of taking on as many cases as possible 
and less able lawyers are likely to favour plea bargaining over trials (2008, p.342).  
In England and Wales, the time between a case first being listed for trial and the actual date 
of the trial hearing is currently split into three equal time periods, and once what is known 
as the ‘first third’ has passed, the barrister is entitled to receive the cracked trial fee for that 
case, rather than the lower guilty plea fee. It could therefore be in barristers’ interests to 
schedule a hearing for mention and encourage the defendant to plead guilty after this first 
third, but at a sufficiently early stage that little preparation has been necessary. Tague 
acknowledges this is a possibility although on the basis of his calculations of the relevant 
fees, concludes that trials rather than guilty pleas are in barristers’ financial interests (2007, 
p.17).  
 
                                                 
84 The Criminal Defence Service (Funding) Order 2007, Statutory Instrument  No. 1174.  
85 Ongoing disputes surrounding the RAGFS between the Bar Council, the Legal Services 
Commission and the Law Society remain. In November 2003 the Bar Council took the 
extreme step of deciding that all cases subject to the criminal graduated fee scheme were no 
longer deemed to be ‘a proper professional fee’, meaning that effectively, barristers are not 
obliged to take cases and the ‘cab rank’ rule has been suspended. In practice, barristers are 
self employed and need to take the work on. The Bar Council’s Remuneration Committee 
provides up to date information on developments: http://www.barcouncil.org/about the 
barcouncil/committees/remunerationcommittee/  
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Barrister D, interviewed for this study, also indicated that he had a preference for trials: 
 
‘It used to be the stick to beat the defence Bar with, that the Bar would always 
crack a trial on the day. But the thing is, if I have a trial on a Monday, that’s 
supposed to last for four days, and it cracks on the Monday, or even the Friday 
before, it is very rare these days that I’m going to pick up another trial Monday, 
Tuesday and another trial Wednesday, Thursday. It’s not in my interests, 
necessarily…to crack it late. I would crack it early enough so I could guarantee I’d 
have more work, otherwise I’m out of work.’ 
 
Barrister D’s motivation for not cracking trials seemed to be a desire for the certainty of 
work and income, and not specifically because he viewed trials to be in his financial 
interests. Tellingly, his statement that he would ‘crack it early enough’ suggests that it would 
be in his interests for a defendant to plead guilty if it was at a stage at which he would 
receive the cracked trial fee, but still be able to accept more briefs. His comment seems to 
indicate that he saw ‘cracking a trial’ (and thus in a sense playing the system) as something 
he could actively seek to achieve, rather than the decision to plead guilty being solely the 
defendant’s. This accords with the possibility that barristers might deliberately crack trials 
soon after the first third has passed. There may be little incentive for a barrister to crack a 
trial at this stage if he has no other briefs, but there is a considerable incentive if the 
barrister has another case due to be heard which he would otherwise have to return. 
Tague’s calculations do demonstrate that in the sets of circumstances he describes, if only 
strictly financial considerations are factored into the equation, trials can be in barristers’ 
interests (2007, pp.12 - 17). The differential, however, is dependent on the type of case, 
seniority of barrister, and the nature of the other briefs the barrister may have and Tague 
notes that his interviewees said they were not in the habit of calculating their fees in this 
manner (2007, p.17). If barristers are indeed generally unaware of the precise financial 
implications of the patterns of their caseloads this may mean that a consideration of what is 
in barristers’ financial interests is not as helpful as it might otherwise be, and that it is not 
necessarily fees per se which inform barristers’ preferences to crack a case or to proceed 
with a trial. Broader considerations regarding how they are best able to manage their 
caseloads in any given week may be more significant; a very late cracked trial may hold little 
appeal if this leaves the lawyer without work, whereas an early cracked trial or a late cracked 
trial where alternative work is available may prove considerably more enticing. 
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3.4 Working relationships 
 
The working relationships between barristers and other court room actors and legal 
professionals have been identified by empirical studies in both the UK and the USA as a 
driving force behind lawyers’ motivations to encourage guilty pleas and to plea bargain (see 
for example Blumberg 1967b; Alschuler 1968, 1975; Rosset and Cressey 1976; Baldwin and 
McConville 1977; Morison and Leith 1992; McConville et al. 1994). This section of 
Chapter 3 considers the nature of barristers’ relationships with their instructing solicitors 
and clerks, the importance of barristers’ reputations, relationships with prosecutors and 
judges and finally, with the defendants they represent. Blumberg’s 1967 paper, ‘The 
Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organisational Cooptation of a Profession’ paved 
the way in exploring what Blumberg referred to as the defence lawyer’s ‘double agent’ 
status; that is, as the defendant’s representative as well as an instrument of the wider 
administration of justice, and the problematic dynamics of the principal – agent 
relationships between the lawyer, the defendant, and the other actors in the process are also 
considered in this part of the chapter. 
 
3.4.1 The barrister – solicitor relationship 
 
Some cases will undoubtedly crack simply because the barrister, upon receiving the brief 
from the solicitor, may legitimately take a different view of the strength of the case, and 
therefore rightly advise of the benefits of a plea of guilty, and the defendant will enter a 
plea of guilty, in the knowledge that was the right decision. Barristers are generally 
considered to be specialists, more expert in the law then solicitors, and on the day of trial 
have a greater knowledge of the strength of the prosecution and defence cases and of the 
judge’s reputation for giving, (for example) custodial sentences, or sentence discounts, or 
the judge’s views on particular types of evidence or offence (Morison and Leith 1992; 
Nicholson and Webb 1999; Abel 2003, Tague 2006).  Additionally, as one barrister 
interviewed by Morison and Leith stated: 
 
‘Because we come from outside we can tell them things that their solicitors, 
who…don’t want to upset them and so forth…and are perhaps more involved, 
can’t tell them.’ (1992, p. 68).  
 
Counsel will often be in possession of more accurate facts and it may be that full disclosure 
has not taken place until shortly before the trial. Moreover, the attendance and reliability or 
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otherwise of prosecution witnesses also form part of the ‘facts’ which determine the 
strength of the case against the defendant. It has been argued that there is a need for 
defence solicitors to be more proactive in seeking out relevant evidence in their clients’ 
cases (Edwards 2008, p.248) and if solicitors are indeed unwilling or unable to obtain 
material, then this undoubtedly exacerbates the problem of significant information only 
coming to light at a late stage in the case preparation. 
 
In the present study, three interviewees identified late developments in cases as a key factor 
in cracked trials: 
 
Barrister A:  ‘The main issue is that you don’t have all the evidence until a late stage and 
don’t know if witnesses will turn up. These are factors which only come into 
play at a late stage, and if they do, they’ll result in a cracked trial.’ 
 
Barrister B:  ‘When you first get the brief and have a conference with the client, the case 
can look very very different than at the [Plea and Case Management 
Hearing], then very very different again by the date of the trial.’ 
 
Judge A:  ‘…the full living dynamics of a case only come to light in the corridor as it’s 
just about to start.’ 
 
Provided that counsel in such situations does not place any undue pressure on defendants 
to plead guilty, is simply in possession of more accurate facts than the solicitor, and it is 
this alone which leads a guilty defendant to make a rational choice to plead guilty, there is 
little cause for concern.  
 
There are however other aspects of the barrister – solicitor dynamic which may operate 
against the defendant’s interests. The Code of Conduct for the Bar states that: 
 
‘A barrister owes his primary duty as between the lay client and any professional 
client or other intermediary to the lay client and must not permit the intermediary 
to limit his discretion as to how the interests of the lay client can best be served’ 
(2004, para. 303(b)). 
 
It is, however, the professional client, the solicitor, who is strictly speaking the barrister’s 
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‘client’, and not the defendant.86 Barristers receive briefs from solicitors, and are almost 
wholly reliant on solicitors for their work.87 However, the extent to which solicitors are 
involved in the case once the brief has been passed to counsel is limited, and barristers will 
generally conduct pre-trial conferences with the defendant without the solicitor present. 
Attending conferences is an inefficient use of a solicitors’ time financially, and as they have 
passed the brief to the barrister for the barrister’s expertise, from a purely functional point 
of view, there is little reason for their attendance. Often a clerk from the solicitor’s firm will 
attend to take notes at the conference but clerks are generally not legally qualified and play 
little role, if any, in the outcome of the conference. McConville et al. write that ‘[T]he end 
result of these work practices is to establish barristers as the dominant, sometimes, sole 
actors in critical dealings with defendants’ (1994, p.244). The solicitor’s views on the case 
may therefore be ignored despite the fact that he may have spent longer with the defendant 
and / or possess a more detailed knowledge of the facts and the circumstances of the 
offence.88 
 
Barristers are not the dominant actor in all aspects of the barrister – solicitor relationship 
though; they are reliant on solicitors for future briefs and must carry out their instructions 
to the satisfaction of the solicitor. Tague argues that this has the consequence that 
barristers are inclined towards taking cases to trial in order to impress solicitors with their 
ability to win cases, and thus do not have the motive to plea bargain, as is commonly 
asserted by other commentators. He argues that the solicitor’s priority in selecting a 
barrister is the barrister’s ability as an advocate, not as someone who can negotiate an 
outcome, and states that ‘solicitors commonly do not want the barrister to dampen the 
defendant’s enthusiasm for trial’ (Tague 2007, p.6). This is at odds with the findings of 
other studies, Standing Accused (1994) in particular. It is of course possible, and perhaps even 
likely, that working practices and attitudes have changed in the thirteen years between the 
two publications. This may well be a factor, but is unlikely to account for quite such a vast 
difference in perspective. An additional consideration in reconciling the two studies may be 
that Tague’s findings are coloured by his methods; interviews with barristers who may have 
                                                 
86 Chapter 3 of Morison and Leith (1992) provides a detailed analysis of the structure of the 
client relationship. 
87 Although barristers can now also be instructed by some professionals such as 
accountants and surveyors under the Licensed Access Scheme. See www.barcouncil.org  
88
 This is of course subject to McConville et al.’s findings that defence solicitors appear to 
be no more likely to display adversarial values than barristers, and that they also come to 
view a guilty plea as the standard case outcome (1994, p.252). There may, however, be 
cases in which the solicitor feels a trial would provide the defendant with a good chance of 
acquittal, only for the barrister to encourage the defendant to plead guilty. 
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had a vested interest in putting across a particular impression of their working practices. 
Standing Accused, by contrast, was a wide ranging observational study and therefore achieved 
a broader perspective. Furthermore, Tague does not consider the importance of 
occupational cultures which could lead to both solicitors and barristers viewing a guilty plea 
as the ‘standard’ outcome.89 
 
One final aspect of the solicitor – barrister relationship of relevance here is the increasing 
commercialisation of the Bar and the introduction of solicitor advocates. Relatively few 
solicitors have sought higher rights of audience, but there is some suggestion that those 
who have, have had an impact on the work of the junior Bar (Jackson and Hanlon 1999). It 
is more cost-effective for solicitors’ firms to use their own in-house advocates where 
available than to instruct counsel, and Hanlon and Jackson argued that this could force the 
Bar to change some of its working practices in order to provide a better service to solicitors 
and ensure that they maintained a healthy workload (1999, p. 576). One aspect of this 
would no doubt be a greater emphasis on continuity of representation (discussed further at 
3.4.5 below), which the 2007 RAGFS and the Bar Council now hold out as a key aim, and 
fewer returned briefs, perhaps combined with a greater willingness to conduct conferences 
in advance of trial. These would be changes which would benefit defendants as well as 
solicitors. It is after all the defendant who is the solicitor’s client, so in an increasingly 
market driven legal profession, solicitors have a vested interest in instructing barristers who 
will keep their lay clients happy.  
 
3.4.2  The barrister’s clerk 
 
The barrister’s clerk plays a vital role in the running of chambers; clerks manage their 
barristers’ briefs and communicate with solicitors on behalf of barristers, and therefore play 
a pivotal role in a barrister’s caseload. Flood (1983), in an (albeit outdated) ethnography of 
barrister’s clerks cites Zander’s view that ‘the clerk exercises an influence over the 
distribution of work amongst his supposed principals which is out of all proportion to his 
qualifications or other attainments’ (Zander 1968, pp. 85-86, cited at p. 37). Of significance 
to cracked trials and plea bargaining is the fact that clerks retain a percentage of each fee 
earned by their barristers, so have an interest in keeping the case within chambers, and will 
often keep a brief despite knowing that the barrister instructed is already committed to 
appear elsewhere. This enables them to inform the instructing solicitor at the last minute, at 
                                                 
89 It may be that the London bar, where Tague carried out his interviews, is more inclined 
towards adversarialism. See section 3.4.3 below.  
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which point the solicitor is likely to settle for another barrister from the same set of 
chambers clerked for by the clerk in question, allowing him to retain the fee.  
 
3.4.3 Reputation 
  
The potential impact on a barrister’s reputation of an embarrassing trial performance has 
been put forward as a plausible explanation as to why some barristers may pressurize their 
lay clients to plead guilty if the case appears weak or if the barrister is insufficiently 
prepared (Belloni and Hodgson 2000, p. 156). Tague describes these claims as ‘unlikely’ and 
states that ‘advocates must learn how to argue hopeless cases’ (2007, p.7). Tague argues 
that a reputation for advocacy is more important than a reputation for negotiation or 
extracting guilty pleas from defendants (2007, p. 5) and that it is therefore in barristers’ 
interests to take a case to trial, and that even ill-prepared, counsel could ‘resort to formulaic 
questioning and arguments that would be sufficient to hide a lack of exhaustive knowledge 
of the brief’s finer points’ (2007 p. 7). Tague also argues that unlike Baldwin and 
McConville’s barristers in 1970s Birmingham, his sample of London barristers believed 
that they would be sanctioned by instructing solicitors by being denied briefs in the future 
if they were found to be inducing guilty pleas in order to dispose of a case, particularly if 
this was done to avoid returning another brief from a rival solicitors’ firm (2007, p.9).  
 
Barrister D, when interviewed for this study, made reference to his belief that it would 
reflect badly upon him if he were seen to be extracting guilty pleas:  
 
‘It’s not in your interests to make them [plead guilty], because then it just bites back 
on you…that just makes me look like a dufus, so I’m not prepared to do that.’ 
 
Despite Tague’s arguments, it is submitted that the importance of reputation, and how that 
reputation is judged, can have a range of varying impacts on barrister’s attitudes to cracked 
trials. Barrister B was introduced to me by a barrister from his chambers as someone with a 
reputation for cracking trials, and Judge A had also mentioned Barrister B’s name to me as 
someone who often cracked trials; I did not get any sense that these were intended to be 
disparaging comments, they were good-humuoured, and it was simply the way Barrister B 
was perceived to carry out his practice. Barrister B was one of the more frequently 
instructed barristers in the sample of Crown Prosecution Service files, and was regularly 
instructed by both defence and prosecution; a reputation for cracking trials had evidently 
not harmed his career. Those interviewed frequently referred to trials cracking as trials 
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being ‘dealt with’, or ‘sorted out’ and made references to cracked trials being neither 
particularly good nor particularly bad: 
 
Barrister B:  ‘Cracked trials are neither a good thing nor a bad thing, they’re just a fact of 
life.’ 
 
Barrister D:  ‘Cracked trials? What can you do? Maybe they’re just part of life’s rich 
tapestry.’ 
 
Barrister D also felt that there were some types of cases he would rather see cracked:  
  
‘There are cases you’d like them to sort out [crack], particularly those with child 
witnesses…’ 
 
The different conclusions drawn by Tague could plausibly be the result of differences 
between the London Bar and the regional circuits, as Tague himself recognizes (2006, 
pp.24 – 25). London has historically had a much lower cracked trial rate than the circuits 
(Zander and Henderson 1993) and barristers working on a circuit where cracked trials are 
the norm are likely to have a different perspective on them to those working in London 
where they represent a far smaller proportion of cases. Tague’s 2007 paper also refers to 
the fact that cracked trial rates are considerably higher outside London.90 This may suggest 
that the London barristers interviewed by Tague were less inclined to encourage their 
criminal clients to plead guilty than those on the circuits. Several of the barristers Tague 
spoke to believed that counsel on other circuits ‘continued to overbear reluctant 
defendants to plead guilty’, which they felt to be true because they had on occasion been 
briefed to appear in courts elsewhere, instructed by solicitors who were fearful that local 
barristers would pressurise their clients to plead guilty (Tague 2007, n.10). Sommerlad, in a 
study of solicitors, also found that London barristers had a better reputation for 
adversarialism (2001, p.347).  Cracking a trial is likely to have a different impact (or none at 
all) on the career of a barrister whose peers are involved in cracked trials on an equally 
regular basis.  
 
It may also be that, whereas being seen by solicitors to pressurize defendants into pleading 
                                                 
90 The cracked trial rate at the Inner London Sessions House was 29.2% in 2006/2007, 
compared with a national average of 39%, and between 2002/2003 and 2006/2007 has 
ranged from 25.2% to 29.2% (Crown Court Annual Reports, 2006/2007). 
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guilty can harm a barrister’s reputation, the effect will vary depending on the type of case, 
the style of representation the barrister wishes to be known for, and the solicitor’s opinions 
on the defendant’s guilt. If the solicitor feels there is strong evidence against the defendant, 
and / or has formed the opinion that the defendant is guilty, then he is unlikely to express 
surprise at a cracked trial or suspect the barrister of bullying the defendant into changing 
his plea. The impact of individual, local and regional working practices can therefore not be 
underestimated when considering reputation and its effect on barristers’ advice to 
defendants on plea, and barristers’ own interests in case outcomes. The evidence on 
whether reputation is a factor which may lead to barristers having an interest in defendants 
pleading guilty is sparse, but it seems that local factors may have a bearing on whether or 
not guilty pleas align with barristers’ interests and may play a role in the presence, or nature, 
of any pressures placed upon defendants to plead guilty.   
 
3.4.4 Relationships with prosecutors and judges 
 
Boon and Levin have written that ‘nowhere is the notion of legal culture stronger than at 
the English bar’ (1999, p.69). The close physical proximity of barristers’ chambers, 
particularly on the regional circuits, and the relatively small size of the profession is 
regarded as a key factor in the Bar’s ability to perpetuate its working practices. In the light 
of Tague’s findings discussed above, it is noteworthy that as it is considerably larger, the 
London Bar is more geographically dispersed and barristers will often be briefed to appear 
in courts some considerable distance from central London. Nonetheless, the Bar is a tightly 
knit community; even in London barristers will often know each other (on the regional 
circuits it would be unusual for them not to) and barristers are bound together not only by 
their affiliation to a set of chambers, or of a regional circuit, but also by membership of one 
of four Inns of Court.  
 
The ‘cab rank’ rule, which dictates that barristers must not refuse cases within their 
competence, ensures that barristers will sometimes defend and sometimes prosecute cases. 
(Although in practice barristers are able to become ‘typecast’ as prosecutors or defenders, 
should they wish to be, often with the aid of their clerk who can make it known what kind 
of briefs ‘their’ barrister is looking to take on (Morison and Leith 1992). The close 
community of the Bar could have the effect of jeopardizing defendants’ interests in 
situations where barristers who may face each other repeatedly have a greater vested 
interest in keeping each other happy than they do the interests of a defendant they may 
have only met that morning, and will perhaps never see again. Barristers serving each 
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others’ interests (and those of the judges they appear before), may manifest itself in plea 
bargaining and the resulting bargains are as much between the opposing counsel as they are 
between the defendant and the state.  As one defendant in Baldwin and McConville’s study 
said of his barrister’s apparently close relationship with the prosecuting counsel:  
 
‘[A]fter all, they’re near enough mates in the same play. They’re the cast of the play, 
you’re just the casual one day actor. It’s just another day’s work to them.’ (1977, 
p.85). 
 
Another commented that: 
 
 ‘…they all basically piss in the same pot.’ (1977, p.85). 
 
Of the US context, Luban has written that ‘as a repeat player in the criminal justice system, 
the defense lawyer has an interest in playing ball with the prosecution’ (1988, p. 60). This 
may be more true of the US system, where the prosecutor still has greater power and 
influence to make binding deals with the defence, but as Baldwin and McConville’s 
interviewees suggest, the same was true at least of some defendants’ perceptions of the 
English criminal justice system (Baldwin and McConville 1977, pp.83 – 100). Tague 
presents a contrasting finding;  his interviewees stated that they would resist the temptation 
to put the interests of working relationships with colleagues above those of the defendant 
if their opposing counsel was a member of the same chambers (2007, p. 6). This only takes 
into account that specific scenario though, and Tague provides no analysis of the 
importance to his interviewees of maintaining good working relationships with other 
members of the Bar, and with the judiciary more generally, save to say that the view that it 
affects barristers’ representation of defendants ‘is wholly inaccurate as a description of 
barristers’ motives’ (2007, p. 11). 
 
My own data support the view that good working relationships between defending and 
prosecuting counsel are important, and they were referred to by interviewees as a 
significant consideration. Court Administrator B felt that negotiations between prosecuting 
and defending counsel were a key cause of trials cracking, and lawyers themselves 
suggested that cooperation between opposing counsel and between barristers and judges 
was important, and played a role in trials cracking. Barrister A described the process of 
negotiating pre-Goodyear, (in other words, illegal) sentence indications thus:  
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‘We’ve always had Goodyear indications, it’s just they weren’t called that. It was a 
case of round the back and, ‘how’s about it Judge?’’  
 
Barrister D also described Goodyear indications as a form of cooperation between the judge 
and defence counsel:  
 
‘You tend to find Goodyears are used as a lever, perhaps to crack a trial when really 
daggers are drawn and you say ‘this is our last chance’ to the judge, ‘can you throw 
us a bone, if you say it’s less than twelve months [the defendant will plead guilty]’ 
type of thing.’ 
 
This is a particularly interesting comment as it implies that defence barristers in the 
situations Barrister D describes are ‘leaning on’ defendants, evidently have some interest in 
persuading the defendant to plead guilty, and use the judicial Goodyear indication as a ‘lever’ 
to achieve that outcome; in full cognisance of the judge. (This assumes that Barrister D’s 
account is accurate in suggesting this is not a rare occurrence). This appears to be a clear 
example of a cracked trial occurring as a result of pressures to plead guilty, originating from 
the judge and the defence barrister, being brought to bear upon a defendant. 
 
Of the relationship between prosecution and defence, Solicitor A commented:  
 
‘…if there’s a dialogue to be had [regarding the charge], and both parties are 
prepared to engage in this dialogue there’s always scope in there, whatever the 
charge.’ 
 
These comments add to the bank of evidence that legal professionals’ working practices 
take place within organisational structures of the criminal justice system in which the actors 
within that structure value each others’ interests; interests which may have the potential to 
override those of the defendant. There is a considerable body of literature which considers 
a range of approaches to, and explanations for, organisational working practices within the 
legal profession, the criminal justice system and organisations more generally. Writing 
specifically of the organisational conditions which lead to the prevalence of plea bargaining 
in the United States, Feeley argued that the desire for cooperation transcended the need to 
juggle busy caseloads: 
 
‘Clearly it is more than a problem of overcoming work-load so that good men can 
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do good work. There exist strong competing norms and incentives which act at 
cross-purposes to the system’s formal goals and norms.’ (1973, p.422).  
 
In England, this was illustrated by Standing Accused (1994) which highlighted a range of 
factors within the solicitors’ practices observed which went far beyond the practicalities of 
maintaining a busy practice to tight deadlines. The researchers found that clients were 
regarded as ‘good’ if they accepted advice compliantly and ideally entered guilty pleas 
without complaining. ‘Bad’ clients resisted advice, requested meetings with counsel in 
advance of trial, and objected to discontinuous representation. McConville et al. also 
presented the finding that clerks seemed to learn that criminal clients were not worthy of a 
great deal of respect and during the course of their employment began see criminal practice 
as being geared towards the production of guilty pleas. It was argued that qualified lawyers 
often did not check whether there was a factual basis for a plea of guilty and that their 
desire to secure guilty pleas meant that they would sometimes accept a plea even if this was 
completely at odds with what the rest of the client was saying (1994, pp. 189 - 193). This 
appeared to have occurred in Case 2 of the CPS file sample, in which the defendant 
pleaded guilty to reckless arson, despite putting forward an alternative version of events 
and maintaining his innocence of the offence charged. There was no basis of plea and no 
evidence (at least not recorded on file) that the defendant’s barrister or the judge had 
ensured the plea was consistent with the version of events the defendant was putting 
forward. 
 
In order to consider the reasons why such organisational practices might arise, it is possible 
to draw on the literature on the sociology of institutions and professions and to apply this 
directly to the legal profession, and where possible to plea bargaining specifically. 
Organizational theorists draw upon studies of behaviour in commercial enterprises and 
large public institutions and view the criminal justice system in terms of the structure of 
roles and relationships among workers in the courtroom setting (Schulhofer 1984, p. 1041). 
Feeley describes a system of administration of justice as entailing the key elements of an 
organisation: institutionalized interaction of a large number of actors whose roles are highly 
defined and who share a responsibility in a common goal – that of processing arrests (1973, 
p.407). The idea that the criminal justice system, and the courtroom as a microcosm of that 
system, can be regarded as an organisation and can be evaluated on organisational terms 
does not require a great conceptual leap, but defining what type of organisation the 
criminal justice system represents does create some difficulties. Even the starting point is 
contentious; although Feeley argues that the actors within the system share the common 
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goal of processing arrests, others would disagree, and there are a vast range of perspectives 
on what the goals of the criminal justice system are, or should be (see for example 
Ashworth and Redmayne 2005; Sanders and Young 2007; Padfield 2008). It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to do justice to the vast body of literature on organisational theories, or 
to put forward an organisational model with which to explain lawyers’ working practices 
with regard to plea bargains or cracked trials and the intention is simply to highlight the key 
explanations which have been put forward.  
 
Blumberg’s research was one of the first studies to address the issue; he argued that the 
criminal justice system was a hierarchical structure and that the defence lawyer acted as 
‘double agent’ who performed a mission for both the accused and the court organization, 
and therefore had a vested interest in limiting the scope and duration of the case to make it 
more profitable for the court organisation (1967b, p.28). Skolnick, however, put forward 
the view that the main cause for deviance from adversarial, conflict norms was not so 
much double agency as simple administrative convenience (1967, p.55). He argued that 
most prosecuting and defence attorneys were young, inexperienced and idealistic lawyers 
who became socialised into the organisational structure through a system of informal 
controls which valued a plea of guilty above all, and achieving a guilty plea became the 
interest which all parties shared. Skolnick argued convincingly that lawyers rationalized this 
behaviour by placing great value on administrative efficiency and by the belief that they 
were serving the interests of the accused in securing a reduced sentence.  
 
Feeley was critical of the rigidity of the Skolnick-type model and put forward an alternative, 
functional systems approach as a more realistic means of evaluating the organisational 
structure of the criminal justice system. He argued that such an approach embodied a ‘far 
greater and explicit concern for ‘explaining’ the behaviour of the actors (as opposed to 
simply ‘contrasting’ it [with what rules dictate the behaviour ‘ought’ to be])’ 1973, p.419)’. 
Feeley’s approach views the organization of the administration of criminal justice as a 
system based primarily upon cooperation, exchange and adaptation, and emphasizes these 
factors over adherence to formal rules and defined ‘roles’:   
 
‘The ‘rules’ the organization members are likely to follow are the ‘folkways’ or 
informal ‘rules of the game’ within the organization; the goals they pursue are likely 
to be personal or sub-group goals; and the roles they assume are likely to be 
defined by the functional adaptation of these two factors…the functional-systems 
approach is likely to begin to identify and examine the adaptation of the actors to 
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the environment, the workload and the interests of the persons placed within the 
system, i.e. other goals of the actors within the organization’ (p.413).  
 
The functional systems approach, outlined here in brief, has potential to be valuable in 
exploring, and perhaps explaining, the relationship between lawyers’ working practices and 
plea bargaining, but it is important to note that the theories are presented as an analysis of 
the US criminal justice system. Further research on the organisational structure and 
working practices of the English criminal justice system is needed in order to apply and 
adapt the theoretical perspectives. One comparative issue to be investigated by future 
research would be whether the fact that, in England and Wales, the concept of plea 
bargaining is less recognised, and is seen as deviating more considerably from the ideals of 
the adversarial system, may have the effect that it takes greater organisational and cultural 
pressures to engender a situation whereby defence lawyers actively encourage guilty pleas 
than it would in a jurisdiction in which plea bargains are more openly acknowledged and 
regulated. 
 
Nonetheless, the evidence currently available from previous research, as well as from the 
present study, does suggest that the nature of their relationships with prosecutors and 
judges may lead defence barristers to have an interest in encouraging or placing pressure on 
their clients to plead guilty. Tague’s findings stand out as an exception; this may be due to 
his research having been carried out in London which, if this is the case, would 
demonstrate the importance of local working practices.  
 
3.4.5 Relationships with clients  
 
One issue which is likely to impact significantly on a defendant’s relationship with his 
barrister, and the quality of his representation, is whether the defendant has been 
represented by the same barrister throughout. Continuity of representation from an initial 
conference with the client to the pre-trial hearing and beyond firstly allows the barrister 
and client to develop a rapport, but also ensures that the barrister briefed for the trial is in 
possession of the full facts of the case, has had adequate time to prepare, and has spoken 
to the defendant prior to the trial. This was, however, often not the case within the sample 
analyzed for this study, and the level of discontinuous representation faced by defendants 
was a striking feature of the data collected from CPS files; it was not uncommon for a 
defendant to be represented by a different barrister at each hearing. Only 66 defendants 
(45%) in this study’s sample were represented by the same barrister for each of their court 
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appearances (see Fig. 3.1 below). It is an inevitable result of barristers taking on large 
caseloads, or barristers’ clerks not advising solicitors soon enough that the barrister 
requested will be unavailable, that some briefs will be returned at the last minute. The 
barrister who is ultimately briefed to take the case may arrive at court ill-prepared to take 
on a trial, through no fault or incompetence of his own. Zander and Henderson found that 
a third of defence barristers said that they did not receive the brief until either the day 
before the hearing or on the day itself (1993, p.32) and in such circumstances, conferences 
with clients can be nothing other than last minute hurried affairs carried out at the court. 
Bottoms and McClean found that of those committed for trial and pleading guilty, 96% 
had not seen their barrister until the morning of the hearing. Even of those pleading not 
guilty, 79% did not meet their barrister until the morning of the hearing (1976, p.158), 
which suggests that those defendants who did not meet their barristers until the day of the 
trial were those most likely to plead guilty. It should come as no surprise that in Baldwin 
and McConville’s research, the barristers most seriously criticised by defendants tended to 
be those with the largest caseloads (1977, p.45) . A related issue is highlighted by 
Sommerlad and Wall’s (1999) research; they argue that a lack of pre-trial contact between 
lawyers (in this case, solicitors) and their clients leads to poor rapport, which in turn makes 
it more difficult to elicit relevant information from the defendant. The same principle 
undoubtedly applies to barristers and defendants who do not meet in a pre-trial conference, 
and makes it all the more unlikely that the barrister is able to go beyond the papers in from 
of him and listen to ‘the story the defendant has to tell’ (Cownie et al. 2007, p. 320). Since 
many of the findings mentioned above, there have been developments in disclosure and 
court listings procedures which should, in theory, mean that barristers receiving briefs at 
such a late stage and being expected to try a case the following day should be a thing of the 
past.91 Nonetheless, the problem appears to persist. Furthermore, although it dealt with 
prosecuting rather than defending counsel, the National Audit Commission’s 2000 report 
on the Crown Prosecution Service reported on Crown Prosecution Service branches where 
returned briefs were known to be a problem, and found that in these branches, 75% of all 
briefs were returned and that in one third of these cases counsel eventually appointed was 
                                                 
91 The Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act 1996 introduced a framework of 
disclosure, including of unused material, between the prosecution and the defence. In 2006, 
the use of XHIBIT, an online court hearing information system which provides updated 
information on the progress of hearings, was rolled out nationwide, although its 
implementation at Minshull Street has been described as ‘extremely challenging’ (Crown 
Court Annual Reports, 2006/2007, Manchester Minshull Street, p.4). In 2006 Manchester 
Minshull Street Crown court also began a pilot of PROGRESS, an electronic case 
progression system, accessible by courts, the CPS and defence solicitors, and since early 
2009 is gradually being rolled out to other areas. 
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judged to have been of inappropriate quality.  
 
From a barrister’s perspective, aside from the inconvenience of short notice case 
preparation, another problem is that if he was not the barrister originally briefed, he is 
unable to claim a fee for the appearance directly under the Graduated Fee Payment 
Protocol (para. 14), and must instead rely on the advocate initially instructed to apportion 
the fee appropriately. Moreover, if the barrister has not been able to gain a sufficient grasp 
of the facts of the case, he risks a poor performance in court unless the client pleads guilty. 
It should be noted that since Plea and Directions Hearings were introduced to all Crown 
Court cases in 1995, it will be very rare that a defendant will not have met a barrister prior 
to his trial date; the issue is that this will often not be the same barrister as is ultimately 
briefed to represent the defendant at trial. 
 
There seems to have been little success in reducing the incidence of discontinuous 
representation, despite the fact that the importance of the continuity of representation was 
stressed by the Carter Review (at Chapter 2, para. 170) and that the Graduated Fee 
Payment Protocol issued by the General Council of the Bar in 2007 states (at para. 9) that 
the Bar is taking the lead in addressing the problem of discontinuous representation, there 
remains much progress to be made. It should, however, be stressed that the results of this 
study suggest that discontinuous representation did not appear to be a particular feature of 
cracked cases in the sample (see Chapter 3.4.5) - which is not necessarily to say that it did 
not impact on the quality of legal representation.  
 
As Fig. 3.1 below shows, in 83 cases (55% of the total sample) individual defendants were 
represented by more than one barrister during the course of their court hearings and in 32 
cases (21.3%), defendants were represented by three or more barristers. It should be noted 
that none of the sample of cases were cases in which both a leading and junior counsel 
were briefed to appear on behalf of the same defendant; all occurrences of multiple 
representation were of discontinuous representation.  
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 Discontinuity of legal representation would in all likelihood prove to be a hindrance to any 
defendant attempting to play the system and plead tactically as it would create a lack of 
certainty and continuity in the case preparation, thus reducing the potential for tactical 
manoeuvring, with or without the aid of the barrister(s) briefed. 
 
In addition to discontinuous representation, there are a range of other factors which have a 
bearing on barristers’ relationships with defendants, as evidenced by empirical findings 
from both the present study and previous research. Bottoms and McClean wrote that 
‘many members of the Bar would argue strongly that it is no part of their duty to get to 
know the defendant’ (1976, p.158). If this still holds true, the impact this element of the 
legal profession’s culture has on the representation received by criminal defendants is 
potentially considerable. More recently, McConville gave a damning critique of defence 
lawyers’ commitment to their clients’ best interests: 
 
‘Defence lawyers approach their work on the basis of standardised case theories 
and stereotypes of the kind of people who become involved in criminal events; 
images of clients as feckless and dishonest are allowed to structure the way their 
cases are handled from the outset; the views of clients are given little weight and 
their accounts not investigated; and the case proceeds on the basis that the lawyer 
knows best in a context in which all the incentives point towards a guilty plea’ 
(1998, p. 572). 
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A similarly dismissive attitude towards defendants is supported by this study’s findings and 
was a notable feature of several interviews, as the sections extracted below demonstrate: 
 
Barrister C:  ‘We [criminal barristers] deal with flawed individuals…’ 
 
Barrister D:  ‘There’s only two types of defendants. One’s the new guys, who, if you tell 
them to plead guilty, they will, [this was followed by a long pause and a 
glance at the voice recorder]… but you, you obviously, can’t do that. And 
then there’s the guys who’ve been around the system, who already know all 
about the discount, and you can say to them, well, let’s sort out a deal.’ 
 
Judge A:  ‘…I’m afraid, and this is not being class-ist, you’ve just got to be sympathetic 
with people who live in high rise blocks. What have they got to look forward 
to? Take Joe Bloggs in this burglary trial I’m doing: if he isn’t picking up a 
woman and having it off with her, or scoring with drugs or going for a 
boozy night out…. They’re on benefits, what have they got to look forward 
to?’ 
 
Judge B:  ‘Whereas you or I might think, ok, I really ought to face up to this…the 
criminal’s thoughts are somewhere else entirely, they’re thinking about their 
girlfriend, or that they don’t want to have to admit it to their mother…’ 
 
Solicitor A:  ‘…there’s always those [defendants] who’ll chance their arm as long as they 
can, is my experience…[it] depends on the psyche of the client, what he 
wants out of it….Defendants are people who tend to do what they want.’ 
 
Judge A commented that the defendants he sentenced were not be influenced by 
inducements to plead guilty early because of their ‘chaotic’ lifestyles which made them ‘put 
off everything to the last minute’. He felt that it was: 
 
‘[a]ctually a problem of delayed gratification, and you can’t blame people 
who perceive they’re an underclass and don’t have anything to look forward 
to in life, for putting off things and taking pleasure and gratification where 
they can….I can delay having the next boozy night out or pursuing the next 
girlfriend because there are other long term rewards in my life…[but] what 
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have they got to look forward to?’ 
 
Judge B felt that ‘the criminal has an entirely different agenda’ and ‘everything in life is a 
gamble for them’. 
 
As these comments illustrate, the perception of the defendant as not necessarily dishonest, 
but as hapless, disorganised, and ultimately guilty, appeared to feature in the minds of some 
of those interviewed. Galligan has argued that an important constraint on the exercise of 
official discretion is the official’s moral attitude and that there is a ‘close and complex 
relationship’ between that and his actions (1990, p. 139). If attitudes are that defendants are 
inept an incapable of making ration decisions themselves, it is likely that legal professionals 
will seek to impose their own conceptions of the best outcome upon defendants. Two 
cases in particular within the sample of CPS case files also appeared to fit with 
McConville’s characterisation of cases ‘proceed[ing] on the basis that the lawyer knows 
best…’ (1998, p. 572).92 
 
In Case 41, the defendant had been charged with attempted kidnap and was intending to 
maintain a not guilty plea. His barrister had approached the prosecution and asked if a 
guilty plea to s.4A of the Public Order Act 1986 (causing intentional harassment, alarm or 
distress) would be acceptable; the prosecution refused, but indicated that a guilty plea to s.4 
of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (putting people in fear of violence) would be 
acceptable. Counsel put this indication to the defendant, who subsequently pleaded guilty. 
The defendant later applied to vacate his plea, claiming that he had felt pressurised into 
pleading guilty, although at a later hearing retracted his application and the guilty plea 
stood. The file contained a witness statement, written by the barrister originally instructed, 
justifying her advice to the defendant: 
 
‘I had no instructions from the defendant that he would plead to such an offence, 
but it occurred to me that, had it been acceptable, it would meet the merits of the 
case and in effect guarantee that the defendant would not receive a custodial 
sentence. It was my intention to offer it as an alternative to the defendant for him 
to consider.’ 
 
                                                 
92 The fact that only two such cases were identified does not necessarily suggest this is a 
rare occurrence; but rather that it is not an approach which is likely to be recorded on file 
with any frequency, let alone on a prosecution file.   
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The defendant’s barrister appears to have assumed that the defendant would be amenable 
to a guilty plea (and was therefore perhaps guilty), and sought to make an agreement with 
the prosecution without first consulting the defendant, thus demonstrating an indifferent 
approach to the defendant’s wishes. A similar attitude was displayed in Case 18, in which 
the defendant had been charged with the rape of a 15 year old girl. On the second day of 
the trial, the prosecution indicated that a plea of guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse would 
be acceptable, but the defendant refused to plead guilty. The case file contains the 
comment: ‘He will not take the plea!!!’. This seems to express surprise and / or frustration 
at the defendant’s decision not to accept what was perceived to be a good ‘deal’ (which was 
of course only a good deal if the defendant was legally guilty). The defendant’s decision 
served him well as he was later acquitted. 
 
The above comments and cases notwithstanding, there were occasions on which it seemed 
that interviewees’ perceptions of defendants’ cases were slightly less glib, such as Barrister 
D’s comment below: 
 
‘I’ve had people where you’ve said, look, this is an overwhelming case, I can be as 
blunt as that, and they go I know it is, but I didn’t do it. They’re just as entitled to 
be defended to the best of your ability as those who’ve got a really weak case 
against them but equally, there’s a twinkle in their eye and you know full well they 
did it.’ 
 
Barrister A, whilst stating that it was ultimately defendants who caused trials to crack, also 
said that: 
 
‘I can defend the punter because I think the system’s a bit unfair…It’s stacked up 
against the punter.’ 
 
It is possible that as the legal profession is increasingly market-driven, and defendants have 
become consumers, that word of mouth is important, and repeat offenders are likely to use 
the same firm and request the same solicitor or even ask that a particular barrister be 
briefed. Coupled with this, there is a growing awareness of ethical practice and a (perhaps 
exaggerated) fear of complaints; the consequence being that, irrespective of defendants’ 
due process rights, barristers cannot afford, financially or professionally, to act with 
impunity. The comments made by those interviewed for this study suggest not that 
barristers are necessarily committed to defendants’ due process rights, but rather that they 
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have become wary of deviating from adversarial principles too visibly. As Barrister D 
stated: 
 
‘The ones that are going to spin it out, spin it out, and there’s precious little 
pressure that can be brought to bear to speed that process up. And you always run 
the risk that it is pressure, and they’re going to turn round and say, ‘you made me’, 
or ‘you did this’ or ‘you did that’, and that’s not in my interests to do that anymore.’ 
 
Barrister D’s comments suggest he would like to be able to ‘speed the process up’ and that 
it was not in his interests to put any pressure on defendants anymore. Tague also found that 
his interviewees were wary of being fired by the defendant, denied briefs by the solicitor or 
being sanctioned by the Bar Council (2007, p.9) and writes that ‘one barrister said she was 
‘petrified’ of being accused of pressurising guilty pleas’ (2007, p. 10).  Alschuler also found 
this to be an issue in his much earlier research in the United States and argued that defence 
attorneys were aware of the need for self protection in giving their advice and sought to 
avoid accusations of coercing innocent people to plead guilty (1975, p. 1283). Similarly, one 
barrister interviewed as part of the Standing Accused study stated that ‘If you get too tough at 
the start, they sack you!’ (McConville et al. 1994, p. 253). The context into which 
McConville et al. placed that comment was that the researchers found that encouraging 
defendants to plead guilty at a pre-trial stage was at first a subtle process, rather than 
explicit pressure. Tague would perhaps disagree that any encouragement at all to plead 
guilty is routine, but it does demonstrate that an awareness of the need to tread carefully 
lest the defendant or solicitor sacks the barrister appears to be a common consideration for 
barristers advising on plea.  
 
Tague places weight on the fact that, whilst acknowledging that defendants do make 
complaints about barristers’ behaviour in inducing guilty pleas, ‘the Bar’s administrator of 
ethics matters could recall no instance when a barrister was found to have acted 
improperly’ (2007, p.10). The wisdom of relying on this recollection at face value is 
debatable, but more importantly Tague fails to acknowledge the potential significance of 
the fact that what defendants may consider to be pressure, the Bar does not. Undoubtedly 
some defendants may be overly ready to complain about their representation, but if the Bar 
perceives advice as ethical which defendants perceive to be pressure, then there is at the 
very least some need for clarification.  
 
Some researchers have argued that the outward appearance of lawyers’ working practices 
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could actually mask a more due process orientated relationship with their clients. 
Emmelman (1996, 1997) argues that (at least in the US context), defence lawyers do in fact 
make a series of decisions during plea negotiations which are guided at least in part by due 
process values and that they do not settle for bargains which are unfavourable to their 
clients (1996, p.357). She found that, where the prosecution made an offer which was not 
better than average, defence lawyers attempted to elicit a more favourable bargain, and that 
they did so by asserting information about the facts of the case and the evidence which led 
to a higher valuation of the case. Emmelman claims that as a result, ‘plea bargaining and 
trial can actually be seen to converge’ because the same facts and evidence are being used 
to achieve the eventual outcome, and their strengths are assessed in the same way they 
would be at trial. In addition, she points out that some trial hearings will often have taken 
place before the case is settled, so there will have been some conventionally adversarial 
assessment of the strength of the case (1996, p. 357). It is unlikely that evidence presented 
in support of a plea bargain could be challenged and assessed in as great a depth as it could 
at a trial, but Emmelman’s research does provide some tentative evidence that defence 
lawyers may be more responsive to defendants’ rights and the strength of the case than 
most accounts suggest, but that the process is an ‘elusive [and] unspoken’ routine, which is 
therefore overlooked (1997, p.952). This relates to the school of thought that plea bargains 
are concluded in ‘the shadow of the trial’ and that the final outcome is in any case 
determined with implicit reference to features of the cases which would have been relevant 
at trial (Bibas 2004). Similarly, research on ‘cop culture’ has shown that the negative 
attitude police offers outwardly appeared to have towards suspects and their rights was not 
necessarily carried through into the way they performed their jobs (Waddington 1999). 
Although there may therefore be some support for the faith traditionally placed in the 
defence lawyer to fearlessly represent his client, in reality it appears to be limited to faith in 
the lawyer’s ability to bargain with the defendant’s interests at heart, and the need to 
bargain is regarded as almost inevitable by Emmelman. In Alschuler’s influential work on 
the defence attorney’s role in plea bargaining, he advocated the abolition of plea bargaining 
as the only solution to the problems inherent in the relationship between the defence 
lawyer and his client and wrote that plea bargaining ‘is necessarily destructive of sound 
attorney-client relationships. This system subjects defense attorneys to serious temptations 
to disregard their clients’ interests – temptations so strong that the invocation of 
professional ideals cannot begin to answer the problems that emerge’ (1975, p.1180), and it 
is submitted that this is also largely true of the current situation in England and Wales. 
Research which suggests that lawyers could be deliberately or subconsciously masking due 
process or adversarial values demonstrates how far removed the reality of the defence 
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lawyer is from the idealised figure we have come to expect; when compromise which at 
least outwardly favours working relationships over defendants’ interests is the accepted 
norm.  
 
3.4.6 The principal – agent problem 
 
The principal – agent problem is applied most often in the fields of political science and 
economics, (Stiglitz 2008) but also has direct application to the defendant – lawyer 
relationship, and more widely to the other relationships discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Problems in the principal - agent relationship most commonly arise in situations in which 
the agent (here, for the time being, the defendant) instructs an agent (the defence barrister) 
to perform a task for him. The assignment of that task carries with it uncertainties and risk 
because the principal has no way of knowing whether the agent will perform the task 
adequately, and indeed the agent may have strong self interests not to perform to the best 
of his ability. The task may, for example, be costly, time consuming, challenging, or of 
limited interest to the agent. In order to limit the agent’s possible shirking, incentives must 
be put into place to ensure that the agent’s interests coincide with those of the principal. 
Incentives commonly applied may be material, coercive, moral, or a combination of two of 
more of these broad types. 
 
When considering material incentives, it has already been established earlier in this chapter 
that criminal defence barristers are, (or consider themselves to be), poorly remunerated for 
their work, and far from aligning the lawyer’s interests with those of the defendant, the 
current fee structure is more likely to cause their interests to diverge by indirectly providing 
incentives to crack cases in some circumstances. Additionally, as Stephen and Garoupa 
have highlighted, in publically funded criminal defence work, there is another principal – 
agent relationship; the relationship between the defence lawyer and the funding body 
(2008, p. 343). Furthermore, the barrister will have been instructed by a solicitor, and in 
some senses also acts as the agent in that relationship. The criminal defence barrister may 
therefore find himself torn between his various agency roles. Aligning his own material 
interests with the interests of a defendant who is likely to have limited knowledge of the 
legal and procedural issues involved, in addition to the interests of the instructing solicitor 
(see 3.4.1 above), the costs driven targets of the Criminal Defence Service, as well as the 
barrister’s overriding duty to the court and the administration of justice becomes a near 
impossible task. Material incentives therefore do little to regulate competing principal – 
agent interests.  
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Despite (or perhaps because of), the guidance provided by the Turner rules and the codes of 
conduct, there is little coercion which can be brought to bear to ensure a barrister fulfils 
the tasks required of him by his defendant principal. It was not until 2000 and the case of 
Hall v Simons that barristers lost their immunity from being sued for negligence.93 The 
asymmetry of information and power is still acute, and the defendant is unlikely to be able 
to accurately gauge whether the barrister is acting in his (the defendant’s) best interests and 
the case law reviewed earlier in this chapter demonstrates that the appellate courts have 
proven themselves reluctant to intervene in cases in which barristers were alleged to have 
pressurised defendants to plead guilty. Tague argues that applying the principal – agent 
model to the barrister – lay client relationship is not workable as the model could lead to 
the barrister having to argue a case in a way which was ineffective or unethical if he were 
compelled to adhere to the defendant’s precise instructions (Tague 2001, pp.153 – 154) and 
this goes some way towards explaining the courts’ unwillingness to impose coercive 
regulation of the principal – agent relationship. 
 
The loose ethical guidance on the matter, in addition to the fact that barristers have 
competing interests which may detract from their loyalty to individual defendants and their 
commitment to adversarialism makes it unlikely that all defending barristers feel a strong 
moral obligation to act in the best interests of the client. However, not acting in the 
defendant’s best interests could range from the overt pressure depicted by Baldwin and 
McConville (1977) to interpreting the best interests of the client in a way which may not 
tally with the defendant’s view of his best interests, were he to be aware of all the material 
facts. Alschuler quotes one lawyer in his study as stating that ‘[a] lawyer’s function is simply 
to minimise the painful consequences of criminal proceedings for his client…So long as 
there is a 10 per cent chance of a prison sentence, the client is better off to plead’ (1975, p. 
1279). It may, however, be that were a defendant aware that the chance of a prison 
sentence was only 10%, he would prefer to plead not guilty if he were in a position to 
exercise the authority of his role as principal in the relationship. The asymmetry and lack of 
information which characterises the principal – agent problem is all the more acute in the 
client – lawyer relationship, and in Alschuler’s lawyer’s scenario the agent possesses far 
greater specialist knowledge and has the power to relay information to the principal in a 
way which leaves the principal little choice but to regard the agent’s advice as being in his 
interests. 
                                                 
93 [2000] 3 WLR 543, [2000] 3 AER 673. 
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The principal-agent problem thus goes some way towards addressing an obvious question 
which sceptics could level at research which suggests that defence lawyers encourage their 
clients to plead guilty, namely why would defendants (particularly innocent defendants) 
simply comply and plead guilty? There are three major approaches which have been put 
forward to explain why clients themselves become subsumed in the organisational factors 
which provide the context for their lawyer’s working practices: the professional model; 
lawyers as translators of defendants’ interests; and lawyers’ monopoly of knowledge (see 
McConville et al 1994, p.129). What each has in common is that the client / defendant 
often simply does not see himself as the principal and therefore makes little or no attempt 
to exert his authority as principal. In the professional model lawyers deploy expert 
knowledge in the best interests of their clients; these interests are seen as being best served 
through the routine processing of guilty pleas since defendants usually have no factual or 
legal arguments to set against prosecution evidence. Defendants comply because they know 
this and make autonomous choices. This type of model would be supported by McCabe 
and Purves’ conclusions which found that defendants made rational and pragmatic choices 
to plead guilty when faced with the evidence against them (1972). In a model which regards 
lawyers as translators of interests presented by clients, lawyers are ‘conceptive ideologists’ 
who reconstitute interests in terms of a legal discourse which has trans-situational 
applicability (Cain 1979). This corresponds with Blumberg’s argument that in the USA, ‘All 
court personnel, including the accused’s own lawyer, tend to be co-opted to become agent 
mediators who help the accused redefine his situation and restructure his perceptions 
concomitant with a plea a guilty’ (1967b, pp. 19-20). Related to this model is the 
conceptualisation of lawyers as professionals, who, in common with other professional 
groupings such as doctors and accountants, control clients through their monopoly of 
expert knowledge. Legal training and specialised knowledge enable lawyers to act as 
intermediaries between a client’s narrow self-interests and the legal system (Cain 1979). 
 
Each of these models has at its core a simple principle: defendants are in a vulnerable 
position, lawyers think they know best, often do know best, and defendants have no one 
else in whom to put their faith, so the barrister takes over the role of the principal in the 
relationship. This may lead to an unnecessary willingness to please the lawyer, as occurred 
in Case 91 of this study’s sample, in which the defendant, who had been charged with 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm, changed his plea from not guilty to guilty, but then 
applied to vacate his plea. The following is an extract from his statement explaining why he 
had changed his plea: 
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‘I changed my statement when I was first seeing my barrister, Miss X, because I 
didn’t think she believed me. I thought she would not take my case and I would 
have no barrister to represent me in court so I tried to change my story to fit with 
the evidence I have seen and with what I thought the barrister wanted to hear and 
fit better.’ 
 
McConville et al. also write of the ‘submissiveness’ of some defendants they encountered 
and that they were ‘overready to acquiesce’ (1994, p. 255) and Hedderman and Moxon’s 
finding that 68% of their sample of defendants agreed with the statement ‘I thought I 
would be found guilty, no matter how I pleaded’ (1992, p.24) points towards a willingness 
(or perhaps more aptly, a resignation) to acquiesce to inducements to plead guilty. If Case 
91 is an accurate representation of events, the defendant’s fear of being left unrepresented, 
and perhaps being convicted in any case, was so great that he preferred instead to fabricate 
a version of events which made him guilty of the offence charged. The question which 
would have to be answered in this case is whether the barrister had given the defendant any 
cause to feel she did not believe him. If she did, the case represents the detrimental effects 
of barristers’ assumptions of the guilt of their lay client. If she did not, it is indicative of the 
dilemma that barristers who act perfectly within all legal, ethical and professional standards, 
and do not exert any pressures on defendants can still, dependent on the interpretations of 
defendants, be perceived as creating a pressure to plead guilty.  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has brought together a wide range of issues regarding the work of legal 
professionals (defending barristers in particular) and has analysed them in the context of 
their relationship with cracked trials, late guilty pleas, and plea bargaining. Lawyers 
undoubtedly play a pivotal role in the process both of trials cracking as a result of 
defendants entering guilty pleas, and more generally in the process of plea bargaining. Many 
factors tie the defending barrister to the cracked trial, and research shows that his last 
minute advice is often what prompts defendants to change plea (Bottoms and McClean 
1976; Baldwin and McConville 1977; Zander and Henderson 1993). In part this is a result 
of the divided legal profession which creates a barrier between the defendant and his trial 
advocate. The defendant’s direct contact will be almost exclusively with the solicitor or 
unqualified paralegals (Morison and Leith 1992; McConville et al. 1994) and he may not 
meet the barrister briefed to represent him at trial until the day of the trial, as the level of 
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discontinuous representation is such that the barrister originally instructed for the Plea and 
Case Management Hearing may not be available. It is inevitable that there will be many 
cases in which it becomes apparent to the barrister on the morning of the trial that the 
evidence against the defendant is very strong (particularly if all the prosecution witnesses 
have arrived); perhaps stronger than the solicitor had been able to appreciate at an earlier 
stage. In such a situation, it is perfectly clear that the legal and ethical guidelines permit the 
barrister to advise his lay client, in strong terms, that a conviction is likely and ensure that 
the defendant is aware that a guilty plea would result in a reduction in sentence, but that the 
final decision is the defendant’s alone. Although criticisms can be levelled at the existence 
of the sentence discount, or structural flaws in the criminal justice system which lead to a 
crystallisation of the issues at such a late stage, there is little scope for questioning the 
ethics of a defence lawyer in this scenario.  On occasion, the reality may not be so 
straightforward: defendants can perceive advice which is within the ethical guidelines as 
pressure, and there is little that can be done to remedy this, other than to ensure that 
barristers are sensitive to their lay clients’ vulnerabilities. The evidence (both from my own 
data and the previous literature) which has documented defence lawyers’ dismissive 
attitudes towards defendants and towards defendants’ accounts of the facts, suggests this is 
at times not the case. Moreover, there will be occasions when defence barristers do exert 
pressure on defendants to plead guilty, not least because it can be in their professional and 
financial interests to strike a bargain with the prosecution and crack the case (although 
Tague puts forward recent findings on the London Bar to the contrary (2006, 2007)), and 
the skewed principal – agent relationship between the defendant and his barrister leaves the 
defendant without the knowledge or power to enforce a particular course of action in his 
case, again making it unlikely that a defendant is afforded much scope to play the system 
and manipulate the timing of his plea.   
  
This chapter has demonstrated that, for the most part, the evidence on the lawyer’s role in 
cracked trials suggests that the nature of defending barristers’ workloads provide strong 
financial and administrative incentives for them to encourage clients to plead guilty. This, 
coupled with the depersonalised attitudes barristers appear to have towards criminal 
defendants (perhaps inevitable given the short time they spend with them, and the greater 
benefits of loyalty to the system as a whole), engenders a situation whereby barristers 
routinely engage in plea bargaining in order to make a guilty plea an attractive proposition 
for their client. Morison and Leith’s argument that ‘[t]he culture of the Crown court is one 
of crime control and this is a view taken as much by most defence barristers as by those 
who are associated with the prosecution’ (1992, p. 114 – 121) rings true. This is not 
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necessarily manifested in overt pressures of the magnitude of those documented by 
Negotiated Justice (1977) and may be motivated by a genuine belief that it is in the best 
interests of their clients, but it nonetheless contributes greatly to the incidence of late guilty 
pleas. Furthermore, Tague (2006, 2007) and Sommerlad’s (2001) findings suggest that there 
may be regional differences in the weight given to adversarial principles and the advice 
given to defendants on plea, and the importance of local culture in adversarialism and 
cracked trials requires further empirical research. It is nonetheless barristers, not 
defendants, who have the greater means and motive to play the system. 
 
The following chapter presents the quantitative and qualitative data collected by this study 
on those aspects of cracked trials and plea bargaining which do not relate to the role of the 
defence lawyer, and the data are analysed and interpreted in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
IDENTIFYING FEATURES OF CRACKED TRIALS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the data (both quantitative and qualitative) extracted from Crown 
Prosecution Service files, and where appropriate also draws on material recorded during 
interviews with legal professionals (except where it relates directly to the role of the lawyer, 
previously discussed in Chapter 3). In doing so, the thesis moves on from exploring the 
lawyer’s role in cracked trials and plea bargaining, and begins to investigate additional 
features of cracked trials. The data are presented here with limited analysis, and are 
analysed in depth and interpreted in Chapter 5. As the data collection was in large part 
exploratory, these findings represent the wide range of issues that arose in the analysis. 
Although given the non-random nature of the sampling process, and the sample size, it is 
not possible to identify causal relationships between certain features of trials and the trial’s 
outcome as cracked or otherwise, it is possible to identify some features as potentially 
significant to the understanding of the causes of cracked trials.  
 
4.2 Overview of the data 
 
Data were extracted from 119 prosecution files of cases finalised at Manchester Minshull 
Street Crown Court between June 2006 and December 2006, which represented the cases 
against 151 individual defendants. The quantitative data collected from the Crown 
Prosecution Service files can be grouped into seven core categories: 94 
 
(i) Defendant data (age, employment status, race, previous convictions); 
(ii) Offence data (the offences on the indictment, and the facts thereof); 
(iii) Case outcome data (the means by which the case – and individual counts within 
the case – were disposed of. This included information about the plea(s), 
sentence, and the number of hearings); 
(iv) The number of counsel each defendant was represented by in total; 
(v) The nature of the evidence against the defendant; 
(vi) Whether a Goodyear indication or basis of plea was given; and 
                                                 
94 The data collection form used is reproduced at Appendix A. 
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(vii) Whether any specific offers to enter or accept guilty pleas were made. 
 
In addition to the quantitative data extracted from the case files, any relevant qualitative 
information was recorded, which allowed for expansion of the above data.95 Interviews 
with legal professionals were semi structured, and as such covered similar but by no means 
identical ground. All interviewees were asked about their views on cracked trials in general 
and what they felt the causes were.96  
 
The remainder of this section provides an overview of the composition of the case files 
sampled and where possible, a comparison with the data available for Minshull Street 
Crown Court and / or regional or national data. Tests of significance have not been carried 
out as the sample was not drawn at random and is not representative (see Chapter 3.3), but 
it is nonetheless instructive to set out the respective figures in order to make some 
evaluation of the sample in relation to population it is drawn from. 
 
The case files were drawn from three geographical CPS units which cover the south and 
east of the Greater Manchester area (Trafford, Stockport and Salford). Male defendants 
made up by far the majority of the sample (90%). At Minshull Street Crown Court, during 
the seven months from which cases for this study were drawn, 11% of defendants were 
female and 89% male. The proportion of female defendants is also comparable with that 
recorded by the Criminal Statistics annual report in 2006, published by the Ministry of 
Justice, which show that 10.35% of defendants over 18 committed for trial at the Crown 
Court were female.97 The defendants in this study’s sample ranged in age from 15 to 58, 
and the mean age of the defendants was 27.8 years.  
 
The breakdown of the defendants’ employment status (as recorded on police charge sheets) 
is shown below: 
 
 
 
                                                 
95 Common examples were: the reasons given for a change of plea, the terms of a basis of 
plea, communication between prosecution and defence as to which pleas or charges might 
be acceptable, and references to witness reliability. 
96 The outline interview schedules used are reproduced at Appendix B.  
97 See figures at Table 2.10 of the 2006 Criminal Statistics, which show that a total of 
73,400 defendants over 18 were proceeded against and committed for trial at the Crown 
Court in 2006, 7600 of whom were female. 
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Fig. 4.1 Defendant employment status 
 
Employment status Number of defendants Percentage of sample98 (%) 
Full time 55 36.4 
Part time 3 2.0 
Self employed 1 0.7 
Unemployed 80 53.0 
Student 4 2.6 
Unknown 8 5.3 
 
It is generally accepted that unemployment rates among those charged with, or convicted 
of, criminal offences are considerably higher than those of the general population and the 
53% unemployment rate within this study’s sample is not dissimilar to that of the 
population of defendants in criminal cases nationally (see for example Metcalf, Anderson, 
and Rolfe, 2001).   
 
Fig. 4.2 Defendant ethnicity 
 
Ethnicity Number of 
defendants 
Percentage of sample 
(%) 
Percentage of all 
defendants at 
Minshull Street 
Crown Court June – 
December 2006 (%)99 
White European 132 87.4 82.6 
Dark European 1 0.7 n/a100 
Afro-Caribbean 5 3.3 2.0 
Asian 8 5.3 3.1 
Arab 3 2.0 0.7 
Unknown 2 1.3 8.8 
 
Fig. 4.2 above presents the breakdown of the sample’s ethnicity (recorded by, and using the 
same categories as, police charge sheets). The ethnicity of the sample was overwhelmingly 
white (87.4%), which is largely representative of Greater Manchester’s overall ethnic 
composition (the 2001 census recorded Manchester’s general population as being 91.1% 
white).101 In terms of the population of defendants nationally, the 2006 Statistics on Race 
and the Criminal Justice System record that of 63,307 defendants tried on indictable 
offences in England and Wales during 2006, 45,047 (71.2%) were white (Jones and Singer 
                                                 
98 Figures are throughout this chapter rounded to the nearest decimal point. 
99
 Data obtained from the Performance Directorate of HMCS. 
100 The court data did not include a ‘dark European’ category. 
101 It was not possible to obtain comparable statistics solely for the three areas of 
Manchester from which the sample cases were drawn. 
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2007).  It appears therefore that white defendants were overrepresented when compared 
with the national data, but as the fourth column of Fig. 4.2 shows, white defendants within 
the sample do not appear to have been overrepresented to the same extent when compared 
with the population of defendants whose cases were finalised at Minshull Street Crown 
Court during the months from which this sample was drawn. 87.4% of this study’s sample 
were white, compared with 82.6% of defendants whose cases were dealt with at the court 
between June and December 2006. As Fig. 4.2 shows, the sample contained slightly higher 
percentages of minority ethnic defendants than the overall Minshull Street caseload during 
the relevant months, (although 8.8% of defendants from the Minshull Street data were of 
unknown ethnicity, compared with only 1.3% from the study’s sample, which could 
account for the difference). 
 
The offences within the sample spanned a broad spectrum, but included no murder cases 
as Minshull Street Crown Court is a third tier Crown court and murders are sent to 
Manchester Crown Square Crown Court. In total, the 119 cases represented 396 individual 
counts on indictments against defendants, within sixteen separate offence groups, the 
composition of which is illustrated by Fig. 4.3 below. The offence categories are those used 
by the Courts Service when collating offence data, and each of the offences in the CPS 
sample were placed within the relevant offence group according to these criteria. The 
second column of Fig. 4.3 sets out the total number of counts within that offence group, 
and the third column presents the percentage as a proportion of the total number of counts 
of each offence group within the sample. The fourth column shows the percentage of 
Manchester Minshull Street Crown Court’s trial receipts during June to December 2006 by 
offence group.  
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Fig. 4.3 Total number of counts by offence group, and Minshull Street Crown court 
receipts by main offence group 
 
Offence group Number of 
counts 
Percentage of 
sample (%) 
Minshull Street Crown 
Court trial receipts June 
– December 2006 (%)102 
Violence (other) 92  23.2 17.7 
Other indictable 
offences (excluding 
motoring offences) 
75  18.9 22.5 
Other summary 
offences (excluding 
motoring offences) 
48  12.1 14.1 
Theft and handling 46  11.6 7.2 
Robbery 34  8.6 6.3 
Burglary 24  6.1 3.8 
Criminal damage 22  5.6 2.1 
s.18 OAPA  14  3.5 3.6 
Sexual offences 
(excluding rape) 
11 2.8 7.2 
Drug offences 8  2.0 5.0 
Rape 7 1.8 1.6 
Breach 5  1.3 2.7 
Attempted murder 4 1.0 0.2 
Indictable motoring 
offences 
3 0.8 2.1 
Summary motoring 
offences 
2 0.5 1.4 
Manslaughter 1  0.3 0.4 
 
My own data presented in Fig. 4.3 record the offence group of individual counts, and the 
court data record trial receipts, so the two sets of percentages are not directly comparable 
as the court data use the most serious offence and this becomes the offence group for the 
case, even if it includes several less serious offences. For the purposes of a broad 
comparison, however, the data is adequate and shows that the spread of cases across 
offence groups was for the most part in line with the proportions heard at Minshull Street 
Crown Court during the months from which the sample was drawn. Of the larger offence 
groups, my own sample had slightly greater proportions of violence (other), theft and 
handling stolen goods, robbery, burglary and criminal damage. The sample contains slightly 
smaller proportions of non-motoring ‘other’ indictable and summary offences, drugs 
offences and a notably smaller proportion of non-rape sexual offences (although the 
proportions of rape cases are very similar). The largest two groups in the sample were both 
‘other’ categories; other violence (all offences of violence excluding attempted murder, 
                                                 
102 Data obtained from the Performance Directorate of HMCS. 
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manslaughter and grievous bodily harm with intent under s.18 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861), and ‘other’ indictable offences.103 The offences within these two groups 
covered a broad spectrum of criminal offences, which may account for the relative size of 
the groups. It also suggests that the offence group categories used by the Court Service 
may be too broad to use as a tool with which to make meaningful observations about the 
relationship between offence types and the likelihood of a case cracking.  
 
Fig. 4.4 below shows the distribution of the number of individual counts against 
defendants. 
 
Fig. 4.4 Number of counts against individual defendants 
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In 106 cases (70.2%), there were two or more counts against the defendant; three or more 
counts in 56 cases (37%), and four or more counts in 31 cases (20.5%). In only 45 cases 
(29.8%) was there just one count on the indictment, which suggests that the type of 
offending alleged of the defendants within the sample was such that it covered a period of 
time or, more often, represented a series of events which could be broken down into 
multiple criminal offences for the purposes of drafting the indictment. It was not possible 
to obtain any national or local statistics (published or otherwise) which record the number 
of counts against individual defendants with which to compare this finding.104  
                                                 
103 This study’s analysis was not impeded by the broad ‘other’ groupings, as being able to 
analyse cases more closely by collecting data from files meant it was not restricted to these 
categories. 
104 Freedom of Information Act requests were made to HMCS and the CPS, but it is not 
data which appears to be recorded and collated centrally, only on individual defendants’ 
files. 
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Fig. 4.5 below shows the number of previous convictions recorded against defendants. 
 
Fig. 4.5 Number of previous convictions 
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The number of previous convictions within the sample spanned a vast range, from the 43 
defendants (28.5%) with no previous convictions to the defendant with 155 previous 
convictions. A significant proportion of the sample (41.5%) had ten or more previous 
convictions.105  
 
Where it has been possible to make an evaluation of the sample’s composition compared 
with court or national figures, it appears that in terms both of the demographics of the 
defendants, and the types of cases, the cases sampled for this study are broadly speaking 
comparable and the proportions not wildly dissimilar to Minshull Street Crown Court’s 
caseload at the time the cases were sampled, and of Crown courts nationally. Furthermore, 
as the sample is not random and is therefore not intended to be representative, the absence 
of tests of significance to demonstrate its representativeness does not create 
methodological problems for the aims of this study.   
 
                                                 
105 It was not possible to obtain data on the number of previous convictions held by 
defendants nationally, or at Minshull Street Crown court. Freedom of Information Act 
requests were made to HMCS and to the CPS but centralised data on previous convictions 
are held only on the Police National Computer (PNC), which holds data on individuals, 
rather than by court and / or by time period. Attempting to gain access to this data by 
obtaining the names if all defendants whose cases were heard at Minshull Street Crown 
court over the six month period, and then obtaining details of their previous convictions 
from the PNC (in the event that access to the data would have been granted) would have 
been disproportionately time consuming. 
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4.3 Overall trial outcomes 
 
The trials in the sample were all either effective or cracked; there were no ineffective trials 
as the sample of files received were all completed cases. As the sample consisted of cases 
which had been listed for trial, and excluded those which had been disposed of at an earlier 
stage, each of the 151 defendants in the sample had initially pleaded not guilty to each of 
the charges against them, or had failed to enter a plea. 
 
In 35 cases (23.2%), the case was effective in the sense that all counts within the case were 
disposed of by way of a conviction, jury acquittal or judge directed acquittal. The number 
of cases in which at least one, but not necessarily all counts were disposed of by one of 
these means was higher: 49 cases (32.5%). Over three quarters of the sample (76.7%) 
therefore had one or more individual count outcomes which were not effective.  
 
In 75 out of the 151 cases against defendants (49.6%), all the counts within those cases 
were disposed of either by way of a guilty plea or by the prosecution offering no evidence, 
and thus met the administrative criteria for definition as a cracked trial.  This was the 
proportion of cracked trials which had been anticipated and is comparable with the 48.9% 
overall cracked trial rate at Minshull Street Crown Court during that year (Crown Court 
Annual Report, 2006/2007). 
 
4.4 Outcomes of individual counts within trials 
 
It became apparent during data collection that in many cases, if each of the individual 
counts on the indictment within a case were taken into account, there was a wide variety of 
outcomes within individual cases; cases were frequently comprised of one or more counts 
which cracked, and one or more counts which did not crack. Given the high proportion of 
cases which contained multiple counts (see Fig. 4.4) this was inevitable; it is unlikely that all 
counts within a case will always be disposed of by the same means. Even if any possible 
bargaining is disregarded, common sense dictates that there will often be different evidence 
available for different offences represented on an indictment, or that an offender may be 
more willing to plead guilty to some counts on an indictment than to others.  
 
This thesis therefore re-examines the definition of a ‘cracked’ case and conceptualises it 
more broadly. If a case against a defendant is defined as ‘cracked’ on the basis that at least 
one count was disposed of by a guilty plea or by the prosecution offering no evidence, then 
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109 of the 151 cases against defendants (72.2%) were cracked (referred to hereinafter as an 
‘informal’ cracked case); a considerably greater proportion than the 49.6% of cases in 
which all counts cracked (referred to hereinafter as a ‘recorded’ cracked case). 106 This core 
typology of cracked trials makes a contribution to the literature in the field by enabling an 
analysis (at Chapter 5) which challenges assumptions about the dynamics and processes of 
cracked trials; assumptions upon which policy rests. 
 
Fig. 4.6 below illustrates the considerable difference between the percentage of informal 
cracked cases within the sample, and the percentage of recorded cracked cases within the 
sample, as well as the national average and Minshull Street Crown Court cracked trial rates.  
 
Fig. 4.6 Percentage of trials cracked, by data source and type (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the section below demonstrates, the way in which cracked trials are defined has a direct 
and significant bearing on the way in which reasons for cracked trials are calculated. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 In 7 cases, the original indictment was missing and it was not clear what the outcome 
related to; these cases are excluded from this statistic. Thus although there were 151 cases 
and 35 were entirely effective, there were only 109 confirmed Type 1 cracked cases, rather 
than 116. 
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4.5 Reasons for cracked trials 
 
Fig. 4.7 Reasons for cracked trials as published by 2006 Judicial Statistics107 
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A natural conclusion which could justifiably be drawn from the statistics reproduced at Fig. 
4.7 is that it is overwhelmingly defendants’ late decisions to plead guilty which are the 
causes of cracked trials. As discussed in Chapter 1, it is a conclusion which has been widely 
accepted by the criminal justice system and is a view which was subscribed to by both the 
1993 Runciman Commission and the 2001 Auld Report. Most legal professionals 
interviewed for this study also felt that it was defendants’ late decisions which were more 
often than not responsible for trials cracking: 
 
Barrister A:  ‘You can’t get a man to face reality until he has to…ultimately, it’s punters 
who cause trials to crack.’ 
 
Court Administrator B:  ‘Defendants wait for the day of doom before they face up to 
their guilt…they’re playing the system too, to see what they 
can get out of it if they hold on.’ 
    
Solicitor A:  ‘The main reason for trials cracking is defendants changing their minds, 
confronted with the prospect of stepping into court and maintaining a not 
guilty plea when the evidence is, and perhaps always has been, stacked up 
against them… that’s the obvious reason, the classic reason.’ 
                                                 
107 The 2% ‘Other’ category was comprised of cases in which the defendant was unfit to 
proceed, deceased, or bound over to keep the peace. 
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Judge A:  ‘The main reason for cracked trials, I think…is because one has got to 
remember that the clientele of the criminal courts is not the same as the 
clientele of the senior common room at Manchester University. [They lead 
a] very chaotic lifestyle. People who live in that way… they’re not necessarily 
the sort of people who are going to organise their affairs with meticulous 
care… asking them to engage in the litigation process…is very unrealistic.’  
 
Judge B:  ‘The criminal has an entirely different agenda, everything in life is a gamble 
for them…It’s not that they don’t act rationally, but they see things in a 
short term light and would rather see what happens on the day.’ 
 
Barrister C, Barrister D and Court Administrator B also commented that they thought the 
time of year made a difference and that defendants manipulated their pleas to avoid being 
sentenced before a summer holiday or before Christmas, and would initially plead not 
guilty in the expectation that they would be released on bail and change their pleas at the 
later date of the trial.  
 
Despite these views and the existing administrative statistics, the quantitative data collected 
for this study would suggest that the reasons for trials cracking within the sample were not 
as centred on defendants’ decisions as might have been expected, particularly when cracked 
cases with a combination of causes were considered. The table below illustrates the 
percentages of cases cracking by reason (as a proportion of recorded cracked trials, defined 
on the same basis as the Judicial Statistics define cracked trials): 
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Fig. 4.8 Reasons for recorded cracked trials within sample 
28%
16%
28%
28%
Defendant enters plea to
original offence(s)
Defendant enters plea to
alternative offence(s)
Prosecution offer no
evidence
Combination reasons
 
 
The defendant entering a late guilty plea(s) to offence(s) originally on the indictment was 
the sole reason for the case cracking in only 28% of recorded cracked cases. In the 
remaining recorded cracked cases (72%), the reason for the crack was that the prosecution 
offered no evidence (28%), the defendant offered and/or the prosecution accepted a guilty 
plea to alternative offence(s) (16%), or a combination of those reasons (28%).  
 
In 90 cases (59.6% of the total sample), defendants did, however, change at least one plea 
from not guilty to guilty. In 62 cases (41.0%), the change of plea was to a count(s) originally 
on the indictment, and in 27 cases (17.9%), the plea(s) was changed from not guilty to 
guilty to an alternative count(s).  
 
Although interviewees emphasized the role played by defendants’ late decisions, they did 
also acknowledge that other factors could sometimes be equally, if not more, significant: 
 
Barrister A:    ‘You often don’t have the evidence until a late stage so the defendant can’t 
be properly advised on their plea until a late stage…this’ll often result in a 
cracked trial too.’ 
 
Barrister D:  ‘When a case cracks from the prosecution side, it’ll generally be problems 
with witnesses… or police officers losing exhibits, you’d be amazed at the 
number of cases in which vital evidence has just disappeared’. 
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Judge A:  ‘The second main reason for a cracked trial is that often the prosecution 
witnesses, if it’s a domestic fight or something, are as chaotic as they 
[defendants] are.’ 
 
The quotes extracted above all identify evidential or witness related factors as playing a key 
role in cracked trials (aside from, or contributing to, defendants’ last minute decisions to 
plead guilty) and additional data recorded on these issues are presented in the following 
section. 
 
4.6 Victims and other witnesses 
 
The availability and perceived reliability of witness testimony played a large role in the cases 
in this study, initially simply in terms of the frequency with which the case file indicated 
that there was an issue relating to a victim or another prosecution witness.  In 64 cases 
against defendants (43% of the total sample), it was possible to identify a victim or other 
witness related issue. In 14 cases (9.3%), witnesses retracted statements, in 18 cases 
(11.9%), the file noted that at least one victim or other witness was reluctant to give 
evidence in court, and in 26 cases (16.6%), the file made reference to the unreliability of at 
least one victim or other witness. Within the category of ‘other’ victim or witness issues, of 
the seven cases against defendants (4.6%) which fell into this category, three were instances 
where it was recorded that the victim had a particularly strong preference for continuing 
with the prosecution of a specific offence, after the prosecution had put to the victim the 
possibility of accepting a guilty plea to an alternative or lesser offence. 
 
Victim / witness factors were a common feature of both informal and recorded cracked 
cases. Fig. 4.9 below shows the frequency with which victim / witness issues occurred 
within both the effective and the informal cracked cases. 
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Fig. 4.9 Frequency of victim issues within effective and informal cracked cases108 
 
Victim/ 
Witness Issue 
Frequency - effective 
cases 
 
Frequency - 
Informal cracks 
 
Total 
Retraction 1 (6.7%) 13 (26.5%) 14 
Reluctance 3 (20.0%) 15 (30.6%) 18 
Unreliability 5 (33.3%) 21 (43.0%) 26 
Other 6 (40.0%) 0 (0.0%) 6 
Total 15 (100%) 49 (100%) 64 
 
As demonstrated by the data set out in the table above, of those cases where a victim or 
other witness issue could be identified within the CPS file, 15 did not crack, but over three 
times as many (49 cases) did contain at least one count that cracked. As proportions, 
however, there is little difference between the two figures, 42% of the effective cases 
featured witness related issues, as did 44.9% of the informal cracked cases, and 48% of 
recorded cracked cases.109 Of the 49 informal cases, 36 were also recorded cracks.110 
Unreliability of witnesses was the issue most frequently recorded within the informal 
cracked cases (present in 43% of the cases). 
 
Of the informal cracked cases in which victim or other witness issues were identified, the 
reasons for the cases cracking were as follows: 
 
Fig. 4.10 Reasons for informal cracks in cases with victim / witness issues 
 
Reason for informal crack Frequency Percentage of cases with 
victim/witness issues (%) 
Defendant offers guilty plea 
to original count(s) 
3 4.7 
Defendant pleads to 
alternative count(s) 
6 9.4 
Prosecution offer no 
evidence 
20 31.2 
Combination of reasons 20 31.2 
 
The most common outcome for cases in which there were identifiable issues concerning 
                                                 
108 Figures in brackets refer to the percentage of the total of effective cases in the first 
column, and the percentage of the total of informal cracked cases in the second column. 
109 It would be instructive to be able to differentiate the effective cases which resulted in 
conviction from those which resulted in a judge directed or jury acquittal; this was however 
not possible within the structure of the quantitative data which was adopted for the 
purposes of the SPSS analysis. 
110
 This includes those cases in which there was only one count. 
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the availability or reliability of victims or witnesses was the prosecution offering no 
evidence to all counts, or a combination of reasons; in only 4.7% of cases with victim or 
witness issues did the defendant plead guilty to the original indictment.  
 
The qualitative data extracted from the case files shed further light on the circumstances of 
many of these cases and illustrate the potential for the part played by the victim or other 
witnesses (or lack thereof) to affect the outcome of cracked cases. The circumstances of 
four such cases are summarised below:  
 
Case 117:  The defence had suggested that bindovers and compensation would be 
an appropriate punishment in the case (both defendants were charged 
with one count of actual bodily harm under s.47 of the OAPA 1861, at 
the lower end of the range of severity covered by that offence). The file 
indicated that as the victim was unhappy with this suggestion, the 
prosecution proceeded to trial and the defendants were convicted. 
  
Case 67:  The defendant offered a guilty plea to an assault contrary to s.39 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988, in place of the charge of actual bodily harm 
under s.47 of the OAPA 1861 originally charged. The file stated that the 
victim and the prosecution were satisfied with this outcome; there were 
damaging witness preconvictions, and the victim had been unwilling to 
give evidence or to sign the necessary medical consent forms for evidence 
of his injuries to be used in evidence, thus weakening the prosecution 
case. 
 
Case 68:  This case concerned gang related violence; the defendant had been 
charged with causing grievous bodily harm with intent (s.18 of the OAPA 
1861) and three counts of witness intimidation under s.51 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Of the seven prosecution witnesses 
due to give evidence, only two appeared at court; the other five were 
deemed to be hostile witnesses or were wanted on warrant. The 
prosecution file notes that the case worker had been told: ‘in the 
circ[cumstance]s, tell counsel to accept any sensible plea’. A guilty plea to 
one count of actual bodily harm contrary to s.47 of the OAPA 1861 was 
accepted. 
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Case 84:  This was a robbery charge in which it appeared that the defendant was 
well aware that the outcome of the case would hinge on witness 
attendance. The victim had been reluctant to give evidence from the 
outset and a witness warrant was subsequently issued for his arrest. The 
defence canvassed a possible plea of guilty to theft, which was acceptable 
to the prosecution. The defendant then changed his mind, and 
maintained his not guilty plea; the prosecution file suggested that the 
defendant was choosing instead to wait and see if the witness was 
brought. Unexpectedly, the witness did attend and the defendant once 
again offered a plea of guilty to theft, which on this occasion was not 
acceptable to the prosecution. The defendant was tried and convicted of 
robbery.  
 
 
4.7 Evidence against defendants 
 
Another issue which may be relevant to cracked trials and plea bargaining is the presence 
or otherwise of various types of evidence, which were recorded in each case.111 These were: 
(i) DNA 
(ii) CCTV 
(iii) Fingerprints 
(iv) Identification 
(v) Admissions 
(vi) Other physical evidence 
 
The table at Fig. 4.11 below sets out the frequency with which types of evidence were 
noted, and the percentages of those cases which were disposed of by the defendant 
pleading guilty to all original counts, the defendant pleading guilty to all alternative counts, 
                                                 
111 Recording the presence of these evidential factors was by no means an exact method of 
gauging the strength of the prosecution cases, but for the purposes of this study it did 
provide a practical means of comparison between cases which contained evidence of 
various types. In 48 cases (31.7%) more than one type of evidence was recorded within a 
case, but for the sake of clarity the evidence types referred to in Fig. 4.11 below reflect 
what appeared to be the predominant type of evidence in the prosecution case. Witness 
statements were of course also present in each case, but the nature of the content varied so 
greatly that it would not be meaningful to include them as part of an analysis of the 
strength of a case. The mean number of witness statements recorded in each case was 8.6, 
but ranged from cases with just one statement, to cases with over 50 witness statements. 
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the prosecution offering no evidence to all counts, all counts being effective, and the 
defendant pleading guilty to at least one count.112 
 
Fig. 4.11 Trial outcomes by primary evidence type 
 
Evidence 
Type 
Guilty 
plea to all 
counts 
(original 
counts) 
Guilty plea 
to all 
counts 
(alternative 
counts) 
Prosecution 
offer no 
evidence to all 
counts 
All counts 
effective 
Informal 
cracked case 
 
Total 
DNA 2 (16.6%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (8.3%) 3 (25.0%) 6 (50.0%) 12 (100%) 
CCTV 6 (20.0%) 1 (3.3%) 1 (3.3%) 7 (23.4%) 15 (50.0%) 30 (100%) 
Fingerprint 1 (14.3%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (71.4%) 1 (14.3%) 7 (100%) 
ID 4 (9.3%) 3 (7.0%) 9 (21.0%) 13 (30.2%) 14 (35.5%) 43 (100%) 
Admissions 5 (33.3%) 2 (13.3%) 1 (6.6%) 1 (6.6%) 6 (40.0%) 15 (100%) 
Other 
physical 
evidence 
 
11(12.2%) 
 
10 (11.1%) 
 
10 (11.1%) 
 
21 (23.3%) 
 
38 (42.2%) 
 
90 (100%) 
 
The table above shows that other than in cases in which fingerprint evidence was available 
(where an effective trial occurred in 71.4% of cases and was the most frequent outcome), 
the most frequent outcome regardless of the type of evidence was an informal cracked 
case. That fingerprint evidence (arguably second only in reliability to DNA evidence) most 
commonly resulted in an effective trial is difficult to explain, but may be an anomaly given 
the limited number of cases in question. Some other noteworthy figures to extract from the 
data presented in the table are that the greatest proportion of guilty pleas relative to 
evidence type occurred in cases where there had been some admissions made, which in all 
fifteen cases had been at the police questioning stage of the case and in 33.3% of cases led 
to the defendant pleading guilty to the original charges. This is to be expected as reliable 
admissions would provide for a strong prosecution case (although this does not explain 
why the defendants in question did not plead guilty at an earlier stage). 
  
4.8 Offences 
 
One aspect of cracked trials which has been under researched but is surrounded by a great 
deal of anecdotal evidence and many assumptions is the relationship between certain types 
of offence and the likelihood of a cracked trial. Both members of the case progression 
teams interviewed felt that researching trends in offences was the ‘way forward’ in reducing 
                                                 
112
 The percentages in brackets refer to the percentage of the total number of cases 
featuring that evidence type which resulted in the specified outcome.  
 131 
cracked trials; they took the view that certain offences were more likely to crack than 
others, and that if those offences could be reliably identified they could be singled out for a 
targeted pre-trial hearing in an attempt to resolve the issues at an earlier stage. A commonly 
held view, often encountered during informal discussions during the course of this study, 
as well as during interviews, was that those offence groups which were based around a clear 
statutory or common law framework (offences under the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861 was the example most often given) were more likely to crack than others, as they 
would lend themselves more readily to a guilty plea to the ‘next charge down’ being 
acceptable because there was a clear line of offences of decreasing seriousness, but of the 
same nature. The gradation of offences within the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
(s.18, wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent; s. 20, wounding or inflicting 
grievous bodily harm; s. 47 assault occasioning actual bodily harm) fit easily into a 
framework which is then in effect continued by ‘common’ assault under s. 39 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988, affray contrary to s.3 of the Public Order Act 1986, and ss. 4(A) 
and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, which criminalise threatening or abusive or words or 
behaviour.  
 
Barrister D felt strongly that these were the cases most likely to crack: 
 
‘Fights. Fights, across the board [are more likely to crack]. Two reasons. Because 
there’s the whole graduation of s18, s.20, s.47, common assault, and you can move 
that up and down the scale as you want. And also there’s alongside that, there’s all 
the public order offences, affray, s.4, harassment and distress and all that, and 
often, in a big fight, where yes, you definitely punched him, and you might have 
caused some injury, an affray will be a sort of alternative.’  
 
This observation seems to be largely applicable to the cases within the sample, which 
contained 26 cases involving offences of violence or public order which resulted in guilty 
pleas to lesser or fewer counts along the violence/public order continuum. Fewer cases of 
violence or public order (15) proceeded with the indictment unaltered and guilty pleas to, 
or convictions for, the original counts on the indictment. This does not take account of 
factors such as where in the hierarchy of offences the original offence was placed and thus 
the extent of the scope for reductions, but does provide a strong indication that violence 
and public order offences within the sample were often disposed of by lesser or fewer 
charges. 
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Some examples of this were: 
 
Case 35:  The defendant pleaded guilty to s.18 of the OAPA 1861, wounding with 
intent, as an alternative to attempted murder. 
 
Case 68: No evidence was offered in respect of the original count of s.18 OAPA 1861 
wounding with intent, and the defendant pleaded guilty to a s.39 assault 
under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 as an alternative. 
 
Case 29:  The defendant was charged with one count of actual bodily harm contrary 
to s.47 of the OAPA 1861 and one count of s.39 assault under the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988. The defendant pleaded guilty to the former and the latter 
was left to lie on file. 
 
Case 65:  The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of affray (s.3 of the Public Order 
Act 1986) and no evidence was offered in respect of one count of an assault 
contrary to s.39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and one count of 
possession of a bladed article (contrary to s.139 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1988). 
 
Sexual offences are another group of offences said to often be subject to plea bargains. The 
apparently frequent reduction of rape charges to lesser sexual offences has been highlighted 
as an example of a situation in which a charge reduction (specifically where it is the result 
of a form of plea bargain) could have a particularly large impact on the victim of a crime 
(see for example Lees 1996, p.103; Fenwick 1997; Sanders and Young 2007, p. 438). 
However, two barristers interviewed felt that, contrary to this commonly cited situation, in 
their experience sexual offences were in fact those least likely to crack: 
 
Barrister D: ‘There’s very rare cases where any sexual allegation is cracked because very 
often they just won’t admit it, or can’t admit it, or in fact they didn’t do 
it…They don’t lend themselves very easily to a compromise. In fights its 
quite easy to see that there may be shades of grey, so even if they plead to 
the indictment, there’s going to be a basis of plea, because the complainants 
have to an extent, airbrushed their account…and the defendant obviously 
airbrushes his, oh it wasn’t me, it was all them. In sexual assault or the like, 
it either happened or it didn’t. There can’t really be shade of grey in there. 
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There might be consent issues or the like, but basically, it either happened 
or it didn’t, and there aren’t the shades or grey, or the options, or the way to 
manoeuvre a case that you can with assaults and the like’. 
 
Barrister A:  ‘Sex offences…they’re the last to crack, if they do at all. It’s human nature, 
they don’t want to admit it’. 
 
Barrister A also felt that when rape charges were reduced to sexual assault, it was often 
because there was insufficient evidence to sustain a rape charge from the outset: ‘It’s a 
political hot potato so you’ve got these cases coming through that are overcharged’. One 
case (Case 8) seemed to illustrate the underlying principle of Barrister A’s comment, 
although in this instance it did not lead to a cracked trial. The defendant was charged with 
rape in what was in the words of the prosecution file summary a ‘finely balanced decision’. 
The 22 year old defendant had sexual intercourse with a 15 year old girl who in her 
statement to the police had said that she knew she did not refuse his sexual advances, but 
that she had felt upset afterwards. Prosecuting counsel felt that a rape charge was 
appropriate, but the case resulted in a judge directed acquittal.  
 
Two interviewees pinpointed other offences as being those most likely to crack: 
 
Criminal Defence Service Representative:   
‘Fraud, I’d say, is the most likely to crack, there’s so much evidence to trawl 
though, so many complications that a guilty plea often ends up being in 
everyone’s interests’. 
 
Barrister D:  ‘Domestic disputes tend to [crack]. Because again there’s that, the witnesses 
won’t turn up, but if they do, then the pressure is completely on the 
defendant. He will almost always look to get out because he knows if you 
put a partner through it, who’s been beaten black and blue, or whatever the 
circumstances are, and you get found guilty, nobody’s going to have any 
sympathy with you at all’. 
 
Another felt that there were no offences in particular which were more likely to crack:  
 
Solicitor A:  ‘I don’t think any [particular offence] lends itself more or less to it [cracking]. 
There’s always room for negotiation, whether it’s fraud or whether it’s blue 
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collar crime’. 
 
Fig. 4.12 below presents the outcomes of each of the 396 individual counts within the 
sample by offence group. The offence groups are more detailed than the HM Court Service 
classifications (used in Fig. 4.3) because as the discussion above has highlighted, it is 
helpful to be able to make distinctions between individual offences within broad offence 
groups.113 To some extent, it is artificial to separate counts from cases when considering 
outcomes, as individual outcomes can be reliant on each other; for example a defendant 
may plead guilty to a actual bodily harm (s.47 OAPA 1861) on the understanding that the 
prosecution will offer no evidence in respect of a s.39 assault (Criminal Justice Act 1988). 
However, in terms of providing a quantitative outline of which offences most frequently 
resulted in a range of different outcomes, which makes no claims of generalizability, the 
data presented in Fig. 4.12 represent the most appropriate means of presenting this data. 
Each row of the table shows the outcomes of counts of that offence; the percentages 
represent the percentages of the total number of counts of that offence. 
 
Fig. 4.12 Count outcome by offence group 
 
Offence114  Guilty plea 
(as original 
count) 
Guilty plea (as 
alternative 
count) 
Prosecution 
offer no 
evidence115 
Effective Total 
s.20 OAPA 
assault 
6 (42.9%) 1 (7.1%) 1 (7.1%) 6 (42.9%) 14  
s.18 OAPA 
assault  
  7 (63.6%) 4 (36.4%) 11  
s.47 OAPA 
assault 
13 (39.4%) 2 (6.0%) 9 (27.3%) 9 (27.3%) 33  
s.39 CJA assault 7 (26.9%) 5 (19.2%) 11 (42.3%) 3 (11.5%) 26  
Affray 4 (12.9%) 14 (45.1%) 9 (29.0%) 5 (16.1%) 31  
s.4 / s.4A Public 
Order Act  
0 (0.0%) 3 (60.0%) 2 (40.0%) 0 (0.0%) 5 
Witness 
intimidation 
1 (9.1%) 0 (0.0%) 9 (81.8%) 1 (9.1%) 11 
Rape 2 (28.6%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (28.6%) 3 (42.8%) 7 
Sexual assault      
                                                 
113 The sample contained 65 different offences in total; including them all would be 
impractical and add little, if anything, to the analysis of the data. Instead, 22 key offences 
(255 counts) within the offence group which occurred frequently within the sample, or 
which were particularly serious, were selected. 
114 Where applicable, all offences include the inchoate variants of those offences. 
115 Cases in which counts were left to lie on file are included in these figures, as the 
outcome (that the charge is not proceeded with) is the same. See 3.9 for further discussion 
of leaving counts to lie on file. 
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(victim 16 or 
over) 
3 (75.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (25.0%) 4 
Sexual assault 
(victim under 16) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
6 (100%) 
 
6 
Possessing Class 
A drug 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
1 (100%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
1 
Possessing Class 
C drug 
 
4 (66.6%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
2 (33.3%) 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
6 
Possessing Class 
C drug with intent 
to supply 
 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
 
1 (100%) 
 
 
1 
Arson with intent 
to endanger life 
0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 2 
Reckless arson 0 (0.0%) 2 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 
Criminal damage 5 (45.4%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (27.3%) 3 (27.3%) 11 
Burglary 5 (31.3%) 0 (0.0%) 9 (56.2%) 2 (12.5%) 16 
Robbery  4 (15.4%) 0 (0.0%) 19 (73.1%) 3 (11.5%) 26 
Theft 7 (16.7%) 10 (23.8%) 8 (19.0%) 17 (40.5%) 42 
Handling 1(11.1%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (77.8%) 1 (11.1%) 9 
Having offensive 
weapon / having 
bladed article in a 
public place 
 
 
 
3 (30.0%) 
 
 
 
3 (30.0%) 
 
 
 
4 (40.0%) 
 
 
 
0 (0.0%) 
 
 
 
10 
Breach of ASBO 6 (42.9%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (50%) 1 (7.1%) 14 
 
 
Violence 
An analysis of the offences of violence shows that in the most serious assault cases 
(grievous bodily harm or wounding with intent, s.18 OAPA 1861) there were no guilty 
pleas, seven counts to which the prosecution offered no evidence, and four effective 
counts. For s.20 OAPA 1861 offences (grievous bodily harm or wounding), the highest 
frequencies were equally divided (six counts each) between effective counts and guilty pleas 
to original counts. In the s.47 OAPA counts the majority were disposed of by guilty pleas 
to the original counts, but in s.39 assault cases, the majority were disposed of by the 
prosecution offering no evidence. Counts of both affray and s.4/s.4A of the Public Order 
Act 1986 most often resulted in guilty pleas which were guilty pleas to those offences as 
alternative counts. It is notable that a particularly high proportion of the nine counts of 
witness intimidation (81.8%) resulted in the prosecution offering no evidence. 
 
Sexual offences 
Out of the 17 sexual offences in total included in Fig. 4.12, only five resulted in guilty pleas, 
whereas ten were effective and two (both rapes) were disposed of by the prosecution 
offering no evidence. This accords with Barrister A and D’s views that sexual offences to 
not tend to crack readily. No sexual assaults were offered as alternative counts. 
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Drug offences 
Eight drug offences in total are included in Fig. 4.12, half of which were guilty pleas to the 
possession of a Class C drug as original offences. The more serious charges, the possession 
of a Class A drug, and the possession of a Class C drug with intent to supply were disposed 
of by the prosecution offering no evidence, and an effective trial respectively. 
 
Arson 
As there were only two cases of this nature, it was possible to review the original data and 
confirm that in both cases, the prosecution offered no evidence on counts of arson with 
intent to endanger life, and the defendants instead pleaded guilty to reckless arson as an 
alternative. 
 
Theft Act offences 
It is notable that the majority of burglary and robbery offences resulted in the prosecution 
offering no further evidence, and that almost a quarter of the theft counts are guilty pleas 
to theft as an alternative offence. This may suggest that, as with the OAPA 1861, the 
gradation of offences within the Theft Act 1968 lends itself to defendants pleading guilty to 
lesser charges along the same spectrum of offending. 
 
4.9 Pleading guilty to alternative charges, ‘informal’ alternative charges, and 
leaving counts to lie on file  
 
In 29 cases (19.2% of the total sample), a defendant pleaded guilty to at least one charge 
which had been explicitly substituted as a lesser or alternative charge to that which was 
initially on the indictment (the Judicial and Court Statistics, 2006 show that nationally, this 
figure was 18% for 2006; the sample therefore appears to be comparable in this respect). In 
12 cases (7.9%) the entire indictment was disposed of in this way. During data collection, 
guilty pleas to lesser or alternative charges were only recorded as such where the file 
expressly stated that the counts pleaded to were in the alternative.  
 
It became apparent, however, that a more informal means of pleading guilty to lesser to 
alternative charges was also commonplace. In effect, every case which resulted in at least 
one guilty plea to an original count, but in which no evidence was offered in respect of 
other counts, the outcome was in effect the same as in those cases in which a particular 
count(s) was formally replaced by another. For the defendant, the end result was that he or 
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she pleaded guilty to fewer offences than were originally on the indictment; and for the 
prosecution the end result was that they still obtained a conviction in respect of at least one 
charge. The sample contained 36 cases (23.8% of the total sample) in which there appeared 
to be a plea of guilty to ‘informal’ alternative count(s), and eight of these cases also 
contained a formal substitution of counts on the amendment. Related to this informal 
pleading to an alternative indictment is the use of leaving counts to lie on file, which has a 
similar effect to informal alternative counts, in that any counts left on file are not 
proceeded with, and again, the defendant pleads guilty to fewer charges than were originally 
on the indictment. It is also possible for an entire indictment to be left on file. When 
count(s) are left on file, the proceedings are not formally concluded as there is no verdict, 
but the counts can not be proceeded with, without the leave of the Crown Court or the 
Court of Appeal. In 23 cases (21.1% of the informal cracked cases), at least one count was 
disposed of by means of a lie on file.  
 
The four cases summarized below each involved informal alternative charges and/or the 
use of leaving counts to lie on file: 
 
Case 42:  The two co-defendants initially pleaded not guilty to one count of s.47 
OAPA assault and one count of having an offensive weapon each. On the 
first day of the trial, the prosecution indicated that if both defendants were 
to plead guilty, they would not proceed with the offensive weapon charge. 
As a reason for not proceeding with all the charges, the prosecution cited 
the fact that it had been alleged that the defendants had been friends with 
the victim, although the file provided no explanation as to how that 
allegation bore any relationship to the prosecution decision to accept guilty 
pleas to the s.47 offences and to offer no evidence on the other counts.   
   
Case 39:  The defendant changed his plea to one count of s.47 OAPA 1861 assault to 
guilty on the first day of his trial, and one count of making threats to kill was 
left to lie on file.  
  
Case 77:  The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of s.47 OAPA 1861 assault on 
the second day of his trial, and no evidence was offered in respect of one 
count of a s.39 CJA 1988 assault which it had been alleged was a part of the 
same incident. 
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Case 65:  The defendant’s indictment originally comprised of two counts of s.47 
OAPA 1861 assault, two counts of assaulting a constable, one count of 
damaging property and on count of attempted an s.20 OAPA 1861 assault. 
A charge of affray was formally added to the indictment as an alternative to 
the attempted s.20 OAPA 1861 assault, and the defendant pleaded guilty to 
this count of affray as well as to both s.47 charges. The other counts were all 
left to lie on file. 
 
4.10 Previous convictions 
  
The table at Fig. 4.14 below shows how many cracked cases (both informal and recorded) 
occurred within each range of previous convictions grouping. 
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 Fig. 4.13 Number of previous convictions, by frequency within case outcomes 116 
 
                                                 
116 The record of the defendants’ previous conviction was missing from the file in 49 cases; 
these data are drawn from the remaining 102 cases. 
117
 As all recorded cracked cases are also informal cracked cases, the totals are greater than 
the total number of defendants in that previous convictions group. See Fig 4.13 for a table 
of the frequency of previous conviction groups. 
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As Fig. 4.13 shows, the number of previous convictions a defendant had did not appear to 
be a particularly striking feature of cracked trials, but some of the data presented above do 
warrant further comment. Notably, the highest percentage of occurrence (with the 
exception of the 50 – 59 and ≥100 previous conviction groups, which contained only four 
and three cases respectively) within the effective trials group was for those cases in which 
the defendant had no previous convictions. The percentage of cases within the effective 
trials outcome decreases, although not sequentially, with the number of previous 
convictions. Within the informal cracked trials, the percentage of cases occurring across the 
previous conviction groups ranges from 33.3% to 60%, and within the recorded cracked 
trials, the percentage ranges from 25% to 50%. The percentages of cases falling within the 
cracked outcomes (both informal and recorded) do, broadly speaking, remain at a similar 
level or increase as the number of previous convictions rises, but there is no discernable 
pattern or relationship between the factors. 
 
4.11 Number of hearings 
 
The total number of hearings, from the pre-trial hearing stage to sentencing, was recorded 
in each case. The number varied quite widely, from eight cases which appeared to involve 
only one court hearing, to one case which necessitated twelve hearings. The mean number 
of court hearings was 3.75. 118  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
118 The number of hearings in each case was determined by taking note of the hearings 
recorded in the Crown court minute sheet, maintained by CPS case workers and contained 
in each file. The detail with which the minute sheet was completed varied, at times there 
was a note on the file to the effect that a hearing had gone ahead without a case worker or 
other CPS representative available to take notes, and at times parts of it were evidently 
missing. The actual number of hearings may therefore have on occasion been greater than 
that which was recorded. The eight cases which involved only one recorded hearing may 
well fall into this category, as they should not have proceeded to cracked or effective stage 
without at least one pre-trial hearing and one trial date.  
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Fig. 4.14 Number of hearings 
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The representative from the Criminal Defence Service felt that a lack of CPS organisation 
was a factor in the wastage caused by cracked trials as hearings were too frequently 
adjourned or vacated as a result of evidential issues which resulted in alternative charges 
subsequently being offered or accepted at a very late stage when it transpired that the 
evidential issues in respect of the original charges could not be resolved. 
 
Case 70 was a case at which this criticism could have been levelled. The defendant was 
originally charged with one s.20 OAPA 1861 assault and one count of damaging 
property. Following the PCMH there had been an indication that the defendant would 
make an offer of a guilty plea and the prosecution had indicated that a plea of guilty to 
the s.20 OAPA assault, with no further action to take place in respect of the other 
charge, would be acceptable. The minute sheet for the case states that: 
 
‘In light of the Judge’s comments – that he’s reluctant to drag it out any longer 
– maybe we ought to accept a s.20 [and offer no evidence for the damaging 
property]’.  
 
This notwithstanding, a trial date was set, but vacated twice as a result of issues with 
prosecution readiness. On the eventual date of the trial, by which time both key 
witnesses had indicated a reluctance to give evidence, the defendant canvassed a guilty 
plea to a lesser, s.47 OAPA assault, which the prosecution accepted.  
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4.12 Number of counsel 
 
The number of barristers who represented each individual defendant was recorded during 
data collection, and this data was presented and discussed at section 3.4.5 of Chapter 3. 
 
The table below shows how many informal cracked, recorded cracked, and effective trials 
occurred, by number of counsel. 
 
Fig. 4.15 Informal and recorded cracked trials by number of counsel 
 
Number of counsel 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Informal 
cracked 
trial 
51 
(51.0%) 
37 
(51.4%) 
17 
(47.2%) 
1 
(100%) 
3 
(50.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Recorded 
cracked 
trial 
38 
(38.0%) 
23 
(31.9%) 
11 
(30.6%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
3 
(50.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Effective 
trial 
11 
(11%) 
12 
(16.7%) 
8 
(22.2%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(100%) 
TOTAL119 
(100%) 
100 72 36 1 6 1 
 
 
Contrary to what might have been expected, the percentages within both the informal and 
recorded cracked trials decrease as the number of counsel involved in the case increases, 
and the percentages within the effective trial group decrease as the number of counsel 
increases. 
 
4.13 Goodyear indications 
 
Goodyear indications were given to only fifteen defendants in the 151 cases. All fifteen of 
those cases resulted in a plea of guilty to at least one count on the indictment, and eleven 
of the cases resulted in a plea of guilty to all counts on the indictment (either original 
counts or alternative counts). In the remaining four cases, one or more cases were disposed 
                                                 
119
 As all recorded cracked cases are also informal cracked cases, the totals are greater than 
the total number of cases with that number of counsel. See Fig 3.1 for a table which 
presents the frequency of different numbers of counsel. 
 
 143 
of by the prosecution offering no further evidence, or by counts being left to lie on file. 
 
The table below summarises the circumstances of those cases in which a Goodyear 
indication was given (for the sake of brevity, Goodyear indication is abbreviated to ‘GI’, 
defendant to ‘D’, prosecution to ‘P’, and judge to ‘J’). 
 
Fig. 4.16 Goodyear indications  
 
Case 
No 
Original count(s) Details of Goodyear Indication 
11 1.Witness 
intimidation   
2.Damaging   
property 
At trial, D asked for a GI on full P facts. J stated that after a 
trial, the sentence would be 15 months imprisonment, but if 
D pleaded guilty, this would be reduced to 12 months.  
 
86 1. Robbery D asked for a GI on the alternative charge of assisting an 
offender. J indicated that the sentence would be an 8 month 
suspended prison sentence with either a curfew or 
supervision order attached. 
 
87 1. Rape  
2. Rape 
3. Sexual assault 
4.Assault by   
penetration 
5. Assault by 
penetration 
6. Causing to 
engage in a sexual 
act without consent 
7. False 
imprisonment 
All witnesses attend (unexpectedly) and D requests a GI. J 
states that he requires a pre sentence report to be carried out 
first, but that he would give a 15% reduction rather than 
‘the usual’ 10%, ‘for sake of AP [aggrieved person]’. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
88 
 
1. Affray 
2. s.39 CJA 1988 
assault 
3. Criminal  damage   
 
D asked for a GI on the basis of pleading guilty only to the 
affray (acceptable to P). J indicated the sentence would be 
non custodial. 
 
 
89 
 
1.Affray 
2. s.47 
3. s.39 
 
 
D asked for a GI on the basis of pleading guilty only to the 
affray but including the disputed facts that D had concealed 
a knife and released a Rottweiler onto the victim. J indicated 
a maximum of an 8 month sentence suspended for 2 years. 
 
82 1. s.47 OAPA 1861 
2. Resisting arrest  
GI requested on the basis of the s.47 OAPA 1861 only. J 
indicated a maximum of 12 months imprisonment and 
subsequently sentenced D to 24 weeks imprisonment 
suspended for 12 months. 
 
79 1 – 5. s.39 CJA 
1988 
D sought indication of sentence if he pleaded guilty to all 
counts other than the s.47 OAPA 1861 assaults. J indicated 
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6 – 7. Threats to 
destroy property 
8 – 9. s.47 OAPA 
1861 
10. Threats to kill 
a suspended custodial sentence. 
 
 
73 1. Affray  D asked at PCMH if P would accept a guilty plea to s.4 
Public Order Act 1986. P refused at PCMH but agreed at 
trial. GI was that the maximum would be a suspended 
sentence or unpaid work. D sentenced to unpaid work and 
6 months community supervision order. 
 
16 1- 3. Breach of 
ASBO  
4.Breach of 
restraining order  
Initial offers from the D of guilty pleas to two counts of 
breach of ASBO were not accepted. D pleaded guilty to all 
counts after a GI that would be no addition in sentence to 
time already spent on remand. 
 
15 1. Affray 
2. s.39 CJA 1988  
3. Possession of a 
bladed article  
 
J indicated custody on the basis of one count of affray, 
although on the basis of plea that D had armed himself as 
he feared for his safety. (CPS file suggests surprise at the 
severity of the indicated sentence). 
8 1 - 2 Possession of 
offensive weapon   
3. Having a bladed 
article in a public 
place  
 
No details on file other than that a GI was requested and 
given. 
3 1. Witness 
intimidation  
2.Breach of ASBO  
 
GI given on the basis of a guilty plea to affray as an 
alternative to witness intimidation and a guilty plea to the 
breach of ASBO. Indication was for a maximum of 12 
months imprisonment. D was sentenced to a 12 month 
supervision order and 51 weeks imprisonment suspended 
for 2 years. 
104 1.Threats to kill  
2.s.47 OAPA 1861 
File states that ‘over lunch’, P indicated that a guilty plea to 
s.47 OAPA 1861 would be acceptable, with the threats to 
kill to lie on file.  
GI given that the maximum sentence could be non-
custodial with a 2 year supervision order. D sentenced to an 
18 month supervision order and 120 hours unpaid work. 
 
42a 1. s.47 OAPA 1861   
2. Having offensive 
weapon  
J indicated that the sentence would be community 
punishment and compensation regardless of whether one or 
both counts were proceeded with. D pleaded guilty to s.47 
and P offered no evidence to having an offensive weapon. 
D sentenced to 80 hours unpaid work and £200 
compensation. 
 
42b 1. s.47 OAPA 1861 
2. Having offensive  
weapon 
As Case 42a. 
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As there is no literature yet published on the practical application of Goodyear indications, 
these data provide a valuable insight into the way in which the indications are used and 
given. One aspect of the Goodyear indication which was unexpected was the infrequency 
with which it was requested. 
 
Two interviewees put forward explanations as to why Goodyear indications were not used 
more frequently: 
 
Barrister A:  Modern judges are like traffic wardens, or like very well trained dogs…they 
used to be mavericks but they don’t have any creativity in sentencing 
anymore and they don’t like Goodyears. Some say it’s not their policy to give 
Goodyears and simply refuse.’ 
 
Barrister D:  ‘…very often the judge just hasn’t got the time, because a Goodyear indication 
takes about half an hour, and a PCMH takes maybe 15 minutes.’ 
 
Other interviewees also made some additional comments on the subject of Goodyear 
indications. Judge A stated that: 
 
‘Goodyears are very influential…[but] the only people who at trial ask for Goodyears 
are those who are wobbling anyway…’ 
 
Judge A also felt that they could be used by defendants in order to play the system, stating 
that:  
 
‘…you don’t know how many…would have pleaded anyway and are just trying to 
get a better deal…’ 
 
Barrister D described them as a ‘lever’ which was used to crack trials but stated that ‘they’re 
not meant to crack trials, because the judge really shouldn’t be bargaining with the 
defendant’. Similarly, Judge B’s description of Goodyear indications as something he liked to 
use ‘to shortcut cases where I can see problems’ would suggest that he also viewed them as 
a tool with which to encourage defendants to plead guilty and crack trials where it appeared 
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that there were problems with the prosecution case.120 Judge B did not view this as undue 
pressure to plead guilty, but Barrister D, when asked whether he thought that the use of 
the Goodyear indication ever creates pressure upon defendants to plead guilty, answered: 
 
‘[Y]es, it does, but the people who ask for Goodyear indications are thinking about 
pleading guilty anyway.’ 
 
This comment is telling in its inference that it is legitimate to create a pressure on 
defendants who are already considering a guilty plea. Judge A’s attitude was similar insofar 
as he advocated implementing measures to encourage defendants who appeared to be 
guilty, to plead guilty, and to dissuade them from a trial: 
 
‘We try and actively manage the cases in order to try and stop people just being 
silly, and saying oh well, I know I was caught in the house…but I just say not 
guilty…Sometimes, whilst not putting any pressure on the defendant, if I think 
they’re not being realistic, and they’re not bothering to confront the issues, I’ll put 
the case back…to the end of the list…or even adjourn it…so they can have a 
conference, so that I feel they’re really confronting the issues.’  
 
4.14 Basis of plea  
 
In those cases where a guilty plea was entered on a basis of plea, the nature and 
circumstances of the basis of plea was recorded. Bases of plea were entered in 17 (11.3% of 
the total sample) cases, the illustrative details of two of which are summarised below: 
 
Case 82: The defendant faced a s.47 OAPA 1861 assault charge and one count of 
resisting arrest. Both charges arose from the same incident, in which he had 
assaulted a police officer whilst resisting arrest. The defendant pleaded guilty 
to the s.47 assault charge with the basis of plea that he had not realised the 
person he assaulted was a police officer (which would have been an 
aggravating factor in sentencing), and had acted recklessly, without intent. It 
should be noted that it was an undisputed fact that the victim was in police 
                                                 
120 It is possible that this is not the meaning Judge B intended; for a judge to offer an 
inducement to a defendant to plead guilty in order to circumvent a weak prosecution case 
would be improper, but within the context of the conversation, it was not possible to 
discern any alternative meanings. 
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uniform, and that the defendant had seen him step out of a marked police 
vehicle. 
 
Case 74:  The two defendants pleaded guilty to one count each of conspiracy to rob, 
with one count of handling stolen goods and one count of aggravated 
vehicle taking each to lie on file. The defendants had been accused of 
conspiring to rob a Post Office, as they had been apprehended in a stolen 
car, wearing balaclavas, with a sword, outside a post office, the day pensions 
were paid out. Their basis of plea was that they had been conspiring to rob 
an undisclosed business, but that it was not a Post Office. 
 
4.15 Correspondence between facts, evidence and outcome 
 
Aside from the fact that they involved a basis of plea, what was notable about Cases 82 
and 74 (summarised above) in particular, was that the basis of plea seemed at least a 
little implausible when considered in the light of other (undisputed) evidence. It was a 
feature of several cases that there appeared to be a lack of correspondence between the 
alleged facts of the case, the evidence available to support those facts, and the eventual 
outcome of the case. There were eight cases within the sample where (although clearly a 
subjective judgement), the eventual outcome lacked correspondence with certain agreed 
facts of the case. 
 
The relevant details of three of those cases are extracted below: 
 
Case 80:  The defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a 
prohibited firearm, one count of possession of a prohibited firearm with 
intent to cause fear or violence, three counts of possession of prohibited 
ammunition, and one count of robbery. The defendant offered to plead 
guilty to all counts except the two most serious charges (the robbery and 
the possession of a prohibited firearm with intent), the prosecution 
accepted this offer, and agreed to offer no evidence on the two 
outstanding charges. There was, however, what appeared to be reliable 
evidence against the defendant in relation to the robbery count, in the 
form of items found in his bedroom which could be linked by DNA and 
CCTV evidence to the robbery. 
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Case 72:  The two defendants in this case had initially been charged with one count 
of aggravated burglary each, and one of the defendants had also been 
charged with a s.47 OAPA 1861 assault. At the third pre-trial hearing, 
one count of affray was added to each defendant’s indictment, as there 
had been an indication from the prosecution that, if offered by the 
defendants, the prosecution would accept guilty pleas to affray and the 
other counts would be left to lie on file. Aggravated burglary and affray 
are offences which are fundamentally different in nature and severity, yet 
affray was effectively offered as an alternative, with the prosecution 
caveat that the facts of the affray were to include use of a weapon.   
 
Case 13:  The three defendants were charged with one count each of kidnapping, 
false imprisonment and robbery, but instead offered guilty pleas to affray 
and taking a vehicle without consent, which were accepted by the 
prosecution. The two sets of offences again appear to be very different 
and the essence of this case was that the defendants had approached the 
victim, who was not known to them, whilst he was sitting in his car, and 
forced him to drive them home against his will, having threatened him. 
That element of offence was arguable not reflected in the outcome of the 
case. 
 
It is clear that in some cases at least, that the effect of a guilty plea being entered to an 
alternative count, or the functional equivalent of an alternative count as defined by this 
study, resulted in an eventual outcome which did not strictly reflect the facts agreed at 
the outset.  Barrister D felt that cases being resolved with insufficient regard to the 
correspondence between the facts and the outcome was more common when the 
prosecution was represented by a Higher Court Advocate (HCA) (although this did not 
apply to any of the cases sampled): ‘They will accept lesser pleas, or better bases of pleas 
or whatever, in order to crack it, in order to resolve it sooner, to save costs, than actually 
sometimes see the appropriate legal or factual basis through to its conclusion.’ The 
barrister felt that HCA’s were more driven by cost considerations, and benefitted from 
being able to make decisions on charge reductions alone, unlike instructed counsel, who 
had to refer decision back to the CPS. 
 
 
 
 149 
4.16 Offers 
 
It had not been anticipated that prosecution files would provide a great deal of information 
about the presence or nature of specific offers of guilty pleas, or of indications of the 
willingness of the prosecution to accept certain offers. It became apparent, however, that 
the Crown court minute sheets present in each file often recorded the outcome of 
discussions which led to offers, and that correspondence between defence solicitors and 
the CPS on occasion made reference to offers to plead guilty to fewer, lesser or alternative 
charges. In 88 cases (58.3% of the total sample) it was not possible to identify any offers, 
but in the remaining 63 cases (41.7%) an offer of some kind was made, either by the 
defence or by the prosecution in respect of at least one count. The types of offers recorded 
were:  
 
(i) The defendant offered a guilty plea to one or more offences. 
(ii) The prosecution indicated that they will accept guilty pleas to one or more 
offences. 
(iii) Counter-offers between defence and prosecutions. 
(iv) An offer was made by the defendant, but refused by the prosecution. 
(v) A willingness to accept a guilty plea was indicted by prosecution, but refused by 
the defence. 
 
The chart below shows the relative frequencies of the offers recorded: 
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Fig. 4.17 Classifications of offers 
 
1
.
9
9
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Defence 
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Prosecution 
refuse offer
Counter offers
Prosecution 
offer
Defence offer
Unknown / No 
offer
 
 
The circumstances of three illustrative cases in which offers were present are extracted 
below: 
 
Case 40:  This was a case in which counter-offers took place. The defendant had 
been charged with one count of causing grievous bodily harm with intent 
contrary to s.18 OAPA 1861, and one count of affray. The Crown court 
minute sheet included the note ‘D[efence] indicate G[uilty] P[leas]s will be 
offered to s/thing – depends what we want to accept’. The prosecution 
indicated that they would be willing to accept guilty pleas to s.20 of the 
OAPA 1861 (reckless grievous bodily harm), and affray; the defendant 
instead offered a guilty plea to the s.20 assault alone; this was accepted by 
the prosecution and the affray was left to lie on file.   
 
Case 114:  In this case, which involved two defendants who were in a relationship, the 
first record of an offer came from the defence (although the use of the 
word ‘confirm’ might suggest it had been canvassed earlier); a letter from 
the defendants solicitor stated: ‘We would be very grateful if you would 
confirm that should our client be minded to plead guilty to the offence of 
burglary that you would not proceed against his co-accused…’ 
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Case 82:  The prosecution in this case indicated that a plea of not guilty to a charge of 
resisting arrest would be acceptable if the defendant pleaded guilty to the 
other charge of a s.47 OAPA 1861 assault. 
 
Interviews with legal professionals shed further light on their perceptions of the nature and 
frequency of offers being made: 
 
Solicitor A:  ‘…the CPS will not bargain, be prepared to negotiate in every case. 
Sometimes they’ll say, well I’m sorry, ultimately we don’t want a lesser to 
this...But if there’s a dialogue to be had, and both parties are prepared to 
engage in this dialogue, there’s always scope in there, whatever the charge. 
Either some lesser charge, call it by a different label…or indeed plead guilty 
to the charge you are charged with, on your terms, on a basis [of plea].’ 
 
Judge A:  ‘…they [defendants] perceive that there are better offers from the 
prosecution when the case is in for a trial than there are when the case is in 
for the PCMH….At the PCMH, the prosecution take a look at the case on 
paper, and say oh no, we won’t accept that [guilty plea from defendant] and 
then, as everybody turns up to court, and it becomes apparent to the 
prosecution that they have one or two little problems…they take the charge 
which was originally offered by the defence.’ 
 
Barrister D referred to local differences in the kinds of offers which would be accepted to 
particular offences and said that:: ‘At the moment, in Bolton for example, there is almost 
no such thing as a s.18 [OAPA 1861]. Almost without fail they’ll accept a s.20 [OAPA 
1861].’ 
 
4.17 Ethnicity and case outcomes 
 
The table below shows the number of recorded and informal cracked trials by ethnicity, as 
well as the number of cases in which there was at least one guilty plea. 
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Fig. 4.18 Ethnicity, cracked trials and guilty pleas 
 
Ethnicity Recorded 
cracked trials 
(%) 
Informal 
cracked trials 
(%) 
Effective trials 
(%) 
Total121 
White European 64 (34.6%) 96 (51.9%) 25 (13.5%) 185 (100%) 
Dark European 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 
Afro-Caribbean 0 (0.0%) 1 (20.0%) 4 (80.0%) 5 (100%) 
Asian 4 (33.3%) 5 (41.7%) 3 (25.0%) 12 (100%) 
Arab 2 (40.0%) 2 (40.0%) 1 (20.0%) 5 (100%) 
Unknown 5 (45.5%) 5 (45.5%) 1 (9.0%) 11 (100%) 
 
The data show that the percentage of effective trials was lowest for white European 
(13.5%) and defendants whose ethnicity was unknown (9%). This is in contrast with a very 
high effective trial rate of 80% for Afro-Caribbean defendants, 25% for Asians, and 20% 
for Arab defendants. Recorded cracked trial rates were between 33.3% and 45.5% for each 
ethnicity, except Afro-Caribbeans and dark Europeans, who had no recorded cracked trials 
(although there was only one dark European defendant in the sample). Informal cracked 
trials rates ranged from just 20% of the sample set out in the table above (Afro-Caribbeans)  
to 51.9% of the white Europeans.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 Totals do not equate to the total number of cases defendants of that ethnicity were 
involved in, as come cases were both informal and recorded cases. 
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Fig. 4.19 below sets out the types of offer identifiable within the sample (including Goodyear 
indications, by ethnicity). 
 
Fig. 4.19 Offers and Goodyear indications, by ethnicity. 
 
Ethnicity No offer 
(%) 
Defence 
offer (%) 
Prosecution 
offer (%) 
Counter-
offer (%) 
Goodyear 
indication 
(%) 
Total122 
White 
European 
76 (55.5%) 24 (17.5%) 9 (6.6%) 14 (10.2%) 14 (10.2%) 137 
(100%) 
Dark 
European 
0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%) 2 
(100%) 
Afro-
Caribbean 
4 (80.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (20.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 5 
(100%) 
Asian 6 (85.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (14.3%) 0 (0.0%) 7 
(100%) 
Arab 2 (66.7%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 
(100%) 
Unknown 1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 
(100%) 
 
The data presented above shows that by far the majority of offers were made in cases in 
which the defendant was recorded as being white European, and only one of the Goodyear 
indications in the sample involved a non-white European defendant, and this was a 
defendant recorded as being ‘dark European’.  Similarly, in all but one case (in which the 
defendant’s ethnicity was unknown) offers originating from the defence involved white 
European defendants. The percentage of cases in which no offers were made was only 
55.5% in the white European category, compared with 80% for Afro-Caribbeans, 85.7% 
for Asians and 66.7% for Arab defendants (although the very small number of cases falling 
within those categories could skew the results significantly).  
 
4.18 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has presented several key quantitative findings which, it is submitted, have 
contributed to the existing data on cracked trials, and on the scope for plea bargaining to 
be a feature of cracked trials. Firstly, a distinction between informal and recorded cracked 
                                                 
122 Totals do not equate to the total number of defendants of each ethnicity, as Goodyear 
indications could be present alongside other offers, and only offers, not refusals, have been 
included in the table for the sake of clarity. 
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cases has been put forward; the data have demonstrated that if cracked counts (informal) 
rather than entire cracked trials (recorded) are considered, 72.2% of the sample were cases 
which could be defined as cracked cases. This means that the scope for plea bargaining can 
be conceived of more broadly; it is not necessary for a trial to crack in its entirety for it to 
involve a plea bargain. The data presented have also challenged the prevailing assumption 
that cracked trials can be attributed solely to defendants’ late guilty pleas in the majority of 
cases. If reasons for individual counts cracking were taken into account, thus allowing a 
case to have multiple reasons for cracking, then only 21 cases (28% of the recorded cracked 
trials) cracked because the defendant pleaded guilty to all original counts (compared with a 
figure of 64% in the Judicial and Court Statistics 2006). An analysis of outcomes by 
offences has suggested that anecdotal evidence regarding certain types of offence where 
there is a structured gradation of offences being more likely to crack and result in 
alternative charges, may be accurate, and that interviewees’ opinions that sexual offences 
were least likely to crack was also largely true of the cases sampled. The data on race and 
cracked trial outcomes and offers adds to the data on ethnic minorities and plea bargaining. 
 
This chapter has also set out data on the means by which in which the functional 
equivalents of guilty pleas to alternative charges are created within cases where some 
counts, but not others, are proceeded with. The data has also contributed to the knowledge 
of the range and prevalence of offers between prosecution and defence, and to what is 
known of the operation of Goodyear indications.  
 
The following chapter of this thesis builds on the data presented here, by providing an 
analysis and interpretation of the data collected, as well as considering its wider 
implications for cracked trials, plea bargaining and wider criminal justice policy. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCEPTUALISING THE ROLE OF PLEA BARGAINING IN CRACKED 
TRIALS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter analyses and interprets the results presented in the previous chapter, and 
develops the issues raised throughout the thesis thus far in order to conceptualise the role 
of plea bargaining in cracked trials, and to consider the consequences of the way in which 
the practice operates in England and Wales. The chapter begins by considering the way in 
which cracked trials are currently defined by administrative statistics and draws on the 
distinction made by this study between informal and recorded cracked trials in order to 
analyse the wide ranging implications of this definition.  The proportion of cracked trials 
within the sample in which plea bargaining appears to have taken place is quantified, and 
the issue of whether cracked trials are ‘caused’ primarily by the defence is considered. 
Features of cracked trials highlighted by the results are explored in the light of their 
relationship to forms of plea bargaining and when analysing the different types of plea 
bargain present within the sample, an evaluation is made as to whether the presence of the 
practice led to pressures to plead guilty, or whether it allowed defendants to play the 
system. This allows the nature of plea bargaining within the sample to be outlined within a 
broad framework, and to consider whether conclusions can be drawn about the overall 
effect of the practice on defendants’ late guilty pleas and cracked trials.  It is argued that 
neither the policy criticism that cracked trials are indicative of defendants playing the 
system, nor academic concerns that they are the effect of pressure to plead guilty are 
entirely appropriate, and that alternative conceptualisations of plea bargaining warrant 
consideration. Chapter 5 therefore concludes by considering whether plea bargaining has 
the potential to operate as a mutual exchange of consensual or contractual concessions 
which do not necessarily operate coercively, nor allow the defendant to play the system, 
and that whilst taken to extremes, ‘bazaar style’ justice (a term used initially by McDonald 
(1979)) may be undesirable, some departure from adversarialism (or at least 
acknowledgement thereof) may be inevitable.   
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5.2 Defining cracked trials: recorded and informal cracked trials 
 
 
As the results presented at Fig. 4.6 of Chapter 4 demonstrate, the number of cases in which 
at least one, but not all, counts on the indictment cracked was considerable (109 cases out 
of a sample of 151; 72.2%). In this light, it becomes clear that the current definition of a 
cracked trial is in itself problematic. From an administrative perspective, a case in which 
only one count cracks, even if others are tried, still entails the wasted preparation, 
overestimated court and court staff time, and possible distress to witnesses that is 
associated with cases in which all counts crack, yet only the latter is deemed to be a cracked 
trial. With reference to late guilty pleas causing trials to crack, one late guilty plea together 
with other outcomes within a case is no less interesting in terms of the likelihood that it 
was a plea bargain than a case which is disposed of entirely by way of guilty pleas. As a 
cracked trial is defined in part as a case which ‘requires no further trial time….‘ (Judicial 
Statistics 2006, p.103), an informal cracked case in which at least one, but not all counts, 
crack will require further trial time and it will not be a cracked trial as defined by existing 
administrative statistics. The effect of this is that a potentially considerable number of cases 
nationally are recorded as effective, despite including one or more individual cracked 
counts. The resulting statistics therefore underestimate the prevalence of individual late 
guilty pleas and prosecution decisions to offer no evidence; the fact that almost three 
quarters of this study’s sample are comprised of informal cracked cases suggests that the 
‘problem’ of the cracked trial may be broader than is generally acknowledged. 
 
The difference between the two figures may not be of overwhelming interest to the 
administration of the criminal justice system, as where the entire case does not crack, there 
is less inconvenience in terms of wastage of court time and cost. Depending on the nature 
of the offences this could, however, vary considerably; particularly if it is the most serious 
charges which are not proceeded with, as a large proportion of any trial preparation will 
then have been wasted, and some witnesses may no longer be required. The significance of 
these hidden cracked outcomes is not restricted to highlighting a need for improved 
administrative record keeping though. Every individual cracked count is one late decision 
to plead guilty, or one decision by the prosecution to offer no evidence. The fact that the 
same decision making processes may not be applied by defendants or their lawyers to each 
count does not make cases with mixed outcomes any less worthy of attention; in fact it may 
be those cases in which some counts are disposed of by way of guilty pleas and others by 
trial or by the prosecution offering no evidence that are of particular interest. This is 
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because any charge bargains would invariably fall either within this group of cases or within 
those cases in which the defendant pleads guilty to alternative offences.  
 
Having analysed case outcomes on an individual count basis has therefore revealed that 
cracked counts were an even more prevalent feature of Manchester Minshull Street Crown 
court than the existing data would suggest, and that the potential for plea bargaining was 
therefore also greater and more varied in its dynamics. 
 
 
5.3 Cracked trials: ‘the stick to beat the defence Bar with’? 
 
 
As discussed at Chapter 1.2, cracked trials have generally been regarded as a problem for 
which the defendant and / or the defence lawyer can be blamed, and taken on face value, 
this view is supported by statistics: the 2006 Judicial Statistics record that 64% of cracked 
trials that year were caused by defendants’ late guilty pleas, 18% by the prosecution offering 
no evidence, and 16% by defendants pleading guilty to alternative charges. This equates to 
80% of cracked trials which can ostensibly be attributed to defendants’ decisions and it is 
little wonder that Barrister D described cracked trials as having been ‘the stick to beat the 
defence Bar with’ (quoted above at 3.3). However, Figs. 4.7 (official statistics) and 4.8 (this 
study’s findings) demonstrate that when cases are analysed more closely and multiple 
reasons for trials cracking are accounted for, a very different picture emerges than the one 
put forward by official statistics and relied upon by policy makers. Fig. 4.8 shows that a 
defendant pleading guilty to the original charges was the only reason for the trial cracking 
in just 28% of the sample, and pleading guilty to alternative charges was the only reason in 
16% of the sample; resulting in 44% of the sample being attributable to defence reasons, 
rather than the 80% of the official statistics.  
 
It is primarily the emphasis which is placed on the considerable proportion of cases (28% 
of the recorded cracked cases, see Fig. 4.8) with combination reasons for cracking which 
separates the prevailing administrative designation of cracked cases from one which may be 
more revealing about the true nature of cracked trials. Existing statistics are founded on 
recording practices which record any case in which there is at least one guilty plea as a case 
which has cracked as a result of the defendant pleading guilty, when in fact this outcome 
may have been one of many reasons, and the prosecution may have offered no evidence in 
respect of other counts. The resulting statistics are therefore flawed as in neglecting to take 
account of cases with multiple outcomes, they fail to represent a full picture of the nature 
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of cracked cases, and as such are of less value to the courts in achieving their aim of 
attempting to reduce the number of cracked trials. If for example a trial cracks following 
one guilty plea to a lesser offence than that which was originally charged on the indictment, 
and no evidence was offered by the prosecution in respect of a further two counts, then 
there is little logic in deeming it to be a cracked trial caused solely by a defendant’s late 
guilty plea. Doing so simply perpetuates the view that defendants or defence lawyers cause 
cracked trials, and adds nothing to the understanding of the causes of cracked trials. 
 
If (as in this study) cases are examined more closely to explore the variety of reasons for 
counts within trials cracking, then a fuller picture of the cracked trial emerges. If the 
findings of this study were to be representative of cracked cases more widely (and as 
demonstrated at Chapter 4.2 above, the sample has features which suggest it may be similar 
in nature to the case load at Minshull Street Crown Court), then trials which crack for a 
combination of reasons would be as common as those which crack as a result of the 
defendant pleading guilty to the original indictment, or the prosecution offering no 
evidence; yet the prevalence of combination cases has been overlooked to date. This has a 
direct bearing on charge bargaining, because, as stated above, cases in which there are a 
combination of guilty pleas and the prosecution offering no evidence may be those in 
which charge negotiations are more likely to have occurred (see 5.5.4 for a more detailed 
discussion of the presence of charge bargaining within the sample). It is indicative of a 
degree of hypocrisy in the way statistics on cracked trials are recorded and presented that a 
cracked trial is only deemed such when all counts within the case crack, yet the reason for 
the trial cracking is the defendant’s guilty plea when just one count cracks for this reason. 
The combined effect of this is that the total number of cases featuring cracked counts is 
vastly underestimated, but also that the proportion of cracked trials caused by defendants 
pleading guilty at a late stage is overrepresented and contributes to the myth that 
defendants manipulating the system for their own benefit is a widespread phenomenon.  
 
 
5.4 The extent of plea bargaining as a cause of cracked trials 
 
 
As stated at Chapter 4.3, in 35 cases within the sample (23.2%), each individual count 
within the case was effective. This leaves 76.7% of the sample in which at least one count 
cracked (the informal cracked cases). The entire trial (recorded cracked cases) cracked in 
49.6% of the sample. Having established that defence reasons for cracked trials were 
considerably less frequent within the sample than cruder official statistics would have 
 159 
suggested, this section of Chapter 5 analyses the reasons for these cracked counts and cases 
more closely in order to put forward an estimation of the prevalence of plea bargaining 
within the cracked cases; in doing so it provides the basis for the conceptualisation of plea 
bargaining within the sample.  
 
Of the informal cracked cases, 5 (4.6%) comprised of a combination of effective counts 
and the prosecution offering no evidence in respect of other counts and 21 (19.3%) 
cracked solely (and were therefore also recorded cracked cases) as a result of the 
prosecution offering no evidence. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine decisions 
to drop prosecutions  more closely but it is clear that where each count within a case either 
resulted in the prosecution offering no evidence, or was effective, and therefore no guilty 
pleas were entered, plea bargaining is unlikely to have played any role in the final outcome. 
It is possible that some decisions to offer no evidence could have been related to the 
acceptance of guilty pleas in respect of the same defendant’s charges in another trial, but no 
evidence of this was present within the cases sampled. Similarly, decisions to offer no 
evidence in respect of one defendant’s charges may have been made in response to a co-
defendant’s guilty pleas. There was evidence of this being true of one case within the 
sample, Case 114.  
 
If the number of cases which were entirely effective (35), and those whose cracked counts 
were a result solely of the prosecution offering no evidence or leaving counts to lie on file 
(26)123 are deducted from the total sample of cases against defendants (151), this leaves 90 
cases (59.6% of the total sample) in which there was at least one guilty plea. This group of 
cases are those in which some form of plea bargaining can be said to have taken place. It is 
these cases which are considered below, as the thesis moves on to consider the types of 
plea bargaining present within the sample. 
 
5.5 Forms of plea bargaining identified within the sample 
 
As stated earlier in this thesis, the definition of plea bargaining adopted by this study is that 
any guilty plea which a defendant believes will give rise to benefits or concessions which 
flow from the prosecuting authorities or the government to the defendant, directly or 
indirectly, is the result of a plea bargain, and it is with this in mind that the discussion of 
                                                 
123 See 5.5.4 for further explanation of the reasons for treating the two types of disposition 
alike. Three cases were disposed of by all counts being left to lie on file, and two cases were 
disposed of by a combination of counts being left to lie on file and the prosecution 
offering no evidence. 
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forms of plea bargaining which follows should be read. The data presented in this thesis 
support the broad consensus within the academic literature that plea bargaining falls into 
four predominant types: ‘straightforward’ plea bargaining, sentence bargaining, fact 
bargaining and charge bargaining. ‘Straightforward’ plea bargains are those in which there is 
no bargain as to the charge or the facts, but the defendant pleads guilty in the expectation 
of a lesser sentence (Ashworth and Redmayne 2005, p. 275). Given, however, that it is the 
expectation of a lesser sentence which motivates this type of bargain, they are described 
hereinafter as ‘sentence bargains’ brought about by the sentence discount. The distinction is 
primarily semantic; it is not argued that this type of bargain operates in a way which is any 
different from the practice previously described by Ashworth or others, but it is submitted 
that it is more clearly defined when referred to as a form of sentence bargain as it is the 
sentence which is subject to the ‘bargain’ (see 5.5.1 below). Goodyear indications were seen 
to operate as an alternative form of sentence bargaining, formalised to a degree, which were 
infrequent but did occur in fifteen cases within the sample (see (5.5.2 below). The use of a 
basis of plea was a feature which occurred with relative frequency within the cases sampled 
(in 15.6% of the informal cracked cases) and, it is argued, represents a formalised fact 
bargain (see 5.5.3 below). Charge bargains, however, were by far the most common form of 
plea bargain found within the sample, and evidence of their use was present in 57 cases in 
total (52.3% of the informal cracked cases). It is argued that charge bargains occurred in 
those cases where pleas of guilty were offered to alternative offences formally, and also in 
cases in which the defendant pleaded guilty to some of the original counts and the 
prosecution offered no evidence (or left counts to lie on file) in respect of other original 
counts on the indictment (see 5.5.4 below). 
 
 
5.5.1 Sentence bargains: the sentence discount 
 
 
In 21 cases within the sample (28% of the recorded cracked cases), the entire case was 
disposed of by guilty pleas to all original counts on the indictment, without any other 
apparent concessions from the state featuring within the case (Fig. 4.8). In these 21 cases, 
there was no reduction or other change to the charges, the facts were not presented 
differently (at least not with the aid of a basis of plea), there was no recorded indication of 
the maximum sentence which would be imposed, and there appeared to be no relationship 
between the defendant’s guilty plea and the outcome of another case against the same, or 
another, defendant. These cases are therefore those which appear to have had no 
discernable evidence of plea bargaining other than the defendant’s late decision to plead 
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guilty, and the existence of the sentence discount. If implicit bargains are incorporated into 
our understanding of plea bargaining, as they are by the majority of writers, and by the 
definition adopted by this study, then these 21 cases are plea bargains regardless of the 
absence of other features. It may be that in some of these cases, other, more personal or 
specific factors induced the defendant to plead guilty, but he will nonetheless have been 
entering into a plea bargain by receiving a benefit from the state in exchange for his guilty 
plea.124   
 
Furthermore, it is argued that upon closer examination, the sentence discount variant of 
plea bargain is not as implicit as might be assumed. Unlike jurisdictions in which a guilty 
plea may merely attract an informal expectation of leniency, in England and Wales the 
sentence discount is formalised on a statutory basis by s.144 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003, and further clarified by the 2007 SGC Guideline. When a defendant pleads guilty, he 
exchanges that guilty plea not just for a tacit expectation of leniency, but for the strong 
expectation that his sentence will be reduced by a certain degree, dependent on the timing 
of his plea. A potential flaw in this argument is that it fails to take into account the 
complication that sentencing, as well as discounting, can be inconsistent, and there is no 
way of ensuring that a defendant does in fact receive a discount; the judge can impose the 
sentence which would have in any case been imposed following conviction, and simply 
state that he had been minded to impose an even higher sentence. There have, however, 
been recent Court of Appeal decisions which have emphasised the importance of the 
sentencer stating explicitly that a discount has been given, when given, in order to ensure 
transparency.125 Furthermore, the fact remains that most judges do at least appear to give 
credit for guilty pleas (see Baldwin and McConville 1978; Moxon 1988; Hood 1992) and 
the sentence discount is a firmly entrenched feature of sentencing in the Crown court. It 
should be noted, however, that Henham (1999, p.527) found that over one third of judges 
considered a guilty plea to be either not important at all or not particularly important. The 
effect of the 2007 SGC Guideline remains to be seen; the application of discounts may 
become more consistent (if not more equitable) with a framework in place. Baldwin and 
McConville (1978) and Moxon (1988) both found that defendants tended to be given 
greater sentence discounts for last minute guilty pleas; although the principle has always 
(even pre-SGC Guidelines) been that defendants should be given the most credit for early 
                                                 
124 Bottoms and McClean, for example, who found that 10% of the defendants they 
surveyed pleaded guilty because they wanted to ‘get it over with’ (1976, p.112). 
125 See for example Shane Tony P [2004] EWCA Crim 287 and Aroride [1999] 2 Cr App R (S) 
406. 
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guilty pleas.  These factors notwithstanding, the formalised nature of the sentence discount 
means that a guilty plea entered in the knowledge of the discount is an explicit bargain, 
rather than one which is predominantly tacit in nature. From a plea bargaining perspective, 
the important issue is not necessarily whether a particular discount was applied, but 
whether the defendant perceived that he would receive the benefit of a reduced sentence in 
exchange for a guilty plea and the possibility that sentencers may, unbeknown to the 
defendant, not always give a discount does little to lessen the explicit nature of the sentence 
discount. 
 
 
5.5.2 Sentence bargains: Goodyear indications 
 
Goodyear indications, like the sentence discount, result in a formally regulated and explicit 
exchange of concessions between a defendant and the state. The sentence discount gives a 
defendant the legitimate expectation that he is exchanging a guilty plea for a reduced 
sentence, but the Goodyear indication takes this one step further and allows the defendant to 
enter a guilty plea in the knowledge that the sentence imposed will not exceed a specified 
maximum. Although the Court of Appeal stated in Goodyear that the judge should never be 
invited to give an indication on the basis of what would appear to be a plea bargain, some 
commentators have viewed the introduction of Goodyear indications as the formalisation of 
plea bargaining (Darbyshire 2005, p.284; Sanders and Young 2007, p.404; Vogel 2008).  
 
Goodyear indications were given in only fifteen of the cases sampled (13.8% of the informal 
cracked cases), and in each case the defendant subsequently entered a guilty plea to one or 
more offences (see Fig. 4.16). Barristers A and D, Judge A and Solicitor A also felt that in 
their experience Goodyear indications were given infrequently, which suggests that the cases 
sampled may not be unrepresentative. It may be the formalised nature of the arrangement, 
and the fact that the exchange is between the defendant and the state rather than the 
defendant and the prosecution, which results in its infrequent use. To date, there appears to 
be no other empirical data available on the use of Goodyear indications; the data presented 
by this thesis therefore address important questions about the implementation and nature 
of sentence indications.  A Goodyear indication requires more procedure and accountability 
than, for example, a charge bargain which can be struck relatively informally and swiftly 
between opposing counsel. The increased certainty which accompanies it makes the 
Goodyear indication a powerful form of plea bargaining. As the indication is binding and 
enforceable, a defendant can plead guilty in the knowledge that his sentence will not exceed 
the maximum indication and it was made very clear in the recent case of McDonald that a 
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Goodyear indication was binding, even in a situation in which the judge had erroneously 
overridden a statutory requirement to impose an indeterminate sentence for public 
protection.126  This makes a guilty plea following a Goodyear indication an attractive 
proposition for a defendant as, unlike charge or fact bargains which can give rise to the 
expectation of a lesser sentence, but will still result in an unknown sentence, the Goodyear 
indication gives a defendant the security to enter a guilty plea in the knowledge that there is 
no risk inherent in the outcome. For a defendant who is guilty, or for a defendant who is 
not legally guilty but believes there is an unacceptably high risk of conviction and a more 
severe sentence, the elimination of that risk in exchange for a guilty plea may be a rationally 
calculated choice for a defendant to make.127  
 
Three of those interviewed (Barrister B, Barrister D and Judge A) felt that defendants who 
requested Goodyear indications were generally those who were intending to plead guilty in 
any case. If this is the case, the request for a Goodyear indication could be seen as additional 
security for defendants to ensure that they will receive a sentence discount which they 
consider to be an acceptable exchange for their guilty plea and the loss of their chance of 
acquittal. The fact that each of the fifteen defendants in the sample who requested a 
sentence indication pleaded guilty as a result could suggest that they were intending to 
plead guilty in any case, particularly when one considers the non-specific terms of some of 
the indications given. It is notable from an examination of the Goodyear indications within 
this study’s sample that in only a minority of cases were judges specific in the sentence 
indication they provided, in most, only a vague indication was given.  
 
One case in which a very specific indication was given was Case 11, in which the judge 
breached the Goodyear guidelines by presenting the defendant with two alternative 
sentences. He stated that the defendant would receive a 12 month custodial sentence 
                                                 
126 [2007] Crim LR 737 
127
 This of course relies on that risk of conviction being real, and not a risk deliberately 
overestimated by a defence barrister in order to encourage a guilty plea. See Sanders and 
Young (2007), pp.425 - 428 for a comprehensive discussion of the importance of estimates 
of the likelihood of conviction. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for even the most 
experienced of defendants to be able to accurately estimate their risk of conviction and 
establish how good an offer a particular sentence indication may be. That assessment will 
be based largely on the defendant’s barrister’s view of the indication, as conveyed to the 
defendant, and will also be influenced by the extent to which the defendant is risk averse. 
There was no evidence within the cases sampled that the defence barrister under- or over-
estimated the risk of conviction in advice to the defendant, but it is highly unlikely that 
evidence thereof would be contained within the prosecution file. 
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following a guilty plea, or a 15 month sentence following conviction at trial.128  The 
defendants in Cases 89 and 86 were both given relatively precise indications (eight months 
imprisonment suspended for two years in Case 89, and eight months imprisonment 
suspended for two years with either a curfew or supervision order attached in Case 86). 
These indications are in contrast with the majority, which were generally less precise, such 
as that the sentence would be non-custodial (Case 88), that it would be custodial (Case 15), 
that the sentence would be suspended (Case 79), or that the punishment would be a 
community sentence and compensation regardless of whether one or both counts involved 
were proceeded with (Case 42). Also notable was the fact that in some cases, there was 
considerable disparity between the maximum sentence indication given and the sentence 
subsequently imposed. For example in Case 3, the maximum sentence indicated was 12 
months imprisonment and the sentence imposed was a suspended prison sentence and a 
supervision order. Similarly, in Case 82 the indication was of a maximum sentence of 12 
months imprisonment and a 6 month sentence, suspended for 12 months was imposed 
(see Fig. 4.16). 
 
If such differences between the specificity of Goodyear indications given, and between the 
maximum sentence indicated and the sentence ultimately imposed are commonplace, then 
a Goodyear indication provides the defendant with less useful information than may have 
been supposed. A defendant has no way of knowing how accurately his Goodyear indication 
reflects the actual sentence to be imposed and trading the risk of conviction for the 
certainty of a more lenient sentence becomes a less attractive proposition if that certainty is 
not so certain after all. Some judges may overestimate the likely sentence, wary of the 
possibility of the pre sentence report revealing information which would have warranted a 
higher sentence (in only one of the fifteen cases - Case 87 - in which a sentence indication 
was requested did the judge state that he would need to see a pre-sentence report before 
giving a firm indication; he did however indicate that he would apply a 15% reduction to 
whatever the sentence would have been upon conviction following a trial). In light of the 
fact that Goodyear indications may not be a close reflection of the sentence to actually be 
imposed, the defendant is reliant on the barrister to advise on how good a ‘deal’ an 
indication might be. Since Goodyear indications appear to be used relatively infrequently and 
were only introduced in 2005, it may be that even barristers have yet to have sufficient 
                                                 
128 Similarly,  in A-G’s Reference (No. 80 of 2005) the trial judge had told the defendant 
that he would face a long prison term upon conviction after trial but that a guilty plea 
would result in a non-custodial sentence. The Court of Appeal criticised the trial judge and 
restated that a judge should not give anything other than an indication of what the 
maximum sentence would be following a guilty plea. 
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experience of different judges’ approaches to giving Goodyear indications to be able to 
advise their client more fully.  Moreover, in this study’s sample at least, defendants did not 
appear to be deterred from pleading guilty on the basis of vague sentence indications and it 
may be that even a vague maximum sentence is sufficient inducement to plead guilty and 
even a vague indication may put an anxious defendant’s mind at rest that he will not serve a 
long prison sentence, or will receive a non-custodial sentence.  
 
Sentence bargains as provided for by Goodyear indications are the one type of plea bargain 
which even some critics have acknowledged has a saving grace; that of adding transparency 
to the system and bringing plea bargaining into the open (see for example Darbyshire 2006; 
Sanders and Young 2007). It was, however, the type of bargain used the least frequently 
within the sample (perhaps as a result of the formalities involved), and even when a 
sentence indication was given, it was often vague or was considerably higher than the 
sentence later imposed. The system may therefore be transparent in the sense that it takes 
place in open court, and the indication is enforceable, but the results of this study suggest 
that it does not appear to provide the associated certainty of outcome to defendants which 
might have been hoped for.  
 
 
5.5.3 Fact bargains 
 
 
The fact bargains (Darbyshire 2000) within the sample were primarily those involving a 
basis of plea; a written record of the agreed facts to which the defendant agrees to enter a 
guilty plea, present in 17 cases within the sample (Fig 4.14). As was expected, bases of plea 
were used to lessen the severity of the facts of offences, presumably in the hope that 
sentencing would be more lenient if aggravating factors could be expressly denied, or 
mitigating facts put forward. This is a clear form of plea bargain in which a defendant 
enters a guilty plea in exchange for the offence (even if it is the offence originally charged) 
being presented in a less serious way, and this is a clear benefit which flows from the 
prosecution to the defendant.  
 
In Beswick [1996], the Court of Appeal held that the prosecution should not agree to a basis 
of plea on a set of facts which are known not to reflect the true facts.129 However, as the 
data presented at 4.14 and 4.15 show, it was apparent that there were several cases within 
the sample in which a basis of plea resulted in an agreed set of facts which appeared at the 
                                                 
129 1 Cr App Rep (S) 343. 
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very least to be unrealistic and there was a lack of correspondence between the facts, 
evidence and eventual outcome. Wright and Miller describe plea bargaining as ‘dishonest’ 
for this reason; the eventual outcome matches neither the original charges nor the 
offender’s behaviour (2002, p.33).  
 
Although the effect of a fact bargain is less certain than that of the sentence discount or a 
Goodyear indication, as it may just reduce the severity of the offence by a small degree, it is 
nonetheless another benefit in exchange for a guilty plea which is explicit in nature, as the 
agreed facts form a written basis of plea and it is upon these facts that the defendant is 
sentenced. As Goodyear indications may only be requested where the prosecution and 
defence are agreed on the factual basis for the guilty plea, it may be that fact bargains 
become an increasingly common feature of cracked trials.  
 
 
5.5.4 Charge bargains 
 
 
A charge bargain takes place when a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for some 
prosecutorial concession as to the number or severity of charges; the quantitative findings 
of this study demonstrate that charge bargains were a common feature of the cracked cases 
within the sample, and that there were several ways in which charge bargains could be 
created. The most straightforward, ‘classic’ charge bargains occurred when a defendant 
pleaded guilty to alternative charges on an expressly amended indictment; this occurred in 
respect of at least one charge in 29 cases (19.2% of the total sample), and entire indictment 
was disposed of by formal alternative charges in 12 cases (7.9%). The clear benefit which 
flows to the defendant in exchange for his guilty plea is the reduced charge, which in 
addition to resulting in a less serious charge on his criminal record, is also likely to lead to a 
lesser sentence than that which would have been imposed (even following a guilty plea) for 
the original charge.  
 
In addition to these cases, however, an analysis of the data shows that there were many 
instances in which a more informal equivalent of pleading guilty to alternative charges was 
used, and there were 36 cases (23.8%) in which there was at least one guilty plea to an 
original count, but no evidence offered in respect of other counts. It is argued that, as the 
outcome was that the defendant pleaded guilty to an alternative, lesser indictment, the 
effect was the same as that of a ‘classic’ charge bargain, but that an awareness of the 
distinction to be made between the two types of cases allows for a greater understanding of 
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the varied dynamics of charge bargaining, and an acknowledgement that charge bargains 
are not necessarily only the result of amended indictments with officially recorded 
alternative charges. 130   
 
Informal charge bargains of the nature described above were further supplemented by 
cases in which some counts were left to lie on file (this applied to at least one count in 23 
cases – 21.1%), which, it is argued, is a functional equivalent of the prosecution offering no 
evidence. Historically, the purpose of the prosecution’s discretion to leave cases to lie on 
file was to allow for the potential future reinstatement of the charge in the prosecution of 
offenders as repeat offenders, or if the defence launched a successful appeal against other 
offences for which the defendant had been convicted (Pattenden 1990). A charge left to lie 
on file can, in theory, be reinstated by the prosecution, but only with leave of the trial judge 
or the Court of Appeal, and it is a relatively rare occurrence, so the effect for a defendant is 
that the prosecution does not put a case forward on that charge and the defendant does 
not receive a penalty for the offence. The current CPS guidance on the use of leaving cases 
to lie on file suggests that it may be useful in the following circumstances:  
 
(i) where the defendant has pleaded guilty or has been convicted of other counts in 
the same indictment; 
(ii) the defendant has pleaded guilty or has been convicted on counts on another 
indictment; and 
(iii) continuation of proceedings on remaining matters is no longer needed in the 
public interest. 131 
 
It is therefore a flexible means by which the CPS is able to effectively offer no evidence in 
respect of a charge, but without it being recorded as a prosecution ‘crack’. From the data 
extracted for this study, it was not apparent on what basis the CPS made decisions to leave 
cases to lie on file or to offer no evidence, and prosecution decision making is in any case 
beyond the scope of this study. What was clear, however, was that a great many cases 
within the sample were disposed of by an outcome which was difficult to discern from 
cases in which alternative counts were formally added, and that the three disposition types 
discussed in this section each resulted in charge bargains.  
                                                 
130 The only difference in the practical effects of informal charge bargains and pleading 
guilty to alternative charges in a more formal sense, was that the latter could perhaps more 
explicitly acknowledge that a particular offence was more appropriate to the facts as the 
defence and prosecution agreed them to be at court. 
131 Available at: www.cps.gov.uk/legal/section3/chapter_f.html#_Toc44573540. 
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Data were collected on the sources of offers in the 63 cases (41.7%) in which it was 
possible to identify a specific offer, to vary the terms of the indictment in some way 
(including the addition of a basis of plea) or to accept / offer guilty pleas to informal 
alternative charges (Fig. 4.16), and this allows for further analysis of the dynamic of charge 
bargains within the sample. In 16.6% of cases, the defence initiated the offer, compared 
with 7.3% of cases in which the prosecution initiated the offer, and in 10.6% of all cases, 
there were counter offers between the parties. This shows firstly that charge bargains were 
commonplace, but moreover that the bargaining dynamics were varied and it was not 
necessarily the case that offers were made from the prosecution to the defence.   The data 
derived from interviews with legal professionals also showed that those interviewed 
believed that offers and negotiation regarding the charge were commonplace and a routine 
part of criminal procedure.  
 
As charge bargaining was so widespread, it is important to consider the factors which, in 
combination, may explain the criminal justice system’s reliance on the practice. Firstly, the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors provides considerable flexibility in allowing prosecutors to 
choose to proceed with the charges they consider appropriate (2004, para.7); this discretion 
creates an ideal precondition for charge bargaining. With this discretion in place, a further 
precondition for a system of widespread charge bargaining is for the defence barrister and 
the defendant to have an interest in engaging with the prosecution’s discretion in order to 
attempt to influence it and reduce the charges.  As discussed throughout Chapter 3, there 
are numerous factors which point towards the defence lawyer’s interests (at least in some 
cases) being to achieve a settlement rather than to take the case to trial. These may be 
reasons which conflict directly with the defendant’s best interests, or the lawyer may 
believe (albeit possibly based on an assumption of the defendant’s guilt) that a charge 
bargain would be in the defendant’s interests. The defendant’s primary interest when facing 
trial proceedings is likely to be in achieving either an acquittal or the least severe sanction 
possible. An acquittal requires a trial, which carries with it the risk of conviction, the loss of 
any credit for a guilty plea, and depending on circumstances of the case, the possibility of 
being sentenced for more numerous or serious charges. If the defendant fears that this risk 
outweighs the consequences of pleading guilty to a lesser or alternative charge, then a 
charge bargain may be an attractive option for each of the parties concerned, and with little 
regulation, frequent charge bargaining is perhaps inevitable. Charge bargains are 
enforceable as a defendant only pleads guilty to the lesser charges, and unless the 
prosecution has sought the judge’s approval of the reduced charges, there is no judicial 
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oversight of the process.132 
 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, there is a perception that certain offence types lend 
themselves to cracking more than others, and the primary reason for this is generally said 
to be that those offences which form part of a graded structure, such as offences of 
violence and public order, can more readily be reduced to the next serious charge down in 
the grading. The data presented at Chapter 4.8 on offence types would appear to tally with 
the view that less serious counts of violence are often offered as alternatives to more 
serious counts. Similarly, the prosecution offered no evidence to the majority of burglary 
and robbery charges, and almost a 25% of the theft counts were guilty pleas to theft as an 
alternative offence. There were also a greater proportion of guilty pleas to the less serious 
drugs offences in the sample, although the small number of drugs offences (8 in total) 
makes comparisons difficult. Both arson cases within the sample were originally charged as 
arson with intent to endanger life, but guilty pleas were accepted to the lesser charge of 
reckless arson. No sexual offences appeared to have been offered as alternative counts to 
more serious sexual offences, such as rape, although again, it is difficult to evaluate the data 
as there were only two rape cases included in the sample. These findings therefore suggest 
that graded offences are suited to the practice of charge bargaining and that the less serious 
counts were often added as alternative offences, with the exception of sexual offences. 
Although the small numbers involved mean that only speculative conclusions can be 
drawn, if sexual offences do not lend themselves as readily to charge bargaining as others, 
this would accord with the comments made by Barristers A and D that sexual offences 
crack less frequently as defendants are more reluctant to admit their guilt to offences which 
carry a greater social stigma. 
 
 The data collected for this study, as well as demonstrating that charge bargaining was 
commonplace and investigating the offences within which it occurred, also shed light on 
the means by which the parties came to agreements as to the charges and pleas in the case, 
which in most cases were examples of explicit bargaining. The strengths and weaknesses of 
individual cases were exploited by both the prosecution and defence in order to negotiate a 
mutually acceptable outcome and were the case features which can be regarded as the 
bargaining tools used in the creation of the terms of charge bargains. Charge bargains were 
often legitimised by reference to the evidence; most frequently the likelihood of reliable 
prosecution witness testimony, and a picture emerges of the victim and other witnesses as 
                                                 
132 See Soanes (1948) 32 Cr App R 136; Herbert (1991) 94 Cr App Rep 2; Grafton [1993] Q.B. 
101 
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key bargaining tools. It is important to reiterate that in those cases in which offers were 
made, 25 were initiated by the defence, compared with only eleven which were initiated by 
the prosecution, and in sixteen cases initial offers were rejected and replaced with counter 
offers (see Fig. 4.17). In the light of literature on defence lawyers’ interests which suggests 
that they have strong incentives to encourage their clients to plead guilty (see Baldwin and 
McConville 1977 and McConville et al. 1994 in particular), this could be interpreted as 
evidence that some defence barristers within the sample were overready to offer up their 
client to the prosecution on a guilty plea, albeit a guilty plea to modified set of charges. This 
may have been true of some cases, and Case 41 for example (the facts of which are 
summarised at Chapter 3.4.5 above) provides clear evidence of a case in which the 
defendant’s barrister approached the prosecution with a possible offer without first 
discussing the matter with her client, and the content of her witness statement produced 
for the subsequent proceedings makes plain the explicit nature of the charge bargain 
offered. 
 
In addition to the fact that the majority of offers made were initiated by the defence, a 
striking feature of the study’s results was the number of counter-offers found within the 
data, which suggests firstly that charge bargains were not, as a general rule, presented as 
‘take it or leave it’ offers by the prosecution and secondly, that there was scope for 
negotiation which went beyond one-off offers from either the prosecution and the defence, 
and that the defence were willing to seek to improve the terms of a charge bargain.133 
Evidently, the individual circumstances varied from case to case, but it is clear that explicit 
charge bargains featured prominently within the sample and were identified in just under 
58% of the informal cracked cases. It was the attendance, or non-attendance, of 
prosecution witnesses which was most often used as a bargaining tool in order to reach a 
settlement.134 Charge bargained cases in which explicit offers were made involved not only 
alternative offences formally defined as such, but also the functional equivalents whereby 
guilty pleas were entered to some counts (either counts originally on the indictment or 
added on the day of the plea change) and the prosecution offered no evidence in respect of 
other counts, or counts were left to lie on file.  
                                                 
133 An illustrative example of this process is to be found in Case 40, which is summarised at 
4.16. 
134 The availability and reliability of defence witnesses will no doubt have had an impact on 
the assessment of the strength of the defence case, and may also have played a role in the 
acceptability to both prosecution and defence of charge bargains, but without access to 
defence files, and generally very little relevant information in the prosecution files, it was 
not possible to make any judgements on this issue in the cases in question.  
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The results set out in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis demonstrate that sentence bargains 
facilitated both by the sentence discount and by sentence indications, as well as fact 
bargains and charge bargains were widely employed within the sample. The finding that 
plea bargaining is widespread, and that it falls into these four primary categories lends 
additional weight to existing findings and academic discourse on plea bargaining’s 
prevalence in the Crown court. The depth and complementarity of the data collection has 
made a close analysis possible and with that, quantitative findings on issues such as the 
effect of the use of ‘informal’ alternative charges and the frequency of counter offers, and 
their relationship to plea bargaining.  
 
The following section of this chapter develops the analysis of the findings in order to put 
forward a broad outline of the nature of the plea bargaining within the sample and to draw 
some conclusions on the extent to which defendants playing the system or pressures to 
plead guilty featured as part of the process of plea bargaining and cracked trials. 
 
5.6 The nature of plea bargaining within the sample   
 
5.6.1 Outlining the nature of plea bargaining 
 
Based on the data collected and the analysis presented thus far, it is submitted that it is 
possible to outline the nature of plea bargaining in the Crown court in the following terms: 
 
(i)  It is almost entirely explicit. Defendants enter guilty pleas in the knowledge 
that they will receive some benefits or concessions from the prosecution or 
the state (this differentiates it from a system of tacit bargaining in which the 
defendant simply has some reasonable expectation that he may be treated 
more leniently). 
 
(ii) Both prosecution and defence can negotiate and some degree of ‘haggling’ 
is tolerated135 (as evidenced by the presence of prosecution, defence and 
counter-offers within the sample). 
 
                                                 
135 McDonald proposes that the amount of ‘haggling’ permitted is one dimension along 
which negotiations can vary; the other two being who negotiates, and whether the 
agreement is treated as a legal contract (1979, pp. 386 – 387). 
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(iii) Different forms of plea bargain can be struck with varying levels of 
specificity and degrees of enforceability. 
a. The sentence discount operates alongside, and in addition to, all other 
types of bargain and provides an additional (and potentially greater) 
benefit to defendants entering into charge or fact bargains. The sentence 
discount is enshrined in statute by s.144 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 and is currently guided by the 2007 SGC Guideline (the clearer 
guidelines in place since the introduction of the 2004 SGC Guideline 
may have the effect of increasing the transparency and specificity of 
sentence discounting). Although there is no absolute entitlement to a 
sentence discount following a guilty plea, case law suggests that even a 
very late guilty plea should be rewarded with a discounted sentence (see 
for example Fearon (1995).136  
b. Goodyear indications are enforceable sentence bargains which, subject to 
the judge’s discretion are given in broad or specific terms. 
c. Fact bargains represent an exchange of a guilty plea for the specific 
benefit of an agreed set of facts which are less serious than those 
originally charged or implied by the offence, and although the 
prosecution should not agree to a basis of plea which does not 
accurately reflect the known facts, this does not appear to be strictly 
enforced. 
d. Charge bargains are made on specific terms and are enforceable as the 
defendant pleads guilty only to the specified alternative charges (which 
may be formal or informal alternative charges). 
 
 
Plea bargaining’s relationship with cracked trials is thus a very close one; a relationship 
which played a role in 90 of the 109 informal cracked cases. The remainder of this section 
of this chapter seeks to explore the reasons why plea bargaining has nonetheless been 
marginalised and questions whether, in the light of this study’s findings, the criticisms of 
plea bargaining which have led to its pariah status are in fact justified.  
 
At this stage, it is useful to summarise two competing criticisms of plea bargaining, firstly 
the argument that it allows defendants to play the system. Plea bargaining in the UK has 
                                                 
136
 2 Cr App Rep (S) 25.   
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rarely, if ever, been presented in a positive light; it is generally portrayed by the media as a 
loophole which allows defendants to escape the punishment they deserve, a view which is 
reinforced by the frequency with which defendants in US crime dramas are able to ‘cut a 
deal’ and which many members of the public may mistakenly believe to be representative 
of all types of plea bargain across all jurisdictions. There is a perception (part of a wider 
phenomenon of public opinion that sentencing is too lenient, see for example Hough and 
Roberts (1998)) that the sentence discount allows defendants to ‘get away with it’ and to 
play the system by trying to extort as many concessions as possible from the state.137 This 
perception is not limited to the media, or to the public; it also comes across in the RCCJ, 
1993 and the Auld Report, and was held by some of the legal professionals interviewed for 
this study. Announcing proposals that plea bargaining would be used in cases of serious 
fraud or other serious and organised crime, and as stated earlier, the Attorney General was 
at pains to clarify that the proposed procedure was not ‘plea bargaining’, aware of the 
negative connotations of the latter phrase (The Times, 4th April 2008). 
   
Meanwhile, the groundswell of academic opinion encapsulates the second criticism, that 
plea bargaining is undesirable, not because it advantages the defendant, but because it 
disadvantages the defendant by robbing him the free choice to exercise his right to trial and 
places pressures upon him to plead guilty. The sentence discount is regarded as operating 
not as a benefit, but as a ‘trial penalty’ which punishes defendants for wasting the state’s 
resources, and additional charge, fact or sentence bargains operate as further undue 
inducements to defendants to plead guilty. Baldwin and McConville (1977), McConville 
(1998, 2002), Hodgson and Belloni (2000), Darbyshire (2000, 2005), Ashworth (2005), and 
Sanders and Young (2007) all adopt the position that these inducements to plea bargain are 
so powerful that even innocent defendants may plead guilty. Both sets of objections to plea 
bargaining have in common a distaste for the inherent betrayal of adversarial principles 
which plea bargaining entails and the resulting ‘bazaar’ atmosphere (McDonald 1979, 
p.386) in which plea bargaining reduces the criminal process to an unprincipled series of  
exchanges of concessions and rights.  
 
                                                 
137 See for example: ‘Guilty plea could see reduced sentences for rapists’ Daily Mail 1st June 
2006; ‘Villains caught in the act will still see their sentence cut for pleading guilty’ Daily Mail 
16th June 2006. ‘Get out of jail in 10 years if you admit murder’ The Telegraph, 21st 
September 2004.The Sun launched a campaign in 2006 to ‘get soft judges sacked’, see The 
Sun 12th June 2006, but also blame ministers for implementing ‘soft’ sentencing laws: 
‘judges must administer the law laid down, sometimes bizarrely, by ministers. Nobody 
understands why sentences are…slashed in return for a guilty plea’ (The Sun, 12th June 
2006). 
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5.6.2 Playing the system? 
 
The purpose of this section is therefore to consider more closely whether the data provided 
evidence of defendants being able to ‘play the system’ (resulting in cracked trials), using the 
sentence discount, sentence indications, or fact or charge bargaining. As the rationale of the 
2007 SGC Guideline is that the later the guilty plea is entered, the less discount will be 
applied, if the Guideline is adhered to, there is little sense in a defendant pleading guilty late 
in order to secure a greater discount as the outcome will be the reverse. However, there are 
indications that defendants may still perceive that there are better deals to be had at a late 
stage, notwithstanding the sentence discount guidelines, which may be because certainly in 
the past, greater discounts were given at later stages (Baldwin and McConville 1978; Moxon 
1988). Judge A stated that: 
 
[Defendants] ‘perceive that there are better offers from the prosecution 
when the case is in for trial than there are when the case is in the for the 
PCMH…At the PCMH, the Prosecution take a look at the case on paper 
and say oh no, we won’t accept that [offer of a guilty plea to an alternative 
charge from the defence] and then, as everybody turns up to court, and it 
becomes apparent to the prosecution that they have one or two little 
problems…they take the charge which was originally offered by the 
defence’.  
 
It may be in a defendant’s interests to withhold his guilty plea until the case reaches trial 
particularly if he hopes to secure a charge bargain. The data presented at Fig. 4.17 show 
that charge bargains were a feature of 58% of the informal cracked cases and thus a 
common occurrence which, depending on the strength of the case, a defendant could 
justifiably hold out hope for. As demonstrated by the data presented at Fig. 4.9, which 
illustrates the important role of witnesses in cases cracking, the strength of a case and the 
likelihood of a charge bargain being acceptable to both parties often appeared to depend 
on whether reliable prosecution witnesses had attended court on the day of the trial, which 
again would mean that a defendant would have an interest in deliberately withholding his 
guilty plea.  
 
The introduction of sentence indications - the closest procedure England and Wales has to 
formalised plea bargaining – may also provide defendants with incentives to withhold guilty 
pleas, in order to ensure that their guilty plea is entered in exchange for a maximum 
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sentence acceptable to them, and although Goodyear indications can be requested at pre-trial 
hearings, in practice this is rarely the case, as the evidence and issues may not yet be clear. 
This study’s data showed that Goodyear indications were given infrequently, and in light of 
their largely imprecise nature, were at most a form of reassurance for the defendant rather 
than a particularly good ‘deal’ which might allow or encourage defendants to play the 
system. 
 
A fact bargain is in many respects the type of plea bargain in which there is least likely to be 
the scope or motivation for a defendant to play the system. A basis of plea alone will only 
ever alter the facts upon which the defendant is sentenced; the offence he pleads guilty to 
remains unchanged and the risk of conviction at trial arguably makes it unlikely that a 
defendant would deliberately withhold a guilty plea solely in the hope of achieving a fact 
bargain. In combination with a charge bargain, however, a basis of plea can assist in 
substantially reducing the seriousness of offending upon which a defendant’s sentence is 
based on and result in an outcome which does not appear to reflect the true facts of the 
case, as was also highlighted by the findings of this study. This raises the related issue that 
the fact that a defendant can simultaneously benefit from multiple bargains could be seen 
as evidence of playing the system. In a single case a defendant could have a charge reduced, 
enter a guilty plea on the basis of facts which mitigate the severity of the reduced charge, 
receive a binding and enforceable Goodyear indication, and of course receive credit for his 
guilty plea in the form of a sentence discount. This could all happen on the first day of trial, 
at which it becomes apparent that, for example, a distressed prosecution witness is 
reluctant to give evidence, and ‘a reluctant witness both precludes inducement of pleas of 
guilt and sharply reduces the chances of winning in a trial by jury’ (Reiss 1975, p.15). It is 
this kind of (albeit slightly exaggerated) scenario which fuels the perception that defendants 
can play the system by exploiting innocent witnesses’ weaknesses and ‘get off lightly’.  
 
The question arises though as to whether this really is a situation in which the defendant 
would be ‘playing the system’. From the perspective of policy which is increasingly crime 
control orientated and driven by efficiency, he perhaps is; he is deliberately withholding a 
guilty plea until the prosecution is forced to make a better offer, and until the judge with a 
heavy caseload is keen to give a sufficiently attractive Goodyear indication. Yet it is not the 
defendant who has created the weaknesses in the prosecution case, and he is not 
responsible for CPS or court targets and nor does he have any impact on the reliability or 
 176 
willingness to testify of prosecution witnesses.138 If, on the day of trial, the prosecution case 
is not strong enough to sustain a trial, it is difficult to see how this is the responsibility of 
an ‘uncooperative or feckless’ defendant (Auld Report 2001, para. 9). Certainly, for those 
defendants who were factually guilty of the offences originally charged but were sentenced 
for fewer or lesser charges, the system worked to their advantage and they may have 
considered themselves fortunate, and as discussed earlier, there were cases in which the 
eventual charges to which guilty pleas were entered did not bear a close resemblance to the 
facts alleged. This notwithstanding, in order to maintain any legitimacy in a criminal justice 
system founded on due process principles, the question must be not whether a defendant 
was factually guilty of the charges in question, but whether he was legally guilty.139 If the 
prosecution fails to even attempt to prove the defendant’s legal guilt in respect of the 
original charges and the defendant’s guilt of the reduced charges is proven only by the 
defendant’s guilty plea rather by prosecution evidence, then the defendant, far from playing 
the system, is giving up his right to have the prosecution prove its case. Ultimately, the 
prosecution always has the option of proceeding to trial but the defendant does not always 
have the option of pleading guilty to reduced charges, and in accepting guilty pleas to lesser 
or fewer offences it is the prosecution, not the defence, who have the greater power to 
‘play the system’ by circumventing an adversarial trial in order to avoid the risk of acquittal 
and the expenditure of additional resources. Moreover, it could be argued that in some 
cases within the sample (such as Case 67 and Case 68, at Chapter 4.9) although the 
defendants’ eventual guilty pleas were to reduced indictments, the defendants’ best interests 
may have been better served by going to trial on the original indictment, as there appeared 
to be a very weak prosecution case. 
 
The analysis above has demonstrated that although there is a perception that defendants 
cause cracked trials by ‘playing the system’, and factually guilty defendants may benefit 
from the widespread use of, in particular, charge bargaining, in reality defendants are at 
best able to take advantage of weaknesses in the prosecution case, which it is submitted can 
not equate to playing the system.  Although there were some cases within the present 
study’s sample in which it was clear that the defence had the ‘upper hand’, the defence was 
only ever empowered as a result of flaws in the prosecution evidence140; there is simply 
                                                 
138 Unless of course the defendant has intimidated a witness in order to dissuade them from 
testifying; the sample contained 8 counts of witness intimidation. 
139 See further McConville and Mirsky (1995). 
140 Cases 67 and 68 (summarised at Chapter 4.6 above) were two such cases, in which the 
lack of reliable prosecution witnesses in attendance on the day of the trial was so 
detrimental to the case that in Case 68 a plea of guilty to a single count of actual bodily 
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little scope in reality for the defendant to benefit from attempting to play the system.141  
 
There is, however, considerable scope for a defence barrister to play the system to his 
financial and professional advantage in order to secure the highest fee chargeable without 
being forced to return other briefs or take the case to trial, and to cooperate with the 
prosecution advocate. These issues were analysed throughout Chapter 4, which argued that 
in many cases, the barristers’ interests may be best served by defendants pleading guilty, 
which provides an incentive to plea bargain (or, as was the case in Baldwin and 
McConville’s findings within their sample (1977), to exert pressure on defendants to plead 
guilty). The following paragraphs therefore examine whether plea bargaining, as 
documented by this study, created, or was an element of, pressure upon defendants to 
plead guilty. 
 
5.6.3 Pressures to plead guilty? 
 
The most serious criticism frequently levelled at plea bargaining by academics is that it 
creates undue pressure on defendants to plead guilty, to the extent that even innocent 
defendants may be induced to plead guilty (Dell 1971; Bottoms and McClean 1976; 
Baldwin and McConville 1977; Zander and Henderson 1993, were all empirical studies in 
which it was found that innocent defendants pleaded guilty on occasion). This section of 
Chapter 5 addresses the extent to which there was evidence that pressures to plead guilty 
appeared to have been exerted on the defendants in the cases sampled, and examines 
interviewees’ views on the issue. As surveying defendants was beyond the remit of this 
study, it is not possible to assess the extent to which the defendants in the cases sampled as 
a whole felt themselves pressurised and as such, it is not possible to make a direct 
comparison between this study’s findings and previous research which did interview or 
survey defendants. There were however two individual cases in which the prosecution file 
did provide clear evidence that the defendants in question had felt themselves to be 
pressurized (Cases 91 (at 3.4.6)  and 41 (at 3.4.5)).  
                                                                                                                                               
harm was accepted even though the defendant had been charged with causing grievous 
bodily harm with intent and three counts of witness intimidation. In Case 67, the defendant 
offered a guilty plea to a ‘common’ assault in place of the actual bodily harm charge with 
which he was originally indicted. In both cases, the defence appeared to have had the upper 
hand in determining the outcome of the case. 
141 It has been suggested that plea bargaining favours recidivists as they come to know the 
‘system’ and are better placed to play it. Previous convictions did not, however, appear to 
be a particular feature of cracked trials, at least insofar as could be established from the 
nature of the data gathered for this study (Fig. 4.13). 
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Other than these cases, the data collected from prosecution case files did not lend 
themselves to assessments of any pressure on defendants, but the legal professionals 
interviewed did provide data which related to their perceptions of the extent to which 
defendants were under pressure to plead guilty, and their attitudes to any such pressure. 
Goodyear indications were a particular feature of cracked cases which interviewees viewed as 
potentially creating pressure on defendants to pleas guilty. As stated in Chapter 3, Barrister 
D described them as a ‘lever’ with which to crack trials and accepted that whilst they did 
create pressure on defendants to plead guilty, they were likely to be considering entering 
guilty pleas in any case if they had requested a sentence indication; Judge B described them 
as a tool with which ‘shortcut cases’. Judge B’s comment would suggest that he also viewed 
them as a device with which to encourage defendants to plead guilty and to crack trials 
where it appeared that there were problems with the prosecution case.142  
 
Barrister D’s comment was telling in its inference that it is legitimate to create a pressure on 
defendants who are already considering a guilty plea and Judge A’s attitude was similar 
insofar as he advocated implementing case management measures to encourage defendants 
who appeared to be guilty, to plead guilty, and to dissuade them from a trial, such as 
putting the case to the back of the list to allow the defendant time to ‘confront… the 
issues’.  Although Judge A explicitly stated that he would not put any pressure on a 
defendant, singling out defendants who, in his view, are guilty and delaying their cases so 
that they can be more ‘realistic’ could lead to defendants feeling pressure to plead guilty, 
not least as it would be apparent to them that the judge already believes them to be guilty. 
As Sanders and Young write ‘[n]othing is more likely to cause a defendant to abandon a 
not guilty plea than the official(s) conducting the trial expressing a view that the defendant 
is guilty’ (2007, p.426). Perhaps with increased safeguards in place, the issue is no longer 
the overt ‘pressure’ of the kind documented by Negotiated Justice, but the uncomfortable 
proximity of what legals professionals may consider to be a routine, realistic, approach to a 
case, to advice defendants may perceive as pressure. It may also be the case, however, that 
the degree of transparency afforded by Goodyear indications at least provides a defendant 
with safeguards against the pressure which may previously have been created by ‘informal’ 
sentence indications. As Judge B stated, they used to happen ‘behind the scenes’ and ‘there 
                                                 
142 It is possible that this is not the meaning Judge B intended; for a judge to offer an 
inducement to a defendant to plead guilty in order to circumvent a weak prosecution case 
would be improper, but within the context of the conversation, it was not possible to 
discern any alternative meanings. 
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was a fiction of sticking to the rules’.  
 
A notable theme which emerged during interviews was that several of those interviewed 
felt that although the sentence discount and sentence indications could have the potential 
to encourage (or pressurise) defendants to plead guilty and thus enter into plea bargains, 
they often did not exert the influence on the defendant which may have been expected. A 
defendant with his own reasons for pleading guilty is unlikely to feel pressurised into doing 
so, whereas a defendant who previously had no intention of pleading guilty may feel 
pressurised to do so if, once at court, his barrister impresses upon him that a substantial 
discount would reward a guilty plea, particularly if the defendant has been told (or has 
gained the impression) that he does not stand a good chance of acquittal. (See further 
Sanders and Young (2007) pp.425 – 428 on the relevance of the prospect of conviction). 
As stated earlier, Judge B believed that as ‘the criminal has an entirely different agenda’ 
Goodyear indications did not always have the desired effect on them. Barrister B felt that the 
graduated sentence discount would not work as ‘you can’t put a formula on it, it can’t be 
reduced to that’ and Barrister A felt that the sliding scale of discounts would not have an 
effect on defendant as ‘punters don’t think like accountants’. There is some support for 
this argument in the literature on criminal psychology, and there are established links 
between the propensity for criminality and impulsivity and a lack of delayed gratification 
(Bower 1995, p.232). In the context of plea bargaining decisions specifically, Bibas writes 
that ‘over-confidence, self-serving biases, denial mechanisms, discounting of future costs, 
risk preferences…all skew bargain outcomes’ (2004, p.2469) and that risk and loss aversion 
are distributed unequally and are dependant on factors such as criminal history, intelligence, 
gender, and marital status (ibid., p. 2512). Without surveying defendants, it is difficult to 
make judgements on the actual effects of inducements on individuals, but it seems clear 
that there are likely to be a range of personal factors which influence whether a defendant 
feels pressurised or encouraged to plead guilty by the existence of the sentence discount or 
Goodyear indications, and it would be an oversimplification to state that defendants are 
uniformly pressurised by these measures, it is simply that they are systemic features with 
the potential to create pressure. Likewise, whether charge bargains create an undue 
pressure on defendants to plead guilty will depend on a variety of factors: whether the 
defendant had other motivations to plead guilty, the relative strength of the prosecution 
and defence cases, the terms in which the defendant’s barrister gives advice on the charge 
bargain, and whether it is initiated by the defence, with the defendant’s informed 
agreement, or without, or whether it is initiated by the prosecution.  
 
 180 
Fact bargains are less likely than other forms of plea bargain to create an undue pressure to 
plead guilty as less benefit accrues to the defendant upon entering into a fact bargain 
compared with other types of bargain; the difference between a guilty plea to specified 
offences and the same guilty plea with an accompanying basis of plea is likely to be, at 
most, only a small sentencing differential, and within the sample, it often appeared that a 
basis of plea was indicative of little more than either the defendant or the prosecution 
wanting to ensure that they had the ‘last word’ and an input into the agreed facts of the 
offence in cases where the offence itself could not be negotiated further (see in particular 
Case 74 at 4.14). 
 
Previous literature (in particular Hood’s 1992 study on race and sentencing, but see also 
Mhlanga 1997 and Flood-Page and Mackie 1998) has indicated that the sentence discount, 
and plea bargaining more generally, may operate to indirectly discriminate against ethnic 
minorities who tend to plead guilty less frequently than white defendants (Hood 1992; 
Fitzgerald 1993). This may be because they are more likely to be not guilty, as 
discrimination at earlier stages of the criminal justice system contributes to an 
overrepresentation of ethnic minorities being charged, and cultural differences in 
willingness to admit guilt or to cooperate with the criminal justice system may also be 
relevant (Hood 1992). They are therefore not as frequently entitled to the benefits which 
accompany guilty pleas, and Tonry advocates abolishing the sentence discount for this 
reason (2004, p.87). The present study’s sample contained only 19 defendants who were 
recorded as being of an ethnicity other than non-white European, so an analysis of the data 
is necessarily very limited by the small numbers involved. However, the findings are 
interesting, and appear to support previous literature. Ethnic minorities had the highest 
rates of effective trials (the highest being 80% for Afro-Caribbeans), compared with only 
13.5% of white Europeans, and none of the cases involving Afro-Caribbean defendants 
were recorded cracked trials, and only one was an informal cracked trial (although there 
were only five Afro-Caribbean defendants in total) (Fig. 4.18).    
 
The data at Fig. 4.19 set out the offers and Goodyear indications by ethnicity, and again, the 
results suggest that ethnic minorities (Afro-Caribbeans in particular) were less likely to have 
engaged in the process of offers being made and trials cracking. Just one Goodyear 
indication was given to a non-white European defendant, and in all cases in which there 
was an offer originating from the defence, and the defendant’s ethnicity was recorded, the 
defendant was white European. In 80% of the cases against Afro-Caribbeans, 85.7% of 
those against Asians and 66.7% of those against Arab defendants no offers at all were 
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made, compared with 55.5% of white European defendants. This again suggests that, based 
on the very limited data available, all parties appeared to be more inclined to bargain in 
cases involving white defendants, and least likely to in cases involving Afro-Caribbean 
defendants, supporting previous research findings which suggest that plea bargaining and 
the sentence discount operate in a racially discriminatory fashion (which the 1993 Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice chose not to engage with, despite Hood’s findings being 
available to them).   
 
An analysis of the data extracted in the course of this study therefore shows that, as found 
by previous studies and argued by much of the literature on plea bargaining in England and 
Wales, the existence and widespread use of plea bargaining clearly has at least the potential 
to create pressures to plead guilty, and that it may discriminate against ethnic minority 
defendants. The argument that it uniformly operates to create undue pressures upon 
defendants in individual cases to plead guilty is, however, questioned by the present 
analysis. Measures put in place to encourage defendants to plead guilty may not be as 
effective as the government has intended them to be, and whether charge or fact bargains 
create pressures to plead guilty, or whether they simply allow defendants to exploit 
weaknesses in the prosecution case, will depend very much upon the individual facts of the 
case. It does seem, as far as can be inferred from the type of data collected, that barristers 
and judges are on the one hand wary of being seen to exert pressure on defendants, and 
that defendants being ‘terrorised’ (Baldwin and McConville 1977, p.46) into pleading guilty 
may be a thing of the past, yet on the other hand some of the views expressed by those 
interviewed suggests that it is deemed acceptable to exert some pressure on those defendants 
who appear to be guilty. 
 
There is recent case law in the form of McKinnon v United States143, which provides some 
indication of the current approach of the appellate courts to the issue of plea bargaining 
and pressure to plead guilty. The case was an appeal against an extradition order, prior to 
which the appellant (a British citizen) had engaged in plea bargaining with the US 
prosecutorial authorities. The appellant had been informed that if he pleaded guilty he 
would receive a custodial sentence of 3 to 4 years, only one of which would be spent in the 
United States. If he did not cooperate and was convicted, McKinnon had been told to 
expect a sentence of 8 to 10 years, all of which would be spent in the United States. 
McKinnon argued that this was an abuse of process and that he had been subjected to 
                                                 
143 [2008] UKHL 59 
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undue pressure, contrary to the guidelines in Goodyear, as Goodyear does not permit a judge 
to give the defendant the two alternative sentences which would be imposed on a guilty 
plea or conviction respectively, and as the sentencing differential was so great. The House 
of Lords held that the US authorities has not contravened the Goodyear guidelines, as their 
purpose was to limit judicial, not prosecutorial, indications of sentence and that ‘the 
discount would have to be very more generous than anything promised here…before it 
constituted unlawful pressure’  although the court did concede that ‘[i]n one sense all 
discounts for pleas of guilty could be said to subject the defendant to pressure, and the 
greater the discount the greater the pressure’ ([2008] UKHL 59 at 38 per Lord Brown). The 
judgment reinforces the conclusion drawn from this study’s data that some degree of 
pressure is acknowledged as accepted as being inherent in the system, but that it would 
only be seen as unacceptable, undue pressure in an extreme case.  
 
This raises the question as to what is meant by undue pressure, if some pressure is tolerated 
as inevitable in a system which rewards guilty pleas, where should the line between 
legitimate and undue pressure be drawn? As the approach of this thesis has been to view 
cracked trials and plea bargaining primarily from a defence perspective, it is argued that for 
a defendant, undue pressure must necessarily be any pressure which he perceives to be 
undue and feels deprives him of making as free a choice as could be expected in the 
circumstances. Whilst individuals’ propensities to feel placed under pressure can not be 
regulated, one way of limiting the potential for undue pressure (whilst maintaining a system 
which rewarded guilty pleas) would be to put maximum sentencing differentials in place so 
that defendants who are reluctant to plead guilty and / or innocent defendants are not 
placed under pressure by significant sentence reductions. What would constitute a 
significant enough sentencing differential to create an undue pressure is, however, not a 
straightforward issue. A sentence discount of one third may not be a large differential in 
many sentences for less serious offences, but could make a huge difference to a long 
sentence, or a tariff for murder. The more serious the offence, the higher the stakes, and 
the greater the potential, therefore, for undue pressure. Moreover, Flood-Page and Mackie 
(1998) found that the effect of the sentence discount was greatest in the most serious 
sexual and violent offences, because those were the offences defendants were least likely to 
have pleaded guilty to at an early stage, again suggesting that pressure may be greater for 
defendants accused of the most serious crimes.144 If, as seems inevitable, the sentence 
                                                 
144 70% pleaded not guilty to rape compared with 39% to other sexual offences. The 
average sentence on conviction was 8.1 years, and 3.9 years after a guilty plea. 67% pleaded 
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discount is to remain a cornerstone of sentencing and criminal justice policy, then research 
needs to be carried out which considers its effect on defendants and whether it not only 
discriminates against ethnic minorities, but also places the greatest pressure on those who 
are already facing the most severe penalties.  
 
In summary, although the data discussed above revealed individual instances of defendants 
being able to benefit from the system of plea bargaining and pleading guilty to a 
substantially less serious set of charges than had originally been laid, and of evidence that 
pressures to plead guilty, from a variety of sources, could be present, the analysis above 
(both of issues specific to defence lawyers in Chapter 3, and the analysis of the other 
qualitative and quantitative data in Chapters 4 and 5) has shown that plea bargaining does 
not fit squarely into either set of objections and alternative conceptualisations of plea 
bargaining which have generally been applied only to the American system of plea 
bargaining are therefore considered below. 
 
5.7 Alternative models of plea bargaining 
 
As Scott and Stuntz write: 
 
‘[T]here is something puzzling about the polarity of contemporary reactions to this 
practice. Most legal scholars oppose plea bargaining…Nevertheless, most 
participants in the plea bargaining process [including defendants]…seem remarkably 
untroubled by it’ (1992, p. 1909). 
 
Perhaps the answer lies in the possibility that the participants view the processes of plea 
bargaining (and thus some of the underlying causes of cracked trials) in very different terms 
to policy makers or academics. Words such as ‘consensus’, ‘concessions’ and ‘contract’ are 
used frequently, but inconsistently, within the existing literature on conceptualisations of 
plea bargaining, which has developed in a piecemeal fashion over the past decades. This 
thesis has taken ‘consensus’ to mean something akin to the dictionary definition of 
‘agreement in opinion’. If a plea bargain is arrived at by consensus, the final outcome 
reflects the defence and prosecution’s assessment of the correct, or just, outcome. This 
differs from a contractual or concessions model in that, although existing literature does 
not consider the issue of whether a contractual model and one which emphasises 
                                                                                                                                               
guilty to grievous bodily harm with intent 67% compared with 29% to other violent crimes. 
The average sentence after conviction was 4.25 years, and 4 years after a guilty plea (p.91). 
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concessions are synonymous145, it is submitted that they both have at their core the 
principle that rights, benefits and risks can be traded and that while the final outcome may 
not be arrived at by consensus as to the ‘right’ outcome, it is an agreement which both 
defence and prosecution have subscribed to. 
 
5.7.1 Plea bargaining as consensus 
 
Plea bargaining has been described as, or considered in the light of, a consensual model of 
justice by the American literature (for example Heumann 1974; Rosset and Cressy 1976; 
Church 1978; Jacob 1984; Nardulli, Eisenstein and Flemming 1985) and literature on 
continental European criminal justice systems (Jung 1997). 
 
Nardulli, Flemming and Eisenstein consider both concessions and consensus models in the 
context of their empirical findings and describe the consensus model as one which stresses 
the importance of shared understandings  in ‘lubricating the court’s machinery’ (1985, 
p.1107) and cite Rosset and Cressy’s view that: 
  
‘Even in the adversary world of law, men who work together and understand each 
other eventually develop shared conceptions of what are acceptable, right and just 
ways of dealing with specific kinds of offenses, suspects and defendants. These 
conceptions form the bases for understandings, agreements, working arrangements 
and cooperative attitudes’ (1976, p.90). 
 
Nardulli, Eisensten and Flemming likened this to their finding that there were well 
established ‘going rates’ for specific offences within the counties they studied (1985, 
p.1109) and that this enabled there to be a consensus about the ‘right’ outcome. There is a 
considerable body of literature on lawyers’ working practices which also emphasizes the 
role and significance of shared understandings in creating routinised working practices (for 
example Blumberg 1967b; Feeley 1973; Alschuler 1975; Jacob 1984; McConville et al. 1994; 
McConville and Mirsky 1995). This is not likely to be as significant a feature of the UK 
Crown courts to the extent that it is described by the American literature, primarily as 
crown prosecutors are not able to hold out promises of specific sentences in the way their 
                                                 
145 The literature on contractual models deals largely with applying classical contract theory 
to plea bargains, and does not expressly consider the relationship between contract theory 
and concessions more generally (see for example Schulhofer 1992; Scott and Stuntz 1992a, 
1992b). 
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American counterparts are, so it would be difficult for ‘going rates’ to establish a sufficient 
degree of certainty, and plea bargains would be expected more frequently when court staff 
worked more closely together (Jacob 1984, p.194), as is the case in most jurisdictions within 
the USA. Barristers in England and Wales, whilst not as bound to particular courts or 
working groups can frequently appear before the same judges (particularly on the regional 
circuits) and may develop an understanding of particular judges’ approaches to sentencing, 
or local court practices, and advise their clients accordingly.146 As Jacob writes, ‘cooperation 
and collaboration is the result of courtroom members’ natural preferences to avoid conflict 
and meet administrative targets’ (ibid., p.193).   
 
The overwhelming flaw of this consensual conceptualisation of plea bargaining, if it is to be 
viewed as a legitimate means of case disposition, is that, as it is generally conceived, the 
consensus never involves the defendant; the ‘shared conceptions’ are those of the defence 
and prosecution lawyers and perhaps the judge and other court staff more widely. In light 
of the negative perceptions of the public to sentencing (Hough and Roberts 1998), they are 
perhaps not the shared conceptions of wider society either; lawyers would effectively exist 
in a microcosm in which their concepts of ‘just’ outcomes dominate the delivery of 
criminal justice, and as Chapter 3 demonstrated, these concepts may conflict with 
defendants’ best interests. Some commentators (although significantly, writing primarily of 
inquisitorial systems) have nonetheless described plea bargaining as a consensual exchange 
from which even defendants can benefit and become empowered. Jung argues that: 
 
‘The notion of criminal law as the ensign of the monopoly of power vested in the 
state, and as clearly distinct from private law, begins to falter. Elements of 
negotiation and participation, hitherto restricted to the sphere of private law 
litigation, are proliferating in all phases of criminal procedure. This indicates a 
shifting equilibrium between state, society and the individual’ (Jung 1997a, p.116).  
 
Jung writes that plea bargaining, along with the increased use of mediation and restorative 
justice as an element of traditional criminal justice represents a shift in values. Similarly 
Luderssen (1990, p.420) expresses hope that the principle of consensus justice will ‘do away 
with the ‘criminal’ in ‘criminal law’’ (cited Jung 1997, p.115). Given the power differential 
                                                 
146 An example of this within the present study’s findings was Barrister B’s comment that 
there was almost ‘no such thing’ as a s.18 OAPA 1861 at Bolton Crown court, and that the 
s.18 grievous bodily harm with intent charge was invariable reduced to s.20 of the OAPA 
1861, grievous bodily harm without intent. 
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between lawyers and defendants, and some of the attitudes expressed towards defendants, 
it seems unlikely that defendants can at present meaningfully engage with a consensual 
process of plea bargaining. Although there were some individual cases within the sample in 
which it appeared that the defendant was in some sense empowered (see Chapter 4.14 – 
4.15), this was not as a result of a shared understanding between the defendant, defence 
barrister and prosecution as to the ‘value’ of the case, but rather as a result of a weakened 
prosecution case which gave the defence barrister greater bargaining power with his 
prosecution counterpart in order to secure a more favourable agreement on behalf of his 
client. Daudistel, Sanders and Luckenbill describe the shared conceptions of a case being 
between the prosecution and defence advocates, and that ‘advising the defendant of the 
settlement’ is a separate stage of the process (1979, p.224). It is argued that, to the extent to 
which this can be seen as a form of plea which is neither predominantly a manifestation of 
‘playing the system’ or of pressures to plead guilty, a contractual model emphasising the 
exchange of concessions and the strengths and weaknesses of bargaining positions could 
be more appropriate. Even Jung acknowledges that in order to safeguard the defendant’s 
position in a system of consensual plea bargaining, a ‘contractual situation’ which ensures 
as far as possible that the defendant makes an informed and voluntary choice to plead 
guilty, is necessary (1997, p.118).147 
 
5.7.2 Bazaar style justice or supermarket style justice? Plea bargaining as contract 
 
The ‘concessions’ model of plea bargaining is well established, and could be described as 
the predominant means by which plea bargains are viewed, often critically, within much of 
the American literature (Nardulli, Flemming and Eisenstein 1985, p.1108) The application 
of contract theory to the concessions model, either to legitimise it (Scott and Stuntz 1992a, 
1992b), or to argue that it operates inequitably (Schulhofer 1992) gained momentum during 
the early 1990s. The essence of a concessions model is that the wide range of issues within 
a trial which can give rise to strengths and weaknesses in a case such as evidentiary flaws or 
the credibility of witnesses become tools by which concessions can be extracted, 
agreements made and deals struck. This conceptualisation of plea bargain can be viewed 
either as an unprincipled ‘bazaar’, or a more regulated and orderly ‘supermarket’. 
McDonald describes plea bargaining in some American jurisdictions as deals concluded in a 
                                                 
147 Menkel-Meadow  makes the interesting point that, at least in popular culture, negotiation 
is regarded and portrayed in an over simplified manner, and that the goals of negotiations 
are not necessarily to ‘defeat’ or to ‘get the best of’ the ‘other side’ (2004, p.583). It is 
doubtful whether a more genuine and consensual approach to negotiation, as she suggests 
exists, applies given the particular power differentials in the criminal process.  
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‘bazaar atmosphere’ (1979, p.386) and Nardulli, Flemming and Eisenstein write that the 
term plea bargaining ‘evokes images of a Turkish bazaar, extensive horsetrading, back 
room deals, etc.’ (1985, p. 1106). McDonald described American plea bargaining in these 
terms to distinguish it from jurisdictions such as the UK, which he argued might not 
conduct plea bargains in a bazaar atmosphere, but did engage in the functional equivalent 
thereof as a result of implicit bargaining and expectations of leniency (1979, p.386). It is, 
however, submitted that, as argued above, plea bargaining in England and Wales today is 
explicit, and the range of concessions, negotiations, offers and counter-offers (and broad 
acknowledgement thereof by legal professionals) gives rise to a system which could be 
described in term of a system of explicit concessions.  
 
To clarify what is meant by the bazaar analogy in this instance; it is taken to describe a 
system of case dispositions in which there is some degree of disorder and inconsistency, 
scope for haggling, the values of commodities (in this case, the sentences and/or charges 
appropriate to factual situations) fluctuate and the best deals are to be had by those who 
maintain a good relationship with those with whom they deal frequently. By contrast, 
Nardulli, Flemming and Eisenstein write that courts may ‘also operate more like 
supermarkets in that they are more orderly than the freewheeling concessions model may 
suggest’ (1985, p.1109). In a ‘supermarket’ concessions model of plea bargaining, prices 
(that is, sentences, charge reductions and outcomes) would be more firmly fixed, with less 
scope for haggling, but also less scope for uncertainty and ‘bad deals’.  
 
There was considerable evidence within this study’s data which would support the analogy 
of plea negotiations as being conducted in either a bazaar or supermarket atmosphere. 
Throughout the case files and the interviews the language used echoed that of contractual 
exchanges: there were repeated references to guilty pleas being ‘offered’ or ‘accepted’, and 
‘deals’ being ‘taken’. The practice of the Crown or the defence ‘indicating’ that it would be 
willing to offer, consider or accept guilty pleas to certain offences mirrors that of 
contractual invitations to treat and the use of the stock phrase ‘indicate a willingness’ 
legitimises the haggling, perhaps making the system more akin to a routinised, regulated 
supermarket environment where patterns of expectations are relatively fixed.148   
                                                 
148 It is interesting to note that King found that the limited evidence on plea bargaining in 
England between 1740 – 1820 indicates that parties had broad discretion and that the 
process consisted of a complex, multidimensional set of decision making processes, 
perhaps suggesting that even at this early stage, plea bargaining may have exhibited some 
features of contractual-style exchanges (2000, pp.355 – 356).  
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A well known debate on applicability of contract theory to plea bargaining occurred 
between Schulhofer, and Scott and Stuntz, in a series of articles in the Yale Law Journal in 
1992. Scott and Stuntz argued that plea bargains should be viewed in terms of contract 
theory, not rights, and that if plea bargains are analysed in contractual terms, they are not 
necessarily coercive, and that contractual measures can in fact be implemented to remedy 
many of the problems inherent in plea bargaining. The authors argued that defendants 
should have the freedom to contract or exchange entitlements in criminal proceedings and 
that to deny them that ability (by abolishing plea bargaining) undermines the value of those 
entitlements (1992a, p.1913). Easterbrook had similarly written that defendants are entitled 
to either use or sell their right to trial (1991, p.1975) and Scott and Stuntz argued that the  
elements of contracts which would make them unenforceable (such as duress or 
unconscionability) do not as a matter of course, apply to plea bargains and that large 
sentencing differentials do not equate to guilty pleas entered under duress, but rather that 
the right to take a case to trial is very valuable and the prosecutor is willing to pay a high 
price for it (1992a, p.1921). They also argued that a bargain is only unconscionable if it is a 
‘take it or leave it’ offer which does not react to individual preferences (ibid., at p.1924) but 
that plea bargains involve bargains whereby the terms of the agreement can be modified and 
individualised. This element of Scott and Stuntz’s approach is supported by the presence of 
counter offers within the cases sampled for this study and the individualised nature of 
charge bargains, in particular when combined with bases of plea and/or Goodyear 
indications. 
 
Schulhofer (1992), however, was critical of this standpoint, arguing that there are flaws 
within the plea bargaining system which Scott and Stuntz fail to address such as 
condemnation, punishment and litigation time - public goods which a contractual model 
can not incorporate, and that it is not possible to monitor the contractual processes of a 
plea bargain to ensure that gains outweigh the costs (1992, p. 2009). Similarly, Baldwin and 
McConville examined the possibility of a defensible model of plea bargain in England and 
Wales following Negotiated Justice but concluded that, as the system could not ensure that 
the defendant’s plea was free and voluntary or that each case was disposed of according to 
the evidence, plea bargaining could not be defended as ultimately, it was ‘not calculated to 
avoid injustice’ in the way in which a trial was (1979, p. 216). 
 
Nonetheless, there are indications that the UK system of plea bargaining is becoming 
increasingly contractual and enforceable. As argued earlier in this chapter, the forms of plea 
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bargain identified by this study were explicit and, to a large degree, enforceable exchanges 
of concessions. This is most clearly true of Goodyear indications which are at least in theory, 
a clear and enforceable bargain between a defendant and the state and empower the 
defendant by providing him with the certainty that the sentence imposed will not exceed a 
specified maximum. That Goodyear indications are enforceable is not doubted and case law 
such as McDonald [2007] Crim LR 737 shows that the Court of Appeal considers Goodyear 
indications to be binding to the extent that, if given in error, they override statutory 
requirements to impose an indeterminate sentence for public protection. An analysis of the 
data gathered for this study has, however, questioned the value of Goodyear indications to 
defendants, in the light of the finding that the indications given were often very broad (Fig. 
4.16) Moreover, Vogel, in her exposition of the origins of plea bargaining, writes that there 
are similarities to be drawn between criminal defendants and involuntary labour and puts 
forward the argument of dualistic liberty (2007, pp.315 – 315). Workers who were formally 
free in the sense that they had the capacity to leave their employment and were legally 
permitted to do so were nonetheless constricted by the fact that they found it difficult to 
claim wages to which they were entitled to if they chose to leave their employment, so were 
subject to economic coercion to remain. Equally, defendants have the freedom to plead 
guilty or not, and effectively to contract with the state as to the terms of their plea. 
However, as Vogel argues, ‘while the choice is formally free, terms of the agreement are 
powerfully leveraged by the more resource-rich participant in each case’ (ibid., p.317). 
  
Mitigating the effects of this lack of real contractual freedom, there is a general trend 
towards increased clarity in rewards for guilty pleas as demonstrated by the 2004 and 2007 
SGC Guidelines and the graduated system of sentence discounts they developed, and this is 
true also in terms of the enforceability of promised sentence discounts. In Jackson [2000], 
the Court of Appeal felt itself bound to enforce a sentence discount promised by the trial 
judge despite the fact that it was inappropriate on the facts and Darbyshire too has 
commented on the fact that cases such as Peverett149 suggest that the Court of Appeal will 
prioritise the enforceability of promises made to defendants over undue leniency or 
conflicting statutory sentences (2005, p.281). These recent developments may have the 
effect that a guilty defendant has (some) increased benefit from the greater transparency 
and certainty of the system within which he may exchange his right to trial for other 
concessions, and it is submitted that a contractual analogy is apt. However, even Scott and 
Stuntz write that ‘contract makes the disquiet of critics seem sensible too, since the 
                                                 
149[2001] EWCA Cr App R 416  
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bargaining dynamic shortchanges the innocent’ (1992a, p.1968). A clearer, enforceable 
exchange of concessions will not only be more attractive to guilty defendants, but also to 
innocent defendants, and a contractual conceptualisation of plea bargaining can only be 
defensible if it can ensure, in so far as possible, that legally innocent defendants are not 
induced, either by lawyers or by features inherent in the system, such as sentence 
indications, to plead guilty contrary to their own best interests. 
 
Empirical research which addresses alternative models of plea bargaining, or a re-
examination of existing research in the light of alternative conceptualisations would assist 
in attempting to explain the nature of plea bargaining practiced in Crown courts of 
England and Wales. It is argued that purely consensual approaches to plea bargaining are 
unlikely to be founded in the reality of the practice; consensus to which the defendant is 
party requires a level of voluntariness which will never be present in criminal proceedings. 
Contractual perspectives more accurately describe the exchanges of entitlements based on 
relative bargaining positions determined by the evidence and other facts of the case which 
were documented by this study, but it is doubtful whether even the application a full range 
of contractual safeguards could ever position a defendant at a level of bargaining power 
sufficiently close to that of the prosecution. Given the inherent problems of the principal – 
agent dynamic between the defendant and his barrister, it is unlikely that a defendant can 
even achieve equality of bargaining power with his own lawyer, let alone the prosecution. 
The greatest inducements to plead guilty would invariably be offered to those defendants 
with the strongest cases, as their right to trial would have greater value, and it is 
questionable whether defendants in this situation could be immune from unconscionable 
pressure to ‘sell’ their chance of acquittal. 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
 
Chapter 5 has continued this thesis’s analysis of its empirical data and shown that plea 
bargaining was commonplace within the cases sampled, and that the legal professionals 
interviewed felt that negotiation was a routine feature of Crown court cases generally. This 
chapter has argued that plea bargaining needs to be conceived of broadly and that the term 
should encompass a range of explicit and implicit bargaining procedures, and that a broad 
definition of plea bargaining as any guilty plea entered by a defendant who perceives that 
he will receive some benefit from the state is one which aptly describes the boundaries of 
plea bargaining. It was argued  (at Chapter 5.3.5) that each type of plea bargain documented 
by the study (sentence discount, sentence indications, fact bargains and charge bargains) 
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was explicit: although there are varying levels of certainty, transparency and enforceability 
accompanying different bargains, they are not merely tacit, and recent developments 
suggest a movement towards transparency and enforceability. 
 
Despite this development, evidenced by a clearer system of sentence discounts, formal 
sentence canvassing, the Serious Fraud Office and SOCA’s powers, and the dicta in 
McKinnon v United States [2008] UKHL 59, plea bargaining has not yet been formally 
acknowledged as a widespread means of case disposition. It is perhaps more acceptable to 
the general public (and thus to policy makers) when it can be presented as concerning only 
serious financial crime, which impacts on the population generally and is not seen as 
involving ‘dangerous’ criminals getting off lightly, but is presented as a means by which to 
convict sophisticated organised criminals who would otherwise walk free.150   
 
Plea bargaining’s role as a cause of cracked trials has therefore been neglected, despite 
empirical evidence of a relationship between late guilty pleas and plea bargaining.  The data 
presented for this study showed that in 90 of the 109 informal cracked trials, a plea bargain 
took place in respect of at least one count; plea bargaining and cracked trials were 
inextricably linked. The two key criticisms of plea bargains, which contribute to the lack of 
desire to openly acknowledge the extent of plea bargaining (that they allow defendants to 
play the system, or that they exert undue pressure on defendants), were examined in the 
light of the data and it was argued that there was no evidence that any type of plea bargain 
routinely fitted into either description. Alternative conceptualisations of plea bargaining as 
either consensual or contractual agreements were therefore considered. There was evidence 
within the data that could sustain a contractual model, with regard to the nature of offers, 
acceptances and counter offers, particularly in the light of recent court decisions which 
have prioritised the enforceability of plea or sentence agreements. These decisions are to be 
welcomed as they protect the defendant who relies on assurances to his detriment. It may 
be that, by viewing plea agreements as contractual exchanges, it is possible to remedy some 
of their flaws with recourse to contractual principles of equality of bargaining power and 
enforceability. Nonetheless, any process which involves the state potentially invoking its 
powers of detention, trial and imprisonment is inherently coercive, and contract theory 
does not provide the tools with which to overcome this problem. Simply because plea 
bargaining as a general principle is ethically dubious, however, is no justification for 
criminal justice policy to continue to distance itself from acknowledging its existence; doing 
                                                 
150 See for example Tony Levene, The Guardian 19/3/09 where the emphasis the Serious 
Fraud office’s powers to plea bargain is on ‘banning corrupt professionals’ and ‘fraudsters’. 
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so exacerbates the problems it potentially causes and has the consequence that the 
response to cracked trials is neither evidence based nor consistent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 193 
CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This thesis began by outlining what is often referred to as the ‘problem’ of the cracked trial. 
Policy makers and criminal justice administrators view cracked trials as an avoidable waste 
of resources and as a source of dissatisfaction for witnesses. Official statistics are collated 
and interpreted in a way which suggests that defendants’ late guilty pleas are the 
predominant cause of cracked trials; accordingly, efforts have been made both nationally 
and in local court centres, to reduce the number of cracked trials, primarily by increasing 
and clarifying the inducements to defendants to plead guilty at an early stage in 
proceedings. The one aspect of cracked trials which policy has, however, consistently failed 
to engage with is the extent to which plea bargaining causes trials to crack. Although the 
research on plea bargaining in the UK is notably less developed than that in the USA, 
studies have repeatedly demonstrated the link between late guilty pleas and plea bargaining. 
Nonetheless, plea bargaining in the UK remains outside the borders of what is considered 
acceptable criminal procedure, with the exception of complex fraud cases and organised 
crime. The practice is generally seen as being untenable (officially) from a policy 
perspective because of the fear that it allows defendants to play the system and ‘get off’ 
lightly. The academic critique, however, is centred around literature which suggests that 
plea bargains create inducements to plead guilty which are incompatible with defendants’ 
due process rights.  
 
The purpose of this empirical study has been to explore the causes of cracked trials in light 
of their relationship with plea bargaining, and to thereby explore the nature and extent of 
plea bargaining, which was defined as any guilty plea in which the defendant perceives that 
he receives some benefit or concessions from the prosecuting authorities or the state in 
exchange for his guilty plea. Having explored the nature of plea bargaining, the thesis puts 
forward a quantification of the prevalence of plea bargaining within the sample, and 
identifies four different types of plea bargain: sentence bargains as a result of the sentence 
discount; Goodyear indication sentence bargains, fact bargains, and charge bargains.  The 
thesis then draws together the issues considered throughout, and the data analysed, in order 
firstly to propose an outline of the nature of plea bargaining as practiced in the Crown 
court; secondly to consider whether traditional conceptualisations of plea bargaining 
applied to the cases sampled; and thirdly, to consider whether alternative conceptualisations 
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of plea bargaining might be more fitting. The discussion below summarises what has been 
demonstrated by this thesis. 
 
The problem of the cracked trial (or, the problem of the cracked trial statistics) 
In 2006/2007, the Crown Court Annual Reports published by the Ministry for Justice 
recorded that 39% of all trials cracked. This thesis has highlighted inconsistencies and 
deficiencies within the administrative data, but more importantly has argued that the 
greater problem present the existing statistics on cracked trials is a definitional one and (as 
the results of this study show) the consequence thereof is a perception of the causes of 
cracked trials which is flawed and misleading. This thesis has put forward the argument 
that there is a need for a distinction between cases in which at least one individual count 
cracked (informal cracked cases), and trials in which each count on the indictment results 
in a cracked outcome (recorded cracked cases). The data showed that the number of 
informal cases is considerably greater than that of recorded cases (72.2% of the sample 
compared with 49.6% of the sample).  
 
This finding is significant as it suggests that the ‘problem’ of the cracked trial is more wide-
ranging than official statistics (based on recorded cracked trials) would indicate. From the 
point of view of the court administrator or policy maker, it highlights the fact that there are 
a great deal of cases which may not crack in their entirety, but could still cause a significant 
degree of wastage in terms of barristers’ trial preparation for charges which are never tried, 
overestimated court time which leaves a court room sitting idle when the case is disposed 
of early and unnecessary witness attendance, with the frustration and distress that can cause 
members of the public. Furthermore, irrespective of whether every count within a case 
cracks, each cracked count is worthy of consideration in its own right; explorations of what 
motivated a defendant to plead guilty at a late stage, or why the prosecution were unable to 
offer any evidence at the trial need not, and indeed should not, be confined to cases in 
which every count is disposed of by the same means.  
 
The benefits of examining cases with respect to count outcomes and exploring informal 
cracked cases becomes all the more apparent in the context of this study’s analysis of the 
data extracted on the reasons for cracked trials. Existing administrative statistics for 2006 
record that the reason for trials cracking in 64% of cracked (that is, formal) cases, was a 
result of the defendant entering guilty plea(s) to offence(s) originally on the indictment. In 
18% of cracked cases the reason was recorded as being that the defendant entered guilty 
plea(s) to alternative offence(s), and in 16% of cases that the prosecution offered no 
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evidence (Judicial Statistics 2006). These statistics classify any case in which a defendant 
pleads guilty to an offence as a case which cracked as a result of that guilty plea, irrespective 
of the fact that other counts within the case may have been disposed of differently. It is 
argued in Chapter 5 that there is an incongruity in only defining cases as cracked if all 
counts crack on the one hand, and on the other, classifying a cracked case as being caused 
by the defendant if only one count of several cracks as a result of a defendant’s late guilty 
plea. The data extracted for this study were analysed in a way which allowed for the causes 
of recorded cracked trials to be considered at the count, rather than trial, level and the 
result was a very different picture of the causes of cracked trials. Only 28% of cracked trials 
were caused solely by the defendant pleading guilty to charges originally on the indictment 
and 16% were caused solely by the defendant pleading guilty to alternative charges. The 
prosecution offering no evidence was the reason for the trial cracking in 28% of cases 
(considerably more than the 16% recorded by the Judicial Statistics) and a key finding is 
that 28% of cracked trials cracked as a result of a combination of reasons and ought 
therefore not be classified as a cracked trial caused by the defendant’s guilty plea, as they 
would be by official statistics. There is no logic in defining a trial in which the prosecution 
offer no evidence to one count, leave another to lie on file, and the defendant pleads guilty 
to a reduced charge, as a cracked trial caused by a defendant’s late guilty plea. Doing so 
merely perpetuates the perception that defendants plead guilty late in order to ‘play the 
system’ and secure greater benefits; a perception for which there is little evidence.  
 
The nature of plea bargaining in cracked trials 
One aim this thesis set out to achieve was to explore the nature of plea bargaining in 
cracked trials, and it has done this in several ways. It has firstly argued that any guilty plea 
which is entered by a defendant who perceives that he will benefit from his guilty plea is a 
plea bargain. In the UK, the well established principle of a defendant receiving a sentence 
discount for a plea of guilty ensures that the vast majority of guilty pleas (other than in 
those cases where a whole life tariff for murder is to be imposed) are entered in the 
expectation that some lenience will follow. In determining whether or not a plea bargain 
has occurred, it is irrelevant whether this is the sole motivation for the guilty plea, 
regardless of a defendant’s other motives for pleading guilty, the sentence discount creates 
a situation in which he enters into a plea bargain by exchanging his right to trial for a 
reduced sentence. As 90 cases within the sample featured at least one guilty plea, there were 
90 cases in which plea bargaining occurred in respect of at least one charge on the 
indictment, and this represented 59.6% of the total sample.  
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The data presented in Chapters 3 and 4, and the further analysis thereof in Chapter 5 
explored the nature of plea bargaining in greater detail and discerned four types of plea 
bargain, each of which was a feature in the causes of cracked trials. The sentence discount 
operated in all cases in which there was at least one guilty plea, and was the only type of 
plea bargain present in 21 cases. In the remaining 69 cases, however, it was possible to 
identify additional forms of bargaining as having likely contributed to the cause of the 
cracked trial. Goodyear indications were given in fifteen cases, and are, it is argued, an 
explicit sentence bargain between the defendant and the judge. The formalisation of 
sentence indications has lent transparency and legitimacy to a practice which interviewees 
suggested had already been common practice. A formal, enforceable agreement with the 
judge that a defendant’s sentence will not exceed a certain maximum will undoubtedly be 
an attractive proposition for many defendants, and within the cases sampled it appeared 
that the assurance of a Goodyear indication had, in each case, if not been the deciding factor, 
then at least contributed to, the defendant’s subsequent decision to plead guilty. 
 
Fact bargains were present in 17 cases within the sample, in the form of agreed bases of 
plea between the prosecution and defence, and is seems clear that an agreement whereby 
the defendant pleads guilty to an offence with a basis of plea which makes the guilty plea 
and the offence more agreeable to both the prosecution and defence, is a plea bargain and 
where its terms result in a late guilty plea, it causes the case to crack. Charge bargains were, 
however, the predominant form of bargain and were present in 57 cases. In Chapter 5, this 
thesis demonstrated that there were several case outcomes which were the functional 
equivalent of charge bargains in a ‘classic’ sense, in which one charge is expressly 
substituted for another on the indictment. Although these express charge bargains 
occurred in 29 cases, there were another 36 cases in which, it is submitted, charge bargains 
also took place. These were cases in which charges were not formally replaced, but in 
which the defendant pleaded guilty to at least one charge and no evidence was offered in 
respect of others. In 23 cases, the prosecution left charges to lie on file as well as, or instead 
of, offering no evidence. It was argued that this range of outcomes all equate to subtle 
variations of charge bargain; each share the final outcome that the defendant pleads guilty 
to lesser or fewer charges then were originally on the indictment.  
 
It is possible, from the analysis of the different types of bargain which where found to be 
operating within the sample, to make some generalisations about the nature of plea 
bargaining, this thesis proposed an outline of the nature of plea bargaining in within the 
sample studied. In summary, plea bargaining is: (i) explicit, (ii) open to negotiation by both 
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the prosecution and the defence (with a degree of permissible ‘haggling’) and (iii), each of 
the four types of plea bargaining is enforceable to an extent. This notwithstanding, the 
fiction that cracked trials and plea bargaining are entirely different phenomena is 
maintained, to the detriment of the knowledge of both. Plea bargaining is a multi-faceted 
process which involves an array of decision making processes, and legal, organisational and 
personal factors. It played a role in almost two-thirds of the cases sampled for this study, 
and yet the government, despite prioritising the reduction of cracked trials, and beginning 
to engage with plea bargaining to a limited extent, has failed to take note of previous 
research demonstrating the link between plea bargaining and cracked trials. 
 
 
Playing the system? 
An argument this thesis has put forward to explain the government’s reluctance to 
acknowledge plea bargaining’s pervasive effect on case dispositions is that there is a 
perception that plea bargaining, and even the sentence discount alone, provide an 
opportunity for defendants to ‘play the system’ and to escape the punishment they 
‘deserve’. Throughout this thesis, the data analysis and arguments put forward have 
demonstrated that contrary to this widespread perception, there is little scope for 
defendants to play the system. As summarised above, the official statistics on cracked trials 
are misleading, but furthermore, examinations of the means by which defendants might be 
able to manipulate the system led to the conclusions that it would rarely be possible for 
defendants to deliberately use bargained for pleas to their advantage and thus crack trials. 
In those cases within the sample where it appeared that a defendant had benefitted from a 
late guilty plea, in the sense that he had pleaded guilty to a considerably less serious 
indictment than had initially been laid, or there was a lack of correspondence between the 
charge pleaded to and the alleged facts, this was due to weaknesses in the prosecution case, 
often a lack of witnesses, rather than a tactic employed by the defendant. Likewise, the 
sentence discount or Goodyear indication do not necessarily lend themselves to being 
exploited by manipulative defendants who withhold their guilty pleas; the very clear 
rationale of the graduated sentence discount is to reward early guilty pleas and Goodyear 
indications (which this study found were used only rarely) can be given in terms so broad 
as to not amount to a particularly good ‘deal’ for a defendant to have secured.  
 
Although the defendant may not often be in a position to play the system, the defendant’s 
barrister is. A core aim of this study was to explore the role of the defence barrister in 
cracked trials and in Chapter 3, the thesis examined the issues affecting the defence 
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barrister’s role in advising on (late) guilty pleas and coming to agreements with the 
prosecution. There have perhaps been changes in the working culture of lawyers since 
Baldwin and McConville found that barristers on occasion pressurised their clients to plead 
guilty to the extent that defendants felt ‘terrorised’, ‘ordered’, ‘instructed’, or ‘forced’ to 
plead guilty (1977, p.46). Tague’s research (2006, 2007) suggests that barristers are wary of 
complaints from clients or of being sanctioned by solicitors, and some of this study’s 
interviewees also stated that it was not in their interests to be seen to pressurise defendants. 
Nonetheless, there are strong incentives for defence barristers to favour guilty pleas over 
trials; the fee structure is extremely unpopular, fees at the criminal Bar have been in a state 
of flux for many years and in some situations at least it is in barristers’ financial interests to 
‘crack’ trials. The close working relationships at the Bar are conducive to negotiation and 
compromise with the prosecution, whereas the barrister’s often very limited contact with 
the defendant makes it unlikely that he will have the means or the motive to mount a 
strong defence if he has formed the view that the defendant is guilty and that a plea bargain 
would serve the interests of all parties. Chapter 3 also put forward evidence from 
interviews that legal professionals’ relationships with defendants was tainted by perceptions 
of defendants as flawed, disorganised, and on occasion manipulative, individuals, echoing 
some of the findings of McConville et al. (1994) in this respect. Defence and prosecution 
barristers have (as a result of its lack of acknowledgement) a relatively free reign to plea 
bargain and are thus those who are in a position to ‘play the system’ and negotiate the 
terms of plea agreements in order to encourage guilty pleas if it serves their competing 
interests of financial gain, workload management and cooperation with colleagues.  
 
Pressures to plead guilty? 
The possibility that defence barristers will advise their clients to plead guilty when it may 
not be in their clients’ interests to do so is one source of pressure to plead guilty, 
documented by Negotiated Justice (1977) in particular, but the effect of a barrister’s last 
minute advice has also been highlighted by Bottoms and McClean (1976) and Zander and 
Henderson (1993) among others. There were two cases within the sample in which there 
was written evidence that the defendant had felt himself to be pressurised into pleading 
guilty, although without interviewing defendants it is impossible to know whether these 
cases were rare exceptions or part of a wider phenomenon (it can not be assumed that 
defendants would always voice their dissatisfaction to the extent that there would be a 
record of the events surrounding the plea). 
 
There are factors other than the barrister’s advice which may create pressures to plead 
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guilty; the very existence of the inducement of the sentence discount could be said to place 
every defendant in a situation whereby going to trial and maintaining a not guilty plea 
carries with it the risk of a greater sentence and that this sentencing differential creates a 
pressure to plead guilty. Likewise, sentence indications and the possibility of fact or charge 
bargains can create yet more inducements to plead guilty. Whilst from a principled 
perspective, it is clear that these inducements potentially undermine the voluntariness of a 
defendant’s plea, this study found limited empirical evidence that undue pressures to plead 
guilty caused the individual defendants whose cases were sampled, to plead guilty and crack 
trials.  This could well be a result of the means by which data were collected; an 
understanding of the effects of these inducements requires defendants to be interviewed or 
surveyed, which was beyond the scope of this thesis.  Furthermore, evidence of pressure 
was documented in Cases 41 and 91 and, as discussed above, interviews with legal 
professionals suggested that they felt some degree of pressure might be appropriate, albeit 
it not undue pressure. A comparison can be made here with McKinnon v United States [2008], 
in which it was stated that although the sentence discount could exert pressure on 
defendants to plead guilty, it would require an extremely large sentencing differential to be 
considered unlawful pressure. Some level of pressure therefore appears to be accepted and is 
indeed inevitable, as even in a system which offered no reward for guilty pleas defendants 
could feel under pressure to plead guilty in order to avoid the ordeal of a trial. The data 
gathered for this thesis also supported previous findings that the sentence discount may 
operate in a way which discriminates against ethnic minorities, Afro-Caribbeans in 
particular, who are less likely to engage with, and therefore benefit from, the bargaining 
process.  
 
Towards an alternative understanding of plea bargaining? 
As pressure to plead guilty was not an overt feature of the cases sampled, Chapter 5 also 
considered alternative approaches to plea bargaining. During data collection and analysis, it 
became apparent that the nature of bargaining as documented by this study, and the way in 
which it was described by interviewees, was at times akin to a consensual or contractual 
system. It was clear that cracked trials were rarely, if ever, caused by defendants exploiting 
the system of plea bargaining for their own gain, but nor was there a sense that defendants 
had been pressurised into plea agreements which ran counter to their interests. It was more 
often the defence (though not the defendant himself) than the prosecution which initiated 
offers, and there were many instances of counter-offers between prosecution and defence.  
Plea bargaining as an example of ‘consensual justice’, on a par with restorative justice or 
mediation, as Jung (1997) suggests, is however a somewhat unrealistic proposition; the 
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criminal justice system is inherently coercive and plea bargains do not represent a 
consensus, or agreement, between the defendant and the state or the prosecution as to the 
appropriate sanction. There may be consensus as to the ‘right’ outcome between opposing 
lawyers, engendered by the shared understandings of their working practices, as Nardulli, 
Flemming and Eisenstein (1985) found, but this shared understanding does not extend to 
the defendant (see more generally Blumberg 1967; Alschuler 1975; McConville and Mirsky 
1995; Emmelman 1996). 
 
A model premised on plea bargaining as a contractual exchange of concessions in which 
the defendant is viewed as an autonomous agent who has the right to ‘sell’ his entitlement 
to trial in an agreement regulated along contractual principles has a more obvious 
applicability than a consensual model, and Scott and Stuntz (1992a, 1992b) convincingly 
argue that it could provide for a more equitable system of plea bargaining if the process 
were to be conceived of along contractual, not rights based, lines. The problem will always 
remain though, that a defendant in a criminal case does not have the same freedom to 
contract as an individual contracting in the civil law; he has no choice but to enter into a 
contract (which may or may not be advantageous to him or her), or accept the risk of a 
conviction at trial, and the more severe penalty which would accompany it; highlighted by 
Vogel’s conception of dualistic liberty in which the defendant is still constrained by his 
position, despite formally having choices (2007).  
 
There is no one single model, perception or conceptualisation of plea bargaining which can 
be applied universally. As Feeley writes: 
 
‘Because it has come to explain so much, plea bargaining is in danger of explaining 
too little. Because the concept is so inclusive and refers to such a subtlety of 
practices, important differences, subtle variations, degrees of magnitude, and 
functional equivalents are in danger of being obscured. People plead guilty for a 
variety of reasons’ (1979, p.199). 
 
The process is expansive, varied, and nuanced but above all, its effect in a case will 
invariably be linked to the defendant’s personal preferences and decision making processes, 
and whilst this thesis has been able to put forward evidence and propose conclusions as to 
the nature of plea bargaining, individuals’ preferences necessarily mean that systemic 
models will not apply in all cases. It is nonetheless hoped that this thesis has been able to 
draw out some of the ‘subtle variations, degrees of magnitude and functional equivalents’ 
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(Feeley 1979, p.199, cited above) of plea bargaining in its sample, in a way which makes a 
contribution to the existing understanding of plea bargaining.  
 
This thesis has shown that there is a pressing need for the use of plea bargaining to be 
reappraised in an open and honest fashion if the ‘problem’ of the cracked trial is to be dealt 
with effectively. This may not be synonymous with a reduction in cracked trials, it is 
possible that they are the inevitable result of equally inevitable last minute plea bargaining 
and that measures to reduce them are alternately futile, or would require increasing 
inducements to plead guilty early to such an extent that undue pressures would undoubtedly 
be brought to bear on defendants. Plea bargaining may well be unique in its position as a 
legal process which has come to dominate court dispositions, become effectively 
formalised by statute and case law, yet still not be acknowledged by policy. The recent 
introduction of the Attorney-General’s proposals for a system of ‘plea negotiation’ in 
serious fraud trials suggests that plea ‘bargaining’ may slowly be coming into the open. If 
this is the case, increased transparency in plea bargaining is to be welcomed, and its pivotal 
role in cracked trials can be explored further.  
 
However, given the predominantly crime control orientated policies pursued in recent 
years, it seems likely that defendants will continue to face increasing inducements to plead 
guilty, and to cooperate with the prosecution, in order to avoid suffering the penalties of 
invoking their basic rights to put the prosecution to proof. This is, in part, what successive 
governments have perceived a punitive electorate to demand, and it also allows efficiency 
driven targets which view trials as unnecessary expenditure to be met. Moreover, both the 
punitive and efficiency aims can be thinly masked behind policies which claim to rebalance 
the system in favour of victims, as set out by Justice for All (2002). Yet the resulting policies 
operate within system of widespread plea bargaining and cracked trials in which neither 
defendants, victims nor the state appear to benefit to any great degree. The criminal justice 
system is structured in such a way that defendants face multiple inducements to plead 
guilty, and funding cuts in legal aid which impact upon the quality of representation 
exacerbate the problem. By far the majority of the inducements come to the fore at a very 
late stage in the pre-trial process though, with the consequence that considerable resources 
have already been expended, and the pressures placed upon a defendant will have done 
little to reduce the inevitable uncertainty or distress which may be felt by witnesses and 
victims. The result of failing to engage fully with the role of plea bargaining is that the state 
is left with the ‘problem’ of the late cracked trial, the defendant’s right to trial is negotiated 
away by lawyers, with few safeguards against coercion, victims are frustrated, and the 
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electorate read newspaper headlines about criminals getting off lightly as a result of 
secretive ‘deals’. It seems evident that the introduction of plea bargaining in cases of 
serious fraud and other serious and organised crime needs to become a catalyst for a 
reappraisal of its role in the criminal justice system as a whole for any of these problems to 
be remedied. 
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APPENDIX  A 
 
Data Collection Form 
 
CPS FILE 
CASE / COURT DETAILS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
URN  
CMS  
T  
CPS Unit  
Mags court  
Police Station  
 
 
 
DEFENDANT / OFFENCE DATA 
 
Name…………………………...                       
 
Address:……………………….. 
……………………………………… 
……………………………………… 
……………………………………… 
……………………………………… 
 
Ethnicity 
White European  
Dark European  
Afro-Caribbean  
Asian  
 
Indictment 
Count¹ Initial Plea Outcome² Sentence 
1.                            
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.    
6.    
7.    
8.    
Minshull Street  
Crown Square  
 
Effective  
Cracked  
Ineffective  
 
Finalisation type  
C4  
C6  
 
Finalisation detail 
G2   
G3  
G4  
Undefined  
 
DOB..…/……/……. 
 
M F 
Arab  
Oriental  
Unknown  
  
 
Outcome 
Guilty plea  
Conviction after trial  
Jury acquittal  
Judge directed acquittal  
Indictment stayed  
Lie on file  
Discontinued  
Offered no evidence  
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¹ Original or amended? ² Conviction after trial / Guilty Plea / Acquittal / Offered no 
evidence / Lie on file / Discontinued 
 
Facts of case 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Chronology 
Date of offence  
Date of arrest  
Date of charge  
Date listed for trial  
Date finalised  
 
Employment [at time of offence] 
Full-time employment  
Part-time employment  
Self-employed  
Unemployed  
Student  
Retired  
Unknown  
 
PLEA CHANGE INFO (if applicable) 
 
Cracked at pre-trial 
hearing 
 
Cracked first day of 
trial 
 
 
Cracked during trial 
[after which point?] 
 
 
Circumstances of plea change  
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………           
 
Written basis of plea?  
YES NO 
 
Further details 
.................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Bail status 
Remanded in custody  
Conditional bail  
Unconditional bail  
 
Sentence Indication 
Was a sentence indication provided?  
Was a guilty plea entered as a 
result?  
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LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
 
Date Hearing Prosecuting Counsel Defence Counsel 
               
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
Meetings with defence solicitor/counsel 
…………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………….             No details in file 
………………………………………………………….       
…………………………………………………………. 
 
Defence solicitor…………………………………… 
 
Police station representation? 
YES NO 
 
Legal Representative  
Solicitor  
 
 
Interview duration: 
1…………………..2……………….3……………….. 
 
PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS 
 
Date first convicted………………                           Total No. Previous  
Date last convicted………………. 
 
Offence type Dates Number Plea 
Theft & kindred offences    
Offences against person    
Offences against property    
Drugs    
Firearms/Offensive 
weapons 
   
Sexual    
Police/Courts/Prisons    
Public Disorder    
Driving    
Non-recordable    
Misc.    
Other:    
 
Interventions during police interviews? 
YES NO 
 
No Comment Interview? 
YES NO 
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PROSECUTION EVIDENCE 
 
Evidence type No. 
Expert witness statements  
Police witness statements  
Civilian witness statements  
Police witnesses to alleged incident  
Civilian witnesses to alleged incident  
DNA  
CCTV  
Fingerprints  
Identification  
Admissions  
Physical evidence recovered  
App. to adduce bad character evidence   
Other:  
 
NATURE OF DEFENCE 
 
n/a   
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
COMMENTS 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX B 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
 
The questions below provide an outline of the issues which were, where possible, 
addressed in each interview. The interviews were semi-structured and differed in length and 
nature, although all took the form of conversations (see Chapter 2 for further details of the 
methods used).  
 
Court administrators 
- How do cracked trials affect your work? 
- To what extent do cracked trials present a problem for the court? 
- Have measures been put in place to reduce the number of cracked trials, if so, have 
they been effective? 
- What do you think are the main causes of cracked trials? 
- What do you think are the main causes of cracked trials caused by late guilty pleas? 
- In your experience, do any particular types of offences more often result in cracked 
trials? 
- How great a role do you think lawyers (prosecution and defence) play in cracked 
trials? What is the nature of that role?   
- Do you think that the [graduated] sentence discount / Goodyear indications 
have/will reduce the number of cracked trials? 
- [If plea bargaining/negotiation mentioned by interviewee] Do you feel that plea 
bargaining creates pressure on defendants? / Allows defendants to ‘get off lightly’? 
 
Barristers and Solicitor 
As above, with additional questions: 
- What impact do you feel your advice has on defendants when they consider their 
plea? 
 
Judges 
As Court administrators, but with greater emphasis on the sentence discount and Goodyear 
indications.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Methods not appropriate to this study: questionnaires, observation and focus 
groups. 
 
Questionnaires, participant observation and focus groups are three major methods with 
potential application in a study of this kind, but which were inappropriate for this particular 
study, either for practical or methodological reasons. 
 
Questionnaires 
 
There is some research on plea bargaining in the UK which has employed heavily 
structured questionnaires to collect data. Seifman’s (1980) study comprised of two parts; 
the first of which consisted of standardised questionnaires administered to a random group 
of 200 convicted prisoners. The questionnaires asked about influences on plea and 
bargaining practices at various stages of case disposition. The second element of the 
research was interviews with the prisoners’ lawyers regarding the process of plea formation, 
their influence upon the client’s decision to plead, and opinions on plea bargaining in 
general. Structured questionnaires were also used by Zander and Henderson’s Crown 
Court study (1994), carried out for 1993 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice. As such, it 
had vast scale and scope, and data from over 3500 cases was analysed; however, the study 
considered cracked trials only as a small part of what was researched and the discussion of 
cracked trials was limited primarily to the extent to which they waste resources, rather than 
their causes.151  
 
Structured interviews or questionnaires, particularly if they make use of Likert-style attitude 
scales or other easily codifiable response options have some advantages over less structured 
methods in that the data is easy to manage, reliable and can be translated into clear statistics 
without difficulty. Standardised questionnaires or heavily structured interviews were 
however not suited to the aims of this study which, given the scarcity and inconsistency of 
previous findings, is largely exploratory in nature and seeks to consider a range of issues in 
depth rather than to present a large body of generalisable quantitative data.   
 
                                                 
151 Zander and Henderson have been criticised for taking a ‘stubbornly atheoretical’ 
approach with little attempt made at assessment or criticism (Baldwin 2000, p.241). The 
study’s findings on cracked trial rates also suffered from a low response rate.  
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Participant observation 
 
Another approach which has previously been taken when researching courts and lawyers is 
to use observational methods. McCabe and Purves (1972) examined 90 cases involving a 
total of 112 defendants who were due to be tried but changed their plea to guilty at a late 
stage in the court proceedings. The authors do not explicitly outline their methods, but 
seem to have observed the court cases of their sample, as well as examining police and 
court documents. What appear to be informal conversations with police and lawyers on 
specific cases are also mentioned. Similar methods were employed by Bottoms and 
McClean (1976), who analysed five key decision-making stages of criminal cases – the first 
of these being plea, and combined interviews with their own observations of the court 
process. More recently, Standing Accused (McConville et al., 1994) observed the working 
practices of 22 firms of solicitors over a total period of three years.152   
 
The benefit of using observational methods to research the causes and features of cracked 
trials would be that, if interactions between defendants and lawyers could be observed, it 
would be a very rich source of data, and one which would be unencumbered by 
participants’ imperfect or one-sided recollections or records of events. Baldwin writes that 
‘no researcher got closer to what happens in pre-trial stages’ than McConville et al in 
Standing Accused and that ‘although direct observation of this kind is a time-consuming (and 
therefore expensive) exercise and one that is far from free from methodological problems 
of its own, the study nonetheless revealed much more about solicitor-client interactions 
that simply could not have been discovered by other methods’ (Baldwin, 2000, p.248).  
 
This notwithstanding, an observational study would not be suited to this piece of research. 
As Baldwin also points out, court observation can be ‘deceptively straightforward’ in the 
sense that, whilst sitting in a courtroom and observing events is, on the surface, a simple 
means of gathering data, it can be extremely time consuming and he refers to the ‘lengthy 
periods of unrelenting tedium’ it entails (2000, p. 245). Whilst avoiding unrelenting tedium 
is a concern, the more important consideration is that a doctoral thesis must be feasible 
within a relatively short timeframe and observational studies can require a great deal of 
investment in terms of time, particularly if all the work is being carried out by one novice 
researcher. There is no specific time at which plea discussions take place, and much of a 
lawyer’s work (even once at court with the client) may be unrelated to plea; these other 
                                                 
152 An average of six and a half weeks were spent at each firm, and the researchers also 
carried out interviews and examined case files.  
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aspects would also have to be observed. By contrast, interviews or questionnaires make it 
possible to focus on the relevant issue throughout. 
 
More significantly, court observation only allows the researcher to see the ‘public face of 
justice’ (Baldwin 2000, p. 245) and a vast range of significant decisions are taken outside 
formal court hearings. This is undoubtedly applicable to negotiated pleas or decisions to 
plead guilty which by their very nature are informal or personal respectively and do not 
take place in open court. Even if one leaves aside negotiated pleas and considers cracked 
trials more generally, the essence of a cracked trial is that, at the start of (usually) the first 
day listed for trial, the defendant expresses an intention to plead guilty; the focus of this 
study has therefore already ‘happened’ by the time the case gets inside a  courtroom. Given 
that one aspect of this research is the nature of the legal advice given to defendants whose 
cases crack, then the rushed, almost ad-hoc meetings between counsel, the instructing 
solicitor and the defendant at the court building would not readily lend themselves to 
observation.  
 
A related problem experienced by Bridges and Choongh (1998) whilst researching the 
impact of the accreditation scheme for police station legal advisors, was that some lawyers 
were concerned that the researchers would not be covered by professional privilege, 
meaning that private consultations observed between solicitor and client, if observed by a 
third party, could potentially be required to be disclosed in court. This indicates the 
heightened concerns both lawyers and their clients may have regarding confidentiality if 
they are to be observed at what, for defendants, is likely to be a stressful time. Bridges and 
Choongh (1998, p. 87) also highlight the difficulty in conducting an observational study in a 
way which leads to meaningful, generalisable results. They proposed a ‘checklist 
methodology’ to record occasions when legal advisors were observed to comply (or 
otherwise) with the relevant guidelines, but were aware of the limitations of this methods in 
terms of its inflexibility in the sense that observations could only be recorded within the 
framework of the structured checklist; thus denying the method of some of its potential 
benefits. In the context of research into cracked trials and negotiated pleas, such a method 
would be inappropriate given the lack of guidelines with which actual conduct can be 
compared.  
 
Overall, observation would have been an inappropriate method to use; the potential depth 
of the data which is its main advantage would be negated by the fact that it would be 
extremely difficult to observe the relevant interactions, particularly within the practical 
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constraints of a doctoral thesis. 
 
Focus groups 
 
Though focus groups have not been used by any of the previous research, they could have 
potential benefits in a study of this kind as they are relatively inexpensive to conduct in 
comparison to conducting all the interviews individually, can often produce rich data, and 
have a flexible format. A significant disadvantage is that the results are often even less 
readily analysable than those of other unstructured methods. Group dynamics and the way 
the discussion progresses can result in there being few similarities between the structure of 
the group interviews, making it difficult to draw comparisons between groups; on a more 
practical level, it can be difficult to distinguish between participants’ voices on recordings. 
Furthermore, the emerging group culture can override individual views and an inaccurate 
group consensus is a potential risk (Fontana and Frey 2000, p. 652). As only a relatively 
small number of interviews were carried out, and individual legal professionals’ views are of 
no less interest than those views expressed in a group setting, focus groups would not have 
added anything significant to the study. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Court Service Data 
 
In addition to the quantitative data recorded from case files, I obtained a data set 
containing raw data on 150,000 counts heard between 2002 and 2006 at Manchester 
Minshull Street, Manchester Crown Square, Liverpool, Leeds and Birmingham Crown 
courts compiled for me by the Court Service Information Management and Analysis 
Group. The data set contains detailed information about the recorded reason for the trial 
being cracked or ineffective, charges, pleas, whether these pleas were acceptable at the first, 
or a later offering, verdicts, and dates of each case, and whilst, unlike the CPS files, not 
having the benefit of contextual data, would potentially have been a very informative 
dataset to analyse statistically. Unfortunately, there were several structural hurdles to 
overcome within the dataset, in order to allow it to generate meaningful results about 
cracked trials.  Despite months of attempts, exhausting the University of Manchester’s 
SPSS support facilities, and enlisting the help of a statistician at the University, it was not 
feasible to overcome these technical issues within the timeframe of this study (indeed it is 
unclear whether or not the problems can be overcome at all). It is hoped that the dataset 
can be analysed at a later date, and could produce results to address the following types of 
questions: 
 
(i)       Which types of case are more likely to crack: 
     - with pleas of guilty to the original indictment; 
     - with pleas of guilty to lesser or fewer charges; 
   - as a result of the prosecution offering no evidence? 
(ii)      Which types of cases are more likely to have offers of guilty pleas accepted
  by the prosecution the first time they are offered, and which are more likely 
  to crack after the second time a guilty plea is offered? 
(iii) What is the extent of regional fluctuations in different types of cracked trial? 
(iv) What is the extent of seasonal fluctuations in different types of cracked 
trial? 
 
The data collected from case files has produced some indications which are useful in 
exploring these questions, but quantitatively, the larger dataset would be able to generate 
more generalisable statistics. If this data can be analysed it would also be possible to make 
comparisons between the quantitative results of the case file dataset with that of this much 
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larger, but less contextual, dataset. 
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